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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Public transportation is a vital service aimed at accommodating the travel needs of those
without easy access to private automobiles, and at maintaining the quality of life in most
urban areas of the United States. Public transit agencies in the U.S. have been challenged
to provide cost-effective service in the face of both declining state and federal aid. Declines
in population, jobs, and business in inner cities have also caused significant losses in the
tax bases, and make it financially more difficult for public agencies to provide transit service
in these areas where more residents depend on public transit for their mobility. At the same
time, continuous trends in suburbanization of jobs and housing have also been increasingly
making travel patterns of residents and workers more complex over the past decades,
requiring them to travel across multiple jurisdictions. Particularly, the need that transit riders
have to be able to travel across a metropolitan area demands better regional coordination
to accommodate trips using multiple transit systems.
This study examines two hypotheses pertinent to the possibility of improving efficiency and
effectiveness of regional transit service through privatization. Specifically, in the empirical
research, the following two hypotheses are examined: given carefully designed contractual
terms, (1) privatization leads to more cost efficient and effective provision of transit service
to the public, and (2) privatization improves regional coordination of transit services through
internal coordination, when one private contractor is contracted by multiple districts. Of
particular interest regarding the first hypothesis is the effects of “delegated management”
contract implemented by New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA), which transfers more
responsibility in management, planning, and financial responsibilities as well as operation
and maintenance to a contractor than contracts prevalently used in the U.S. In addition, the
unique circumstances in Greater New Orleans, where two transit agencies—New Orleans
RTA in Orleans Parish and Jefferson Transit (JeT) in Jefferson Parish—contracted with the
same multinational firm, Veolia, to provide transit service, made it possible to address this
second hypothesis.

Literature Review
This study’s literature review covered two subject areas: (1) transit service privatization
and its effects on productivity, and (2) regional coordination of transit service. The transit
contracting literature addresses various issues ranging from different forms of competition
and ownership issues to economic issues; from labor issues to passengers’ experience
(Thredbo 2010).
In the United States, public transit agencies have been more conservative in terms of both
the levels and forms of privatization than the United Kingdom, other European countries,
and Australia. Outsourcing is usually limited to operation, maintenance, and occasionally
limited planning functions.
Two categories of transit service contracts—cost-plus and fixed-price—are discussed in
some detail regarding compensation, associated incentives for contractors, transactions
Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e
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costs, and risks that agencies must be aware of. Performance-based contracts may be
of either type, but include specific incentives for achieving service quality goals set by the
transit agency. Several important issues that significantly influence outcome of service
contracting are discussed, including competitive bidding and negotiation of contracts, in
order to set the basis to evaluate contractual terms in the case study.
This study’s review of the literature regarding the effects of contracting in past studies
reveals that there remains a mixture of findings on this subject, as different countries
exhibit different experiences in transit service privatization, reflecting large variances in
the amount of experience in public service privatization and conditions in transit policies,
regulations, transit and labor markets, operation and management, operating environment,
and overall travel behaviors of the population in different countries. Regarding the U.K.,
many experts believe that London’s tendering schemes have been more successful in
gaining ridership and improving productivity than the fully deregulated systems elsewhere
in the country (Karlaftis 2006; White 1990, 1997). Although tendering transit service has
had favorable-enough results in Western Europe, not all European nations have been
equally successful at achieving both cost savings and policy goals, underscoring the
importance of contract provisions and awarding procedures.
Most quantitative studies of U.S. transit contracting are more mixed on whether, and
to what extent, cost-efficiency and/or cost-effectiveness are realized. In contrast,
qualitative studies on transit contracting discuss the higher complexity of decision making
for contracting and of its outcomes; agencies are influenced by political, social, and
institutional forces, and by levels of knowledge and experience regarding contracting,
as well as by economic incentives (Berechman 1993; Iseki 2008; Richmond 2001; Sclar
2000). Whether or not contracting is more cost effective than public provision of transit
is an empirical question. The specific provisions of the contract and the manner in which
it is awarded (through a competitive bidding process or through straight negotiation) can
directly influence the cost-effectiveness of transit services.
The studies of transit contracting focus on the productivity and effectiveness of transit
service by contractors in individual transit systems, but do not address the implications
of contracting on regional coordination. In fact, the importance of regional coordination
has been well recognized by researchers and practitioners (Meyer et al. 2005; Miller
et al. 2005; Pucher and Kurth 1989), providing broad definition of regional coordination
and integration. However, relatively little research has been conducted on methods and
criteria for measuring and evaluating regional coordination and integration using concrete
indices and indicators. A common set of indicators in three categories emerged from
careful examination of scholarly articles and reports on the subject of regional coordination
and integration:
1. Operational/managerial coordination,
2. Organizational/institutional coordination, and
3. Financial/institutional coordination.
Operational/managerial coordination indicators directly influence a transit user’s experience
in a transit system and their perceptions toward the quality of service of the system. This
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category of indicators includes coordination of general operations such as schedules, fares,
and facilities. The second category, organizational/institutional involves the coordination
at the level of transit administration. This type of coordination includes such indicators as
coordinated goals and policies, centralized administration, and information sharing. The
last category, financial/institutional, is generally only practiced in highly coordinated regions
and involves the coordination or sharing of financial resources for common goals. This
category includes measures such as joint funding arrangements and joint procurement
of equipment. Based on these three categories, a set of regional coordination indices/
indicators were developed to evaluate the level of regional coordination in the New Orleans
region as well as other regions in the U.S. in this empirical study.

Empirical Study: The Effects of Transit Contracting on Service Provision
and Regional Coordination
Two jurisdictions in the case study—RTA in the city of New Orleans, which is coterminous
with Orleans Parish, and JeT in Jefferson Parish, composed of several suburban cities
outside New Orleans—exhibit very different economic and social conditions that influence
the provision of transit service. Both parishes were impacted by Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
which intensified the decline in population since the 1960s and economic stagnation, and
also exacerbated social problems. At the same time, the two parishes—Jefferson and
Orleans—have very different economic and demographic profiles. Residents of suburban
Jefferson Parish have much higher incomes, longer commute times, and use public
transportation less than Orleans Parish residents. Within these settings, JeT operates
a much smaller transit system with a much smaller budget than does RTA, but serves a
much larger area with fewer routes, while RTA faces the challenge of suburbanization and
“job sprawl,” in which employers are locating in suburban areas. Under these conditions,
RTA and JeT currently outsource transit service, but have approached contracting in very
different ways in terms of roles and responsibilities that are transferred from the transit
agency to a private contractor. RTA made a “delegated management” contract with a
multinational company, Veolia, to transfer a wide range of responsibilities. This decision
has created the necessity for a less rigid, more financially complicated contract. In contrast,
JeT’s contract is a typical of many transit service contracts in the U.S., outsourcing only
operation and maintenance functions to Veolia. It has placed a great deal of emphasis on
quality control and customer service to ensure that standards will continue to be met while
Veolia is discovering new ways to efficiently cut the costs of bus operation. As for RTA, a
desire to reorganize the structure and effectiveness of the transit system while decreasing
the previously high operating costs is reflected throughout the contract.
Survey data of 461 transit users were analyzed using Importance-Satisfaction (IS) analysis
and statistical analysis to observe how the riding public perceive the quality of transit
service provided under the two different types of contracts in the RTA and JeT transit
systems. Although both RTA and JeT transit riders surveyed consider overall ease of making
transfers and connections and reliability of service important, they differed significantly in
their importance ratings of eight of the 17 attributes in the study’s survey, most notably in
the importance of being able to obtain information about JeT routes and schedules. JeT
riders not only ranked JeT information higher than RTA riders—in sixth place, they ranked
the importance of being able to obtain RTA information even higher—in third place.
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RTA and JeT riders differed even more regarding satisfaction levels. While RTA riders
list two access-related attributes, JeT riders place three regional coordination-related
attributes in the top six. Both groups of riders are well-satisfied with access-related
attributes, but are concerned with a lack of sitting space, waiting time, and safety at night.
There were only three attributes for which there was no statistically significant difference
between the two agencies, and only one attribute (ease of getting around the bus stop/
station) for which RTA riders expressed slightly higher satisfaction than JeT riders, and
that difference was not statistically significant. The average percentage of people who are
relatively satisfied for all attributes for 61.5 percent among RTA riders, compared to JeT
riders’ 75.1 percent, indicating RTA riders are less happy about the quality of transit service
than JeT riders, and that RTA/Veolia continues to face challenges regarding customer
satisfaction. As both RTA and JeT riders rank regional coordination-related attributes in
the middle range, and in the same order, these two agencies can address improvements
with a similar priority.
This study also evaluates the performance of RTA and JeT under different contracts
over time, and examines each agency’s financial and operating data, such as operating
expenses, quantity of service provided, level of consumption of transit service, and
several performance indicators for efficiency and effectiveness. While both RTA and
JeT experienced losses in productivity in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, they show different performance trends from 2006 to 2009. Overall, JeT has
not seen dramatic changes over the four year period, while RTA has made significant
improvements in several areas that could be attributed to the significant restructuring of
RTA transit service management and operation under the RTA/Veolia contract beginning
in late 2008.
Although streetcar gains in revenue hours and mileage, passenger trips, fare revenue,
and operating cost efficiency are accompanied by losses by buses through 2008 (while
streetcar lines were being restored, and pre-Veolia management), RTA buses made gains
in revenue miles and hours, trips per capita, cost efficiency, cost per passenger trip, and
farebox recovery ratio (Figure 1) in 2009—despite this being the first complete year of fully
restored streetcar lines. These improvements could be attributed to various adjustments in
operation, such as bus realignment, rescheduling, or reallocation of vehicles, implemented
under the new management by Veolia. These gains in the bus system are accompanied
by a considerable loss of cost efficiency in RTA streetcar operation in 2009 compared
to 2008, although streetcars keep higher effectiveness, in terms of ridership per vehicle
mile and hour, than buses. This loss in cost efficiency for streetcars can be attributed to a
significant increase in operating costs, which may be due to the higher platform-hour rate
charged by Veolia for better management—for example, increasing supervisors on the
routes to maintain even intervals between streetcars. As a whole, RTA/Veolia improved
the overall efficiency in providing transit service, since the gains made by RTA buses were
sufficient to offset the declines in streetcar efficiency.
In the analysis of responses to questionnaires and interviews collected from directors
and planners at RTA, JeT, and New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (RPC) in
comparison to data from the nationwide survey of transit agencies on regional coordination
indicators, the current coordination of transit service in the Greater New Orleans region

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Executive Summary

5

is found limited and less advanced than transit coordination in most of the agencies
responded to the nationwide survey.

Figure 1. Farebox Recovery Ratios for RTA and JeT, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009
Table 1 summarizes Greater New Orleans’ level of achievement in each indicator of
regional coordination, along with the percentages of agencies that provided positive
responses in the survey. Responses to the questionnaire revealed the premature level of
regional coordination of transit service in Greater New Orleans. Out of 17 indices, Greater
New Orleans has a fully positive response for only three: (1) the availability of transit fare
media in the other agency’s service area, (2) joint provision of information, and (3) sharing
facilities. Also, some level of coordination exists in terms of transfer points and discussion
of possibly locating and designing facilities to better accommodate transfers, although the
questionnaire responses are not consistent between all three agencies. The inconsistency
of responses exhibits the different understanding of current conditions on the part of each
agency, and their different perspectives regarding transit service coordination. In other
categories, RTA and JeT are falling behind the national trend, apart from some unofficial
coordination of vehicle scheduling being conducted through a private channel within Veolia.
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Table 1. Responses to the Questionnaire on Regional Coordination of Transit
Service in the Greater New Orleans Region
(1) Well achieved in Greater New Orleans
Nationwide
Availability of passes, tickets, or tokens in the other transit area’s service
55%
area
Joint provision of information on transit service
75%
Sharing facilities (e.g., terminal, shelter, park & ride lot)
69%
(2) Partially achieved in Greater New Orleans
Special discount program with other public or private entities
64%
Clearly designated transfer points
74%
Discussion of possibly locating and designing facilities to better
43%
accomodate transfers
(3) Not achieved in Greater New Orleans
A coordinated regional fare system
52%
Passes, tickets, tokens or transfers usable in the other transit system
54%
Free or discounted transfer from the other transit system
63%
Consideration of the other transit system’s service availability in service
70%
scheduling
Coordination in time scheduling to accomodate transfers
68%
Real-time information for operation (e.g., AVL) shared between the two
6%
transit systems
Other various agreements, such as joint training for employees
9–29%
Overall, although there is a certain expectation of regional coordination both between
RTA and JeT, and through the internal channel of Veolia, many of the testimonies often
lack concrete plans for funding and implementation of regional coordination in followup interviews with the survey respondents from RTA, JeT, and RPC. Some discussion
of increased cooperation that were repeatedly mentioned, and, therefore, could be
candidates for formal implementation include: (1) installing a shared facility in Orleans
Parish, (2) jointly working on vehicle scheduling to provide seamless travel to transit
riders, and (3) discussing the potential for revisiting fare media sharing programs.
This study also identified several obstacles to public agencies in the region moving
forward. One of the most serious concerns is political representation: an assurance of
equal representation on any board or decision-making body is essential—in particular,
from the perspective of Jefferson Transit, which is a smaller agency in the suburbs.
Another serious concern is financial: there has to be a strong justification and solid
assurance for JeT that any coordinating efforts for transit service are beneficial to the
parish’s taxpayers and transit riders, since parish residents pay a dedicated property
tax for transit service. Regarding this point, the mechanism for revenue allocation within
any fare media sharing policy has to be transparent and fair, so that both agencies can
agree on their share of proceeds. These political and financial issues are major barriers
to regional coordination, consistent with past studies on geographic equity and adoption
of new technologies among multiple public agencies. At this point, these concerns on
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the part of the public agencies certainly override any economic incentive that the private
contractor both agencies may have.
In summary, the presence of Veolia as a single provider to two separate parishes has
increased optimism about the improvement of regional coordination. However, uncertainty
and hesitation remain, primarily with respect to political structure, financial concerns, and
the role of metropolitan planning organization, which need to be addressed and resolved
before attempts at further coordination could successfully move ahead.

Nationwide Regional Coordination Survey
A nationwide survey was developed, based on the indicators of regional coordination found
in the literature review, to gauge the present status of regional coordination among U.S.
transit agencies in support of the case study of New Orleans transit service. Among 590
transit agencies with fixed-route transit service in the U.S., 202 responded, representing
agencies in 45 states. The results of the survey indicate that while regional coordination is
commonplace throughout the country, there are still many regions with very low levels of
coordination. Transit agency executives offered a number of reasons why they thought this
is the case, including local funding requirements and political, institutional, and financial
barriers.

Conclusion
This study found some positive indications of effects the RTA/Veolia delegated management
contract may be having on the efficiency and effectiveness of transit service in the RTA
transit system and regional coordination in Greater New Orleans, based on the analysis of
RTA performance indicators and on interviews. However, the analysis of transit user surveys
showed that transit riders are still generally less satisfied with the quality of RTA’s service—
in particular with those attributes related to regional coordination—than with JeT’s, and that
few RTA riders have noticed substantial positive changes in service quality. The analysis
of information from the questionnaire and the nationwide survey regarding regional survey
also revealed very limited efforts being made toward coordination in Greater New Orleans
compared to the nation average, despite some optimism expressed by the interviewees,
and an official report prepared by RPC. Political concerns between the two transit agencies
arising mainly from financial issues, such as the distribution of local tax revenue, allocation
of revenue from regional fare program, and costs of new technologies, are so substantial
that these constraints prevent the agencies from moving forward with coordination. A
relatively simple contract between JeT and Veolia does not allow Veolia much autonomy
outside of operation and maintenance, and JeT generally has greater reservations toward
coordination than RTA. In this situation, it seems important that RTA/Veolia find ways to
improve regional coordination within its system without incurring substantial costs that
offset the benefits, so that it can gain cooperation from JeT in future. Certainly, RPC can
have an important role in bridging gaps between the two transit agencies.
Despite these findings, drawing more definitive conclusions presented substantial difficulty
because of the limited amount of available operation and financial data—due to both a
short period of analysis following the execution of the contract, and a variable level of
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cooperation on the part of RTA. Further analysis will be required to more thoroughly
evaluate the performance of the effects of the delegated-management contract between
RTA and Veolia over the next several years. For example, one should carefully examine
whether Veolia can reverse 2009 declines in streetcar efficiency and increases in operating
costs within its significant involvement in planning streetcar expansions. A future study
might also explore the prospect of Veolia developing a regional transit monopoly with the
execution of its contract to provide demand-response service to a third transit agency in
Southeast Louisiana (River Parishes Transit Authority) in February, 2009, as well as how
that may further influence regional coordination.
The findings of this multifaceted study should provide valuable information on a transit
service contracting approach new to the U.S.—delegated management. This study also
identified a coherent set of indices with which to evaluate the regional coordination of
transit service, the present status of coordination among U.S. transit agencies, and
barriers that need to be resolved for regional transit coordination to be successful.
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Public transportation is a vital service aimed at accommodating the travel needs of those
without easy access to private automobiles, and at maintaining the quality of life in most
United States urban areas. Households with annual incomes of less than $20,000 are at
least five times more likely to be carless and three times more likely to take their trips by
public transportation than higher-income households (Pucher and Renne 2001). For local
public officials, few services are as fiscally challenging to provide as public transportation,
especially in the face of both declining state and federal aid. One of the most important, and
certainly the most hotly debated, strategies for cost-effective provision of transit service is
privatization. In the early 1980s, facing limited funding for transit service, continuous demand
from transit dependents, and political circumstances leading to transit budget cuts, some
state and local transit agencies began to contract out their services in order to increase
productivity and cost efficiency. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Chile and Sri
Lanka, experimented with the privatization of transit in the 1970s and 1980s. In most cities,
this often entailed the breakup of state-run companies and the sale of entire fleets to the
private sector.
U.S. public transit agencies spend a significant amount of public funding to purchase transit
service from private firms or other public agencies. In 2008, 37 percent of U.S. transit
agencies that provided fixed-route bus transit services contracted out at least some of their
service (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Proportion of Agencies Operating on Different Levels of Contracted Bus
Service by Year (1992–2008)
Source: The authors’ calculation based on National Transit Database (Federal Transit Administration 2010)
Note: Dollar amounts are adjusted to 2008 dollars using U.S. consumer price indices available on the website of the U.S.
Department of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.

Analysis of data from the National Transit Database (NTD) shows the total amount spent on
contracted fixed route transit reached $3.1 billion in 2008 (or 10.1 percent of total operating
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expenses of $30.7 billion). Focusing on fixed-route bus service, the total amount spent
on contracted service in the United States reached $2.0 billion (or 11.1 percent of total
operating expenses for bus service) in 2008 (Figure 3). Over the 16 year period from 1992
to 2008, total bus mode expenses for contracted bus service increased by 104 percent,
from $914 million (2008 dollars) in 1992 (Federal Transit Administration 2010). The total
amount spent on contracted bus service over the same period reached approximately
$20 billion (2006 dollars) (American Public Transportation Association 2009). Thus,
contracted service makes up a significant portion of all transit provided and funding spent
in the United States, and plays an important role in providing mobility to the American
public.

Figure 3. Total Modal Expense for Contracted Bus Service by Year (1992–2008)
Source: The authors’ calculation based on National Transit Database (Federal Transit Administration 2010)
Note: Dollar amounts are adjusted to 2008 dollars using U.S. consumer price indices available on the website of the
U.S. Department of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.

Despite its importance, the literature on the effects of contracting on the quality and
productivity of transit service has been limited in the United States. Most research on U.S.
transit contracting is still inconclusive, due to problems with the nature and methodology
of those studies over the past decade. In the 1980s and early 1990s, most U.S. studies
focused on examinations of cost savings resulting from contracted service, but there
are only a limited number of studies that have examined the level of contracting practice
for providing fixed-route service (Halvorson and Wilson 1996; Teal 1985). These studies
collectively show savings estimates on the order of ten to forty percent per unit of
contracted service (e.g., per vehicle mile, per vehicle hour), in comparison to in-house
(or directly provided) service.1 Among U.S. studies, only three cases—the Denver case
reported by Sclar (1997), the Westchester County case described by Teal (1991a), and
a cross-sectional study by McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs (1998)—show private service
costs higher than public service costs.
1 For example, Peskin, Mundle, and Varma (1993); Karlaftis, Wasson, and Steadham (1997); Teal (Evans
1988; Teal 1991b); and Nicosia (2002). For a more comprehensive review of these studies, see Iseki
(2004).
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At the same time, continuous suburbanization and subsequent declines in population,
employment, and business in inner cities of the United States have resulted in significant
losses to their tax bases while suburban city tax bases remain steady or even grow, limiting
inner cities’ ability to adequately fund public transit services. As a result, more transit
dependents (whose mobility depends on public transit due to limited access to private
automobiles) remain in inner cities, creating a situation that makes regional coordination of
transit service even more difficult for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of transit
service is largely driven by the motive of ensuring geographic equity—i.e. allocating transit
services based on a jurisdiction’s contribution to transit funds for the region. This poses
a challenge because while affluent suburbs may contribute more to public transportation
services, residents of these suburbs do not ride transit as much as those who live in inner
cities, where transit is more cost-effective due to high densities and concentrated activities.
The allocation of transit funds to these suburban areas, therefore, reduces the overall cost
effectiveness of transit for the region. Second, individual transit agencies focus on services
within their own jurisdictions, and do not effectively address the needs of transit users who
travel across different systems. Third, making general service improvements, conducting
marketing, providing customer service, and adopting new technologies (such as smart
cards, automated vehicle location systems, or next vehicle arrival notification systems) is
also difficult, because individual agencies have different levels of needs and priorities in
their use of funding (Yoh, Iseki, and Taylor 2008). Thus, political and administrative issues
among public transit agencies often make regional coordination very difficult to achieve,
posing significant challenges to agencies charged with improving transportation for transit
dependents.
During the economic downturn, local governments in the Greater New Orleans region
have continued to struggle to provide public services. For example, the provision of public
transportation has been particularly difficult in the city of New Orleans, which initially lost
more than half its population and 236 public transit vehicles (205 buses and 31 streetcars)
after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005. For low-income New Orleanians who do not
have access to private automobiles, public transit service affects the quality of their lives—
commuting, going to school, taking care of private business, and having social lives. With
the recent trend of state and federal governments being hesitant to increase financial
assistance for local public transit services, local officials and transit planners must seek
a variety of ways to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public transit
services. Under these circumstances, and as transit privatization strategies continue to be
employed around the world, the two primary transit agencies in the New Orleans region
have separately contracted transit services from one multinational private firm.
This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of providing regional transit service
through privatization as a strategy to improve the quality of transit service and achieve
financial resiliency for regional transit systems. In particular, the study addresses the
following two sets of questions in this study. The first set of questions evaluates the effects
of transit service privatization by measuring changes in service improvements, cost
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of service provision in two individual transit systems.
While Jefferson Parish uses the transit service contracting approach most prevalent in the
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U.S.,2 that is, contracting out operation, management, and/or maintenance, New Orleans
Regional Transit Authority (RTA) now outsources a variety of functions and responsibilities
to a contractor at a level unprecedented in the U.S.3 These two transit systems are
compared for various performance indicators.
The second set of questions examines whether or not one private firm that serves two
areas under separate contracts can increase regional coordination for both. The current
situation in the Greater New Orleans region presents a unique case in which one private
firm has contracted with two districts—Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish—in separate
contracts for different functions of providing transit service. In this situation, this study
examines the level of regional coordination in the Greater New Orleans region relative to
other regions in the U.S., based on data collected through questionnaires and interviews
conducted with local public agencies, as well as a nationwide online survey.
The following chapters will review existing literature on the topics of transit contracting
and regional coordination, and develop a set of indices with which to measure regional
coordination from the literature. The study will describe the transit systems in Orleans
and Jefferson Parishes and the contexts within which they operate, and then will present
and analyze findings from the surveys and data collection undertaken for this report, and
finally, presents its concluding remarks and recommendations.

2 Contracting allows public agencies to maintain control of the policy decisions about service quality and
quantity, such as service coverage, operating hours, and headways, while outsourcing operation and/or
maintenance.
3 According to Veolia, the only comparable model in the U.S. is its own management of Foothill Transit in
Greater Los Angeles. Veolia manages the administrative, financial and planning functions for Foothill, but
actual operations of buses and paratransit are contracted to two other firms (Veolia Transportation 2009).
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The transit contracting literature addresses various issues ranging from different forms of
competition and ownership issues to economic issues; from labor issues to passengers’
experience (Thredbo 2010). Although the fundamental objective of transit service contracting
is to increase cost efficiency and cost effectiveness in providing transit service, public transit
agencies may take different strategies to achieve these goals, balancing them with other
policy priorities (e.g., improving service quality, reducing emissions, alleviating congestion).
In general, public transit agencies in the U.S. have followed more conservative strategies
within the spectrum of transit service contracting than their counterparts in other developed
countries, including the U.K., the Netherlands, and Australia, generally outsourcing only their
operation and maintenance functions. As a result, research on this subject is more advanced
outside the U.S., and therefore more literature is available from these and other experienced
countries. At the same time, because many different factors influence a transit agency’s
decision whether or not to outsource public transit service, it is not easy to compare cases
in the U.S. to those in other countries. The transfer of ideas to the U.S. must be done with
great caution, as each country is very different.
Proponents of contracting tout its potential to reduce the cost of transit service provision
through greater flexibility for contractors. They argue that contracting can reduce the
inefficiencies associated with providing peak service, relax labor rules, and reduce overtime
payrolls (Cervero 1988; Morlok and Viton 1985; O'Looney 1992; Tomazinis and Takyi 1989),
thereby freeing up public funds for other uses. At the same time, economists point out that
the promise of contracting will only be fulfilled in the presence of competitive bidding, welldesigned contracts, effective oversight, and competitive rebidding of contracts (Black 1991;
O'Looney 1998; Savage 1986; Sclar 1997). Complicating matters are the many political,
fiscal, institutional, and transit system factors that affect contracting decisions (Berechman
1993).
Whether or not contracting is more cost effective than the public provision of transit is an
empirical question. The specific provisions of the contract and the manner in which it is
awarded (through a competitive bidding process or through straight negotiation) can
influence the cost effectiveness of transit services. Competitive bidding normally allows the
regulator to more carefully stipulate the necessary conditions over the life of the contract,
ensuring greater accountability, while negotiation can permit experienced private operators
to bring their knowledge to bear in the design of a complex contract. Similarly, some publiclyprovided services with lackluster performance have been restructured to make them more
cost effective than before when the potential of future competition from private contractors
has been introduced (McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs 1998; Wallis 2003).

TYPES OF TRANSIT SERVICE CONTRACTING
Many of the current arguments in favor of public transit deregulation and privatization around
the world can be traced back to a series of studies and policies in the 1980s in the U.K.;4
particularly the U.K. Transport Act of 1985, which virtually deregulated bus transportation,
4 Appendix A describes the history of privatization of public transit service in the U.K. in more detail.
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leading to the deregulation and privatization of bus transit service in the U.K. The
privatization of transit services in the U.K. presented two distinct approaches—deregulation
and tendering, and was characterized by three factors: (1) ownership of transit service,
(2) control over policy issues, and (3) geographic area and/or system size of operations
to be privatized or tendered. The following discussion will focus more on transit service
contracting/tendering/outsourcing than on deregulation, because it is more relevant to
most U.S. urban settings, where public agencies have theoretically kept control over policy
issues and where transit has been maintained as a social service for those that have
limited access to a private car for either financial or physical reasons. In particular, this
study will review the nature of contracts and payment schemes because of their crucial
roles in determining the outcomes of service contracting. Past research has examined
the types of transit privatization that will likely facilitate the best outcomes in terms of
cost savings and service quality, focusing on types of compensation and processes for
selecting contractors (Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002; Hensher and Stanley 2003, 2008;
Hensher and Wallis 2005). Indeed, many factors associated with transit privatization
influence the quality of a private operator’s performance (Hensher and Stanley 2008),
including the degree of government regulation and the size of the transit market.

Cost-Plus and Fixed-Price Contracts
Much of the literature associated with public service contracting, or tendering, focuses on
two types of contracting: (1) cost-plus, and (2) fixed-price contracts, although in practice
the distinction is sometimes blurred in cases where incentives or penalties related to
specific performance goals are included, or where provisions for renegotiation exist to
accommodate for future uncertainties (Cox and Love 1991; Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002;
Laffont and Tirole 1993; Piacenza 2006; Roy and Yvrande-Billon 2007). Laffont and Tirole
(1993) place public service procurement contracts along a spectrum between cost-plus
and fixed-price. They define cost-plus contracts as one in which the government pays
its contractor all its realized costs, plus a fee independent of the contractor’s actual
performance. In a fixed-price contract, on the other hand, the contractor’s compensation
from the government remains the same regardless of either performance or exogenous
changes in costs. Each model has potential strengths and weaknesses. Fixed-price
contracts are generally held to incentivize cost efficiency and cost reduction than costplus contracts, but cost-plus contracts permit more flexibility with lower transaction costs
in the provision of goods or services that are very complex or subject to many uncertainties
(e.g., involving a high degree of technological innovation, or long-term contracts where
future circumstances are difficult to predict), and may inhibit a contractor’s incentive to
sacrifice quality to cut costs (Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis 2002; Laffont and Tirole 1993).
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) examine cost-plus and fixed-price contracts and their use in
French public transit systems to determine which is more likely to encourage increased
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firm performance.5 The authors found in their analysis that cost-plus contracts offered very
little incentive for operators to improve efficiency because the regulator pays the firms
ex post costs. This ex post payment, in conjunction with an assumed lack of complete
information on the part of regulators concerning the operator’s efficiency practices, creates
a situation in which operators have limited concern for efficiency because they will be
reimbursed even if expenditures increase. Although fixed-price contracts outperformed
cost-plus schemes in their analysis even when regulators’ information was limited, optimal
welfare was higher in networks with better-informed regulators.
Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007), who also analyzed French transit systems on the basis
of technical efficiency, distinguished between three general types of contracts: (1)
management, essentially a cost-plus contract in which the contractor receives a fixed
management fee, but the public agency bears the service provision costs; (2) gross-cost,
a type of fixed-price contract in which the contractor bears the production-cost risk but
fare revenue is accrued to the public agency; and (3) net-cost, another variety of fixedprice contracts in which the contractor’s subsidy is based on both its projected costs and
projected fare revenues, exposing the contractor to revenue risk. The authors find that
operators under both types of fixed-price contract were more technically efficient during
the period studied, and that gross-cost contracts had the higher efficiency scores than netcost. The differences between all types of contracts were statistically significant but slight,
however, suggesting that technical inefficiency is not the primary cause of burgeoning
transit costs in France.
Examining Italian transit systems using cost-plus or fixed-price contracts (both gross- and
net-cost), Piacencza (2006) also finds beneficial results for fixed-price contracts, exhibiting
lower cost distortion than systems employing cost-plus contracts. Traffic conditions,
however, also had a substantial effect on overall efficiency, limiting the gains that can be
expected from fixed-price contracts without addressing traffic regulation policy in highly
congested networks. Drawing upon experience they have had with contract design in
Detroit, Los Angeles, St. Louis and various other cities, Cox and Love (1991) also found
that fixed price contracts generally yielded lower costs for the transit authority while costplus contracts tend to favor the firm vying for the contract.

Performance-Based Contracts
Regarding transit service privatization, Hensher and his colleagues have conducted an
examination of the type of contract that is best suited to include both performance indicators
and incentives (Hensher and Prioni 2002; Hensher and Stanley 2008; Hensher and Wallis
2005).Their studies go beyond incentives that focus on cost efficiency, and examine how
regulators can add a dimension of service quality within contracts that addresses policy
5 Their study is based on three primary assumptions. First, the authors assume that transit service is
regulated by a local authority (regulator), and that a single, private firm (operator) is responsible for
operation, unlike completely deregulated regimes, or regimes with multiple operators. Second, it is
assumed that information asymmetries exist between the regulator and operator, because operators
have much more knowledge of factors in service operation: for instance, the number of buses required
to operate a specific network and their associated costs; fuel consumption levels, which are highly
dependent on drivers’ skills; and the increased costs of operating during periods of heavy traffic congestion
(Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002).
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goals for transit that may improve social welfare, but not necessarily be profitable enough
for operators to pursue without additional subsidy (e.g., attracting new passengers,
maintaining low fares, school service, increasing service frequency overall and during
peak hours for passenger comfort).
Commonly referred to as performance-based, this type of contract includes not only a
payment for delivering a minimum level of service, but also an incentive structure for
rewarding operators for increases in the quality of service that meet the transit agency’s
policy goals. A critical feature of performance-based contracts, whether they are
competitively tendered or negotiated, is that payments above the level specified for the
operator’s minimum obligations are based on the social or environmental benefits that the
regulating agency hopes to realize, rather than primarily on commercial considerations.
Another key feature is that operators typically have more knowledge of customers’ wants
and needs than regulators do, and thus, should have tactical freedom to design routes and
schedules that meet the requirements that regulators establish as a framework (Hensher
and Stanley 2003). Designing subsidy-based incentives that give operators sufficient
motivation to pursue otherwise unprofitable social goals (in a cost effective manner),
requires a high degree of cooperation between operators and authorities (Carlquist 2001;
Hensher and Stanley 2003).
An example of a performance-based contract is that of Hordaland, Norway, which became
the first county in Norway to fully implement this type of contract.6 Hordaland county, home
of Norway’s second-largest city, Bergen, entered into “quality contracts,” or performancebased contracts, with its three operators in 2000, replacing net-cost contracts (Carlquist
2001). Initial reform proposals called for introducing competitive tendering, but instead,
Hordaland officials chose to try negotiating performance-based contracts, with the threat
of switching to tendering if operators failed to meet expectations.
Increasing the number of revenue kilometers provided was seen as the most important
service improvement from the passengers’ point of view, but it was recognized that
operators faced marginal costs and benefits under different circumstances. In order to
remunerate operators in ways that would encourage them to provide socially-optimal
levels of service at all times of day and in all places without changing passengers’ fares,
Hordaland used modeling schemes that took into account not only the different marginal
costs of adding service for peak or off-peak periods and in areas of different density, but
also considered social benefits from attracting private automobile drivers to transit during
heavily congested periods, and the higher proportions of seasonal pass holders and school
children eligible for free fares in more rural areas (Larsen 2001). Passengers’ overall
perceptions of service are also accounted for in the contracts, with bonuses and penalties
based on customer satisfaction surveys (Carlquist 2001). Reviewing the implementation
of performance-based contracts in the year after its inception, Carlquist (2001) found that
customer satisfaction surveys provided positive results, despite negative media coverage
in 2000. Although actual use of some of the incentives had diverged somewhat from the
original recommendations, operators were free to make changes as long as they did not
reduce total network kilometers.
6 Oslo had previously implemented a more limited form of performance-based contract (Carlquist 2001).
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Process of Selecting Contractors, Increased Costs Associated with Re-bidding
Process, and Communication in Complex Contracting
Performance-based contracting has emerged as an alternative to conventional tendering,7
in response to some of the drawbacks associated with tendering (Hensher and Stanley
2003; Mathisen and Solvoll 2008). As privatization of formerly publicly owned and operated
bus service has proceeded, in regimes that have chosen to contract service areas rather
than fully liberalize their transit markets—i.e. those that introduce competition for a transit
market rather than within a transit market (Karlaftis 2006)—the question of how contracts
are awarded has increasingly been a topic of debate, alongside the question of what
implications the type of contract has on cost and quality of service.
Competitive tendering has been the primary tool for public agencies seeking to award an
exclusive right to allow an operator to service a specific area, encouraging the efficiency
gains associated with competition ex ante, while still maintaining some degree of public
control over the kind of service to be provided (Yvrande-Billon 2006). In practice, however,
there are challenges to designing and implementing tendering processes that yield the
desired service quality and efficiency gains (Yvrande-Billon 2006). Negotiated contracts,
which have been used more frequently in public-private partnerships for infrastructure
provision, are an alternative to tendering (Hensher and Wallis 2005).
In a study of public transit in 13 European nations, the MARETOPE project found that
cities that competitively tendered transit service had the largest positive increases in
overall efficiency (MARETOPE 2003). Cost reductions of as much as 20 to 30 percent or
higher have been achieved where tendering has been introduced. However, the largest
reductions are typically found in the first round of tendering, and the price increase of
tendering became a serious concern among transit agencies in Europe between 1983
and 2001. In some cases, this may be partly due to the “winner’s curse” phenomenon
(Hensher and Wallis 2005). “Winner’s curse” refers to the likelihood that in auctions
where incomplete information is a hazard faced by bidders, the winning bidder will be
the one who has overestimated the value of the item being auctioned by the most, or in
the case of transit, has underestimated the costs of providing the service. In other cases,
this is because of declining numbers of bids per contract and increasing public subsidies
(Hensher and Hauge 2001). This is especially true in cases where contracts must be rebid due to underperformance of the first round operator. Not only does this increase costs
by requiring another bidding round, but the number of bidders in the second round tends
to be less, as contracts are usually too big and the pool of potential bidders too small
(Hensher and Wallis 2005).
Another cause of concern in competitively tendered auctions is the lack of regulator/
operator communication in devising contracts. Bajari, McMillian and Tadelis (2002) found
in their study on private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California that
tendering/bidding mechanisms perform poorly when projects are complex, and stifle the
7 Performance-based contracts can be wholly negotiated or tendered. Conventional tendering’s tendency
to be focused entirely on the lowest-price bid limits the action of market-based competition to the ex
ante contracting stage, whereas performance-based contracts (ideally) build in market-like mechanisms
throughout the contract period (Hensher and Wallis 2005).
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communication between buyers (regulators) and sellers (operators), making it nearly
impossible for the buyers to utilize the expertise of the sellers in creating the contract.
The complexities of competitive tendering have been a reoccurring topic of discussion
in the Thredbo conference series.8 Conclusions drawn from discussions conducted in
conferences outline five steps that must be dealt with in the implementation of competitive
tendering: (1) stimulating competition, (2) making clear what you want, (3) getting what
you want, (4) getting what you paid for, and (5) next time around (Hensher and Hauge
2001). These may seem simplistic but the complexity of tendering leaves some wondering
whether public agencies that are new to competition for service operation should consider
utilizing a different method of contracting. This has led to questions of whether or not
there are viable alternatives to competitive tendering (Hensher and Hauge 2001).

Negotiated Contracts
The widely discussed alternative to competitive tendering is the strict negotiation of
contracts without a prior bidding process. Whereas competitive tendering requires the
regulator to accept the lowest bid for a predetermined contract, negotiation requires the
regulator to work directly with the operator in determining price and performance goals
for the contract. In theory, the negotiation of contracts that have not been put out to bid
can alleviate some of the financial costs of competitive tendering while opening up a
dialogue between the regulator and potential operator. Using negotiation, the value of the
service is created based on the combined knowledge and expertise of both the operator
and regulator, whereas competitive tendering determines the value of the service based
on bid prices received (Hensher and Stanley 2008). It is important to note, however,
that while some negotiation of contracts follows the competitive tendering process, its
purpose is to agree on the final details of a bid, in contrast to negotiations where no prior
bidding process has been undertaken.
While negotiation permits more flexibility in the design of complex contracts, achieving
cost reductions may be more difficult than in competitive tendering, particularly if the
public agency has limited knowledge of the operator’s costs.9 Competitive tendering
can still be a tool used in negotiated contracts when operators are not conforming to
the expectations laid out in the negotiated contract. In situations where the operator is
continuously failing to meet standards, the regulator can use competitive tendering as a
bargaining tactic to either induce performance, or to secure a different operator in cases
where underperformance continues.
8 Thredbo is the Australian city where the first Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport
Conference was held in 1989. The series of biennial conferences that followed have been held in cities
around the world, and is still known as the Thredbo Series (Thredbo 2010).
9 One method to introduce an element of competition in pricing without auctioning the route or network
is “yardstick” competition. Yardstick or benchmarking methods introduce surrogate competition by
comparing multiple similar firms’ prices, and basing all firms’ reimbursements on the best benchmark.
A firm that reduces its costs more than the firms it is compared to profits, whereas a firm that fails to
reduce its costs while other firms do will lose (Schleifer 1985). In the early 1990s, the yardstick model
became the most popular form of contract for bus transit in Norway, replacing lower-powered individual
negotiations with each firm. More recently, however, many Norwegian counties have been switching to
contracts based on subsidy caps or tendering (Dalen and Gómez-Lobo 2003).
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EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTING IN PAST STUDIES
Transit Service Privatization in the U.K.
Although there is some disagreement regarding the ultimate outcomes of deregulation
within the U.K., many experts and academics believe that tendering-schemes in London
have been more successful in gaining ridership and increasing productivity than have
deregulated systems in other areas of the country (Karlaftis 2006; White 1990, 1997).
White (1997) found that ridership fell throughout the deregulated areas as much as 35.6
percent in the metropolitan areas and increased by 1.3 percent in London. In terms of
productivity, White found an increase in productivity of 11 percent and a 23.6 percent
decrease in total operating costs in the metropolitan areas (outside of London), along
with a 16.2 percent decline in ridership between 1985 and 1989. In contrast, in London,
passenger trips and productivity increased by 5.6 percent and 4.4 percent respectively,
while total operating costs declined by 10.5 percent (Karlaftis 2006). Similarly, Banister
and Pickup observed a 10.2 percent increase in ridership in London during the two-year
period following deregulation (Karlaftis 2006). Other studies on the tendering experiences
in London report reduction in cost per vehicle kilometer by 35 percent (Department of
Transport 1984, 1994; Mackie, Preston, and Nash 1995; White 1995) and by 14 percent
from 1985/86 to 1988/89 without including depreciation of vehicles (Glaister 1997).
Including depreciation of vehicles, operating costs per vehicle kilometer declined by 41.2
percent between 1985/86 to 2002/03 (U.K. Commission for Integrated Transport 2004).
These figures remain inconsistent because of different methods employed to gauge
specific attributes and to control for external factors that can influence variables, such as
population and economic growth, and lack of accurate reporting methods (Colin Buchanan
and Partners 2003). In addition, another problem with evaluating the London case is the
difficulty of dealing with the highly aggregate data, a change of regulation, and contract
terms over time (Toner 2001), while Glaister (1997) states that tendering cut down overhead
costs in management, engineering, and staff facilities.
While the studies by White and by Banister and Pickup were undertaken within the
first ten years following the Transport Act of 1985, more comprehensive studies have
been conducted in recent years to better understand trends and the effects the Act has
had on bus operations in the long run. Colin Buchanan and Partners (CBP), which was
commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General of Transport and Energy,
examined the effects of deregulation and transit contracting on the overall health of the
transportation system.10 CBP collected data for 43 European Union cities including 29
with no competition, ten with controlled competition and four with deregulated competition
which had a minimum of five consecutive years of data available. The most recent years
used in this study ranged from 1995 to 1999, depending on the age of the system and how
well information was reported. In their analysis, CBP found that cities without competition
experienced, on the average, an annual decline in ridership of 0.2 percent, and an annual
increase of 1.7 percent in areas of controlled competition areas, and an annual drop of 2.6
percent in service areas that were fully deregulated (Buchanan and Partners 2003). CBP
10 The EC had previously collected some data to examine this issue and hired CBP as consultants to
ensure that their methods of evaluation and conclusions would be consistent with that of the CBP.
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does point out that there are a variety of factors that cannot be accounted for in their study
that have the potential to influence the outcome, such as issues the following: size, the
phase of deregulation a particular area is in, and general geographical and demographic
characteristics. These factors exert influence on travel and ridership patterns (Colin
Buchanan and Partners 2003).

Transit Service Privatization in Other International Cases
Despite initial skepticism in other European countries about introducing competition
into transit, tendering made inroads in the following years, and by 2000, the European
Council was officially encouraging its member states to speed up liberalization of their
transit systems (Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 2007; van de Velde 2001). In 2007,
European Union Regulation 1370/2007 updated the legal framework for the awarding
of transit contracts and compensation for public services, acknowledging the growth of
an EU-wide transit market subject to the Treaty’s protection of economic freedoms. The
regulation advocates regulated competition—with safeguards11—as means to achieving
“more attractive and innovative services at lower cost,” based on studies and experiences
of member states that had already implemented competition in transit (Regulation [EC]
No 1370/2007 2007, p. L 315/2). Gwilliam and van de Velde (1990) summarize the status
and nature of several Western European countries’ transit policies and markets in the late
1980s, as the immediate impact of the U.K.’s reforms were being observed, and van de
Velde (2001) revisits those countries a decade later, as the EU considered amendments
to its regulation of payment of transit operators in light of the ongoing market changes.
There exists a great deal of variation in the amount of experience in public service
privatization throughout the world, with each country exhibiting a unique set of transit
policies, regulations, transit and labor markets, operation and management, operating
environments, and overall travel behaviors. As a result, each country exhibits somewhat
a somewhat different experience in the area of transit service privatization. There is a
mixture of successes and failures. The Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, Poland,
and Australia have seen more favorable results, while France and Italy have had more
disappointing outcomes.
Causes of failures in competitive tendering include: (1) lack of competition in French cities,
keeping incumbent providers in place with little incentive to improve of cost savings; (2)
inability to reduce high labor costs due to a contract clause that require transit providers
to retain existing employees in Italy; (3) no clear service specifications in France and
Italy, giving advantages to incumbents; and (4) monitoring and quality control problems in
the Netherlands. Individual experiences in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Scandinavian
countries, Germany, Central European countries, Australia, South American countries,
and South Africa are reviewed in more detail in Appendix B.

11 While the EU found sufficient positive results of competition in its studies to make it the officially
preferred policy for transit provision, the emphasis on safeguards is warranted, as not all European cases
have been equally successful at achieving both cost savings and public policy goals.
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Transit Service Contracting in the U.S.
In comparison to the U.K., other European countries, and Australia, the U.S. has been
relatively more conservative in terms of forms and levels of public transportation privatization
even after the Reagan administration promoted privatization of public services in the 1980s.
Most public agencies in the U.S., if they engage in any outsourcing at all, tend to outsource
operation, maintenance, and occasionally planning funding to the private sector,12 but keep
control over policies issues, such as fare structure, route design, and operation hours. This
may be a reflection of the fact that public transit business in most urban areas will not yield
profits and requires public subsidies from the governments regardless of whether transit
service is provided by the public or private sector. This status of provision of transit service
also influences the number of studies conducted on this subject in the U.S.
Because of the heightened interests in fixed-route bus service privatization in the 1980s
and continued interest in the 1990s, a number of studies were conducted to examine cost
savings and cost efficiency gains expected from service contracting.13 The first group of
studies examined costs to provide transit service before-and-after contracting, and most
them reported cost savings and/or cost efficiency gains in contracted services. A study of
fixed-route bus services in Denver by Peskin, Mundle, and Varma (1993) showed oneyear cost savings of $2.5 million (or 12.5 percent), based on an incremental cost analysis,
and $5.1 million (or 25.8 percent) based on a fully allocated cost analysis. A fully allocated
cost analysis by Denver RTD Public Financial Management (2001) reported savings of
$40.1 million dollars (or 31 percent) or more over nine years. Three studies on contracted
service in the Foothill Transit system, which were commissioned by Los Angeles County
Transportation Commission and conducted by Ernst and Young (Ernst and Young 1991,
1992, 1993), showed a 43 percent cost savings. Teal (1985) and Teal and Nemer (1986)
found significant cost savings at the level of, on average, 39 percent for six fixed-route
services and 43 percent for six commuter bus services. While most studies examined cost
savings and/or cost efficiency for the service contracted, Karlaftis, Wasson, and Steadham
(1997) analyzed cost efficiency for transit systems. They analyzed monthly data from an
approximately six-year period, and found that cost efficiency increased by 22 percent (or
an 18 percent reduction in cost per vehicle mile) after all transit service routes in the
Indianapolis transit system were contracted out to a private firm.
The second group of studies conducted a cross-sectional comparison of the costs of
services provided by the public sector and by the private sector, either by system or by
line. Morlock and Viton (1985) found higher cost efficiency—in terms of average costs
per vehicle mile—was consistently higher in privately provided services by a margin of 40
percent to 50 percent than publicly provided services in three U.S. cities. Downs (1988)
found that the six private companies as a group were more cost efficient and cost effective
in providing local bus service than the New York City Transit Authority. Webster’s case
study of Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) (1988) also reported costs per vehicle mile for
contracted suburban express and local services that were lower by about 40 percent than
in-house services.

12 On average, in the U.S. the farebox recovery ratio is less than 30 percent.
13 Iseki (2004) provides a more comprehensive review of these studies.
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Employing a simultaneous equations model in an analysis of panel data of more than 300
U.S. transit agencies from 1994 to 1998 to addresses the endogeneity problem between
contracting decision and cost efficiency, Nicosia (2002) developed a transit cost model to
predict the potential minimum cost to produce specified outputs, given input prices as
well as other influential factors.14 Nicosia found cost savings of 14 percent of operating
costs, or approximately $3.7 million (in average dollar over the six-year period from 1993
to 1998), for the average public transit agency in her analysis.
Iseki (2010) analyzed a cross-sectional time-series data of more than 400 agencies
constructed from the National Transit Database from 1992 to 2000, using a simultaneous
equations model with a clear distinction between agencies that contract out only a
portion of service from those that contract out all service and taking into account the
moderating effects of several factors on the effect of contracting on cost efficiency. Iseki
found relatively small cost efficiency gains in the average cases—7.8 percent and 5.5
percent for partial and full contracting agencies respectively. Iseki’s analysis also shows
the effects of contracting on cost efficiency vary by factors such as peak-to-base ratio,
agency size, the wage gap between bus operators in the public and private sectors, and
agency.
Only a handful of studies reported negative economic effects of contracting services in
the U.S. cases. In contrast to the findings of Peskin, Mundle and Varma (1993) and
Denver RTD Public Financial Management (2001), Sclar (1997) argues that the Denver
RTD actually lost $9.2 million (in 1990–1995 dollars) in contracting over six years. And
in contrast to the findings of Ernst and Young (1991; 1992; 1993), Coopers and Lybrand
(1991) reports that the net marginal cost per revenue hour of in-house services was
equivalent to that of services procured from a private firm in the Foothill Transit District.
In a study of multiple contracting cases in the U.S., Teal (1991a) cited Phoenix Transit
and Westchester County studies that increased costs. McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs
(1998) reported that operating cost per revenue vehicle hour in the system level is much
higher in an absolute term for agencies that contracted some portion of their service than
for those that contracted all or none of their service, using cross-sectional data from the
National Transit Database (NTD) over a 5-year period, from 1989 to 1993. Examining
the rate of cost increase over the study period, they also found that unit costs increased
below inflation for all three groups, but least for those agencies with partially contracted
service.
In addition to cost savings concerns, the effects of contracting on workers’ wages and
benefits and quality of service in terms of vehicle maintenance and collision rates have
been a point of apprehension. Kim (2005) conducted the first comprehensive study of
the effect that contracting out operations has on workers’ wage and benefit packages by
examining twelve U.S. transit operators from 1995 to 2001, finding that overall, private
operators were paid less than the rate in which comparable public employees were paid
(Frick, Taylor, and Wachs 2006; Kim 2005). In her regression analysis of the NTD for 320
14 Nicosia’s transit cost model is a fundamentally different approach from other studies. It has a solid
theoretical basis of the functional form based on the duality theory that allows an analysis of production
and cost functions at the same time (Obeng 1985). Refer details of transit cost models to the studies
such as Foster (1974), Williams (1979), Viton (1981), Friedlaender et al. (1993), Braeutigam (1999), and
Nicosia (2002).
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agencies, Nicosia (2002) found that contracted service providers had 70 percent more
vehicle collisions and 36 percent more vehicle breakdowns than transit systems that were
publicly operated (Frick, Taylor, and Wachs 2006). In these cases, it is likely that cost
savings were realized at the expense of workers and quality of service provided and not
necessarily from increases in efficiency.
Collectively, most studies of transit contracting in the U.S. have reported on the varying
level of positive economic outcomes in terms of cost savings or cost efficiency (i.e., cost per
unit of service output—cost per vehicle mile and cost per vehicle hour). At the same time,
several studies reported adverse impacts of contracting on the costs, labor conditions, and
quality of service.
In contrast to this dominant group of quantitative studies, qualitative studies on the subject
discuss the higher complexity of decision making for contracting and of its outcomes. These
qualitative studies argue that agencies are influenced by political, social, and institutional
forces, and by levels of knowledge and experience regarding contracting, as well as by
economic incentives (Iseki 2008; Richmond 2001; Sclar 2000).
While research has been done on public decision making regarding whether or not to
privatize transit service as well as other public services (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1997), there has not been any research on how such privatization of transit service
may affect the quality of transit service in a regional level. This is not a big surprise for
two reasons. First, as a contract is made between each public agency and a contractor
for a service provision within each system, the success of contracting is often measured
also within each system. In addition, regional transit coordination is usually considered
responsibility of public agencies, often in conjunction with regional authorities or entities.
Nevertheless, contractors may have an important role to increase effectiveness of regional
coordination with its role to determine service scheduling and distribute service information.
Furthermore, as a private contractor increases its role in other functions, such as planning
and capital acquisition, it is likely that their influence on the quality of regional coordination
also increases.
The next section will discuss transit service regional coordination in depth based on the
literature review. However, it should be noted that it does not include discussion of private
contractors’ role in regional coordination as no studies on the roles, behaviors, and attitudes
of contractors toward transit service coordination could be located.
While research has been done on public decision-making regarding whether or not to
privatize transit service as well as other public services (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1997), there has not been any research on how such privatization of transit service
may affect the quality of transit service in a regional level. This is not a big surprise for
two reasons. First, as a contract is made between each public agency and a contractor
for a service provision within each system, the success of contracting is often measured
also within each system. In addition, regional transit coordination is usually considered
responsibility of public agencies, often in conjunction with regional authorities or entities.
Nevertheless, contractors may have an important role to increase effectiveness of regional
coordination with its role to determine service scheduling and distribute service information.
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Furthermore, as a private contractor increases its role in other functions, such as planning
and capital acquisition, it is likely that their influence on the quality of regional coordination
also increases.
The next section will discuss transit service regional coordination in depth based on
the literature review. However, it should be noted that it does not include discussion of
private contractors’ role in regional coordination as no studies on the roles, behaviors,
and attitudes of contractors toward transit service coordination could be located.

REGIONAL COORDINATION OF TRANSIT SERVICE
As one of its components, this study examines the possibility that a private firm contracting
with multiple public transit agencies within a region may improve regional coordination of
transit service. This section discusses the different types of regional coordination and
identifies the indicators that researchers have used to define and measure regional
coordination.
Transit users often travel across political jurisdictions conducting economic and social
activities in dispersed metropolitan and urban areas. Since many transit users have to
travel across a region, the provision of transit service that accommodates people’s travel
needs is inherently a regional issue. However, political, operational, organizational and
financial barriers often pose challenges to coordinating transit services across jurisdictions
within a region.
The importance of regional coordination and integration has been well recognized by
researchers and practitioners (Meyer et al. 2005; Miller et al. 2005; Pucher and Kurth
1989). According to NEA, an international research firm based in the Netherlands,
regional coordination/ integration is defined as:
The organization process through which elements of the passenger
transport system (network and infrastructure, tariffs and ticketing,
information and marketing etc) are, across modes and operators,
brought into closer and more efficient interaction, resulting in an overall
positive enhancement to the overall state and quality of services
linked to the individual travel components. (NEA Transport 2003, 17)
Regional coordination and integration are important in providing seamless travel to transit
users using multiple transit systems to reach a destination (Cook, Lawrie, and Henry
2003; Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005; NEA Transport 2003; Pucher and Kurth 1989).
Regional transit systems that are not well-coordinated can impose burdens on transit
users, discourage transferring among multiple transit agencies, and decrease ridership
(Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005). Some of the burdens that riders may face in an
uncoordinated transit system are unpredictable travel times, long transfer times, lack
of system wide information and increased fare payments (Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan
2005). By coordinating services, some regions have been successful in reducing those
burdens, and thereby increasing ridership and customer satisfaction (Miller et al. 2005;
Pucher and Kurth 1989). Several examples have been pointed out in the literature. Pucher
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and Kurth (1989) found that regional integration has been an important factor leading to
an increase in transit ridership in decentralizing cities in Germany. Miller, Englisher, and
Kaplan (2005) conclude that integration has led to customer level of service improvements
and ridership increases in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Despite its importance, relatively little research has been conducted on methods and
criteria for measuring and evaluating regional coordination and integration using concrete
indices and indicators. In contrast, many studies on the subject tend to broadly define
regional coordination and integration, but do not offer any specific indicators to measure it.
While limited, scholarly articles and reports that provide specific indicators, as well as
concepts, to measure regional coordination and integration, were carefully examined in
order to identify a common set of indicators (Tables 2, 3 and 4). Broadly speaking, among
those actually measuring regional coordination and integration, scholarly journal articles
often use indictors to analyze the success or failure of specific transportation systems,
programs, or policies, while research reports prepared by transit agencies and consultants
tend to use indicators as criteria to make recommendations for improving a specific transit
system.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the following three categories to organize indicators of regional
coordination and integration:
1. Managerial/Operational Coordination (page 30),
2. Organizational/Institutional Coordination (page 32), and
3. Financial/Institutional Coordination (page 33).
There are similar typologies within each of these three categories that provide a better
perspective on the concrete measures that can be taken by regional transit service
administrators to achieve regional coordination. The following sections discuss each of the
identified measures in relation to the three aforementioned categories of coordination.

Managerial/Operational Coordination
The first category of indicators is managerial/operational (Table 2). These indicators directly
influence the transit user’s experience in a transit system and their perceptions toward
the quality of service of the system. Among the eight articles in Table 2, all except one
(Cook, Lawrie, and Henry 2003) discuss at least two indices in this operational/managerial
coordination category.
One of the most frequently mentioned types of operational integration in the literature is
schedule (or timetable) coordination.15 Timetable coordination allows for the seamless
transfer of transit passengers from one vehicle to another, from one mode to another, and
from one transit system to another. By coordinating arrival and departure times, agencies
15 Several of the articles suggest the use of technology in coordinating schedules. Many transit operators
have begun using GPS technology to coordinate schedules and provide better information to transit users
on arrival or departure times of vehicles. These technologies such as the automatic vehicle location system
can greatly enhance the ability of operators to better coordinate their own schedules and schedules of
other operators by providing real-time information about vehicle locations. 	
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can minimize waiting time for travelers at transfer points. This has a direct impact on transit
riders’ experience by reducing waiting times, particularly out-of-vehicle time, which users
usually perceive more onerous than in-vehicle time. Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan (2005)
discuss one such example of successful schedule coordination in the San Francisco Bay
Area that was done by coordinating schedules of two regional transit systems: Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) and Caltrain. After coordinating schedules, Caltrain experienced a
17 percent increase in ridership over four months.
Intermodal facility coordination is frequently mentioned as an important factor of regional
coordination and integration (NEA Transport 2003; Pucher and Kurth 1989; Transport
for London 2001; Tyson 1990). Transport for London’s (TfL) “Best Practices Guidelines”
provides the most extensive research on intermodal interchange facilities and discusses
why this type of coordination is integral to transit planning. Well-coordinated intermodal
interchange facilities can help reduce problems such as uncertainty about arrival times,
lack of safety, or exposure to the elements by making transfers more convenient,
comfortable, secure, and predictable (Transport for London 2001). In particular, taking
into account that people generally dislike transferring because of the inconvenience and
uncertainty involved (Horowitz and Zlosel 1981), improving interchanges can significantly
raise the overall level of integration in a regional transit system (Transport for London
2001). Interchange facilities in certain scales16 provide lighting and security, shelter from
the elements, and serve as centers for passenger information. Other articles mention
the importance of accommodating the needs of transit users in non-transit modes at
interchange facilities and transfer points, including the provision of park-and-ride systems
and bicycle facilities (Pucher and Kurth 1989; Transport for London 2001, 2002).
Information coordination is also identified as a key component of coordination and
integration. This form of integration brings together information from multiple agencies,
combining it into one medium and using common terms, descriptions, and logos to make it
understandable to the user (NEA Transport 2003). There are several references to utilizing
real-time, computerized information from regional entities, allowing the transit user to
access this coordinated information, either through on-display boards at transit facilities
(Pucher and Kurth 1989; Transport for London 2001) or electronically, via the Internet
(Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005; Transport for London 2001). It can reasonably be
assumed that technologies not readily available when these articles were published (e.g.,
Internet-ready mobile phones, handheld computers) would further enhance the user’s
experience. These various techniques for disseminating comprehensive information for
regional transit service can heighten the user’s sense that he/she is dealing with one
coordinated transit system, as opposed to many multiple operators, which can make
interpreting information much easier (Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005; NEA Transport
2003; Pucher and Kurth 1989; Transport for London 2001; Tyson 1990). Information
coordination is not only important for information on schedules or routes, but also for
reporting accidents, delays, or emergency information to passengers or among agencies
(Transport for London 2002).
16 As noted by Iseki et al. (2007), transfer facilities can vary greatly in levels of accommodation to
passengers, ranging from a simple curbside stop with no shelter to large city-center transfer stations
accommodating multiple modes and thousands of transit users. 	

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Review of the Literature

27

Fare coordination enables the use of single tickets or passes among multiple transit
agencies. Several articles mention fare coordination’s role in regional coordination and
integration (Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005; NEA Transport 2003; Pucher and Kurth
1989; Transport for London 2001; Tyson 1990). When a trip takes more than one leg to
complete, fare integration enables passengers to pay only once, despite the number of
operators providing the service (NEA Transport 2003). Fare integration can be implemented
within one agency or among multiple agencies, and in the form of passes, stored-value
cards, or transfer tickets (Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005). Where passes or storedvalue cards are not in use, transfer tickets can offer some degree of coordination among
transit operators, allowing passengers to transfer within a transit system or to another
system at a discounted fare or at no extra charge for a certain length of time, which can
facilitate better coordination between transit systems. Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan (2005)
note that many transit systems in the United States with a coordinated fare system have
created a better experience for the user. Pucher and Kurth (1989) discuss the success
(in terms of ridership growth) of fare coordination and innovative pricing structures in
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, where transit systems utilize corporate and university
discounts and special off-season fare rates.
Lastly, coordinated expansion of service is also important for improving regional coordination
and integration (Pucher and Kurth 1989). Coordinated expansion of routes allows for more
direct and faster journeys, while increased service intervals help attract more transit users
(Pucher and Kurth 1989). Pucher and Kurth (1989) cite expansion of routes, improving
regional connectivity, and increases in service intervals as key to the success of regional
transit systems in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The coordination of transit routes
and interchanges is also important to regional coordination and integration by connecting
routes that otherwise might otherwise be disjointed (Transport for London 2001; Tyson
1990).

Organizational/Institutional Coordination
The second category of regional coordination indices includes organizational and
institutional efforts progressing towards regional coordination (Table 3). The literature
presents regional coordination at a variety of levels. Highly coordinated regions have
integrated regional transit, including a centralized administration, long-term planning and
research, and a shared regional vision and strategy (Cook, Lawrie, and Henry 2003;
Federal Highway Administration 2002; Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005). These highly
coordinated regions are characterized by an active policy at all authority levels (from
individual managers, to operators, to regional transit authorities) to implement coordination,
with fair representation of all operators at a regional coordinating agency (NEA Transport
2003). These regions may also choose to monitor interagency coordination through the
application of performance measures, i.e., benchmarking their progress against integration
indices derived from case studies (NEA Transport 2003).
In a regional setting, the policies of individual transit entities can greatly help or hinder the
success of regional coordination. Shared regional policies regarding staffing, maintenance,
and cleaning of intermodal facilities were identified as indicators of coordination. For example,
in Paris “site committees” of transportation operators, local officials, and private tenants are
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often established to manage intermodal facilities and maintain operations (Transport for
London 2001). Similarly, Cook et al. (2003) referred to the ability to consolidate staff and
staff training as benefits to regional transit system consolidation and coordination. This
sort of regional training can produce a more consistent quality of service system-wide
for transit users. Furthermore, Pucher and Kurth have identified similar regionally shared
policies, such as shared advertizing and marketing, as keys to successful coordination
(and increased ridership) in several of Germany’s Verkehrsverbunds, regional transit
authorities established in each of the country’s major urban areas (Pucher and Kurth
1989).
Several authors mentioned that a uniform set of agency policies clearly defining roles and
responsibilities are essential in reducing conflict between entities and/or transit agencies
(Cook, Lawrie, and Henry 2003; NEA Transport 2003; U.K. Commission for Integrated
Transport 2001). Indeed, the FHWA discusses the importance of establishing a regional
concept of operations in which roles and responsibilities are thoroughly defined through
regulations and regional agreements (Federal Highway Administration 2002). Shared
regulatory policies can, in fact, strengthen a regional transit system (NEA Transport 2003).
Similarly, the sharing of data on ridership, fare revenue, and accidents between agencies
could strengthen regional coordination and reduce conflicts (Miller, Englisher, and
Kaplan 2005). In addition to institutional policies and goals, a strong political commitment
transcending municipal administrations is seen as essential to regional coordination (NEA
Transport 2003).

Financial Coordination
The final category of indices covers financial coordination (Table 4). If one thinks of regional
coordination as a spectrum of involvement between regional transit entities, evidence of
these financial indicators are most often found in the more highly integrated regions, while
less integrated regions would likely utilize relatively simple coordination practices, such
as timetable sharing. According to the U.K. Commission for Integrated Transport, the
most coordinated regions funnel dedicated funding through a citywide umbrella agency
(with responsibilities for regional coordination). While creation of this additional layer of
bureaucracy is a major barrier in some cases, it is crucial to improving integration. Case
studies in the U.K. demonstrated that regional coordination was “only likely to be achieved
where funds and resources for policy and scheme implementation are readily available
and vested in regional authorities” (U.K. Commission for Integrated Transport 2001, 28).
One of the most important factor affecting regional transit planning and coordination is the
role of local government in identifying funding sources for the establishment and ongoing
operation of cooperative programs at the regional level (Rivasplata 2006).
In the U.S., the financial integration of regional transit systems is much less common than
in Europe. According to Miller et al., (2005) joint funding proposals and joint procurement
of equipment between regional transit entities are practices that can indirectly impact
the service provided to users. Their survey of transit regions across the U.S. found
that several regions (including Metro DC, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Southwest
Connecticut and Dallas/Fort Worth) utilized joint funding and/ or joint procurement of
vehicles. However, the authors acknowledged that none of these regions actually prepared
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cost-benefit analyses before embarking on coordinative projects, and as a result, have not
been able to quantitatively measure the outcome of infrastructure improvements (Miller,
Englisher, and Kaplan 2005). Elsewhere in the literature, dedicated funding sources were
seen as beneficial, as they can ensure that regional transit systems provide matching
funds for state and federal grant opportunities. In addition, dedicated regional funding
sources were seen as potentially important for training of regional staff, coordinating fares
and schedules, and improving regional facilities (Cook, Lawrie, and Henry 2003).

Barriers to Regional Coordination
The literature also discusses barriers to regional coordination. Finding sources of
funding can be a major barrier to regional coordination and integration (Federal Highway
Administration 2002; Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005; Pucher and Kurth 1989).
Coordination and integration projects are often expensive to implement, and many regions
lack the money or resources to do so (Miller, Englisher, and Kaplan 2005). Moreover,
the Texas Transportation Institute has grouped types of barriers that face regions; some
of these groups include jurisdictional/boundary issues, communications, funding, crossagency concerns/lack of trust, service gaps, differing driver requirements, cost allocation,
and differing collecting and data requirements (Capital Area Regional Transit Coordination
Committee 2006; North Central Texas Council of Governments 2006). These types of
obstructions to regional coordination can be present in many urban areas.

Regional Coordination Indices Summary
Table 5 summarizes the indices of regional coordination that were identified in the literature
review in a way that they can be more easily operationalized for actual measurement. A
“data needed” column elucidates data to obtain to accurately apply these indices to actual
measurement of regional coordination. Some of the information is more concrete and easily
obtainable (fare schedules, routes, etc), while other information related to organizational
policies is obtainable only through interviewing local transit planners and operators. It
should be noted that transit operators in this table can mean either public transit agencies
or private transit companies.
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Type of
Coordination

Indices
Miller et al., 2005
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Real-time info
about travel cond.
shared
Coordinated
activities of
information
dissemination
Transit trip
planning info
shared

Real-time shared
information

Information
provision

Uniform security
guards & lighting in
interchange zones

Establishment of
transfer centers

Timetable
coordination

Tyson, 1990

Shared
Coordination
interchange
between modes
signage and route
way information

TfL, 2001

Coordinated
intermodal facility
improvements

Cook et al., 2003

Information
Integration

Network
integration
(operational)

NEA, 2003

Greater pedestrian
and cyclist priority
Balance use of
street space to
enable walking,
cycling
Better provision for
cyclists (secure
cycle parking)
Easier interchange
between modes
Better provision of
information

Integrated
timetables
High-tech
approach to
coordinating and
time tabling

Average point-topoint delay time

Total average
delay (regional)

On-time arrival rate

UK Commission, Federal Highway
Admin., 2002
2001

Note: TfL, 2001, Transport for London, Best Practices; NEA, 2003, NEA, Integration and Regulatory Structures; U.K. Commission, 2001, U.K. Commission for Integrated
Transport.

Information
provision
expanded
Computerized
timetables

Park-and-ride
systems

Better coordination Coordination of
of timetables
timetables

Pucher et al.,
1989

Table 2. Regional Coordination Indices, Managerial/Operational

Managerial/ Operational

Schedule
coordination

Intermodal facility
coordination

Information coordination
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Better service
quality

Expanded,
modernized bus
stops and stations
Improved quality of
vehicles

Increased service
frequency
Reserved bus
lanes

Attractive monthly
and annual tickets
Corporate or Univ.
discounts
Discounts for offseason tickets
More attractive
fares
Service expansion

Pucher et al.,
1989
Single systemwide passes
Reduction of
transfer fees
between
jurisdictions

Miller et al., 2005

Interchange
journeys (transfer
coordination)

Inter-availability of
tickets

Tyson, 1990
Ticket and fare
integration

NEA, 2003

Increased service
quality

Security- actual
Customer
and perceived
satisfaction
(incl. appropriate
shelters, lighting,
amenities)
Carefully
coordinated routes
Shelters,
passenger info,
lighting, seating, at
all stops
Perceived
affordability - good
value for money
Appropriate speed
limits (reduces
perceived journey
time, creates safer
conditions)

Common tariffs

UK Commission, Federal Highway
2001
Admin., 2002

Note: TfL, 2001, Transport for London, Best Practices; NEA, 2003, NEA, Integration and Regulatory Structures; U.K. Commission, 2001, U.K. Commission for Integrated
Transport.

Managerial/ Operational

Indices

Fare coordination

Expansion/ coordination of services (routes, stops, etc.)

Type of
Coordination

Table 2. Regional Coordination Indices, Managerial/Operational (continued)
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Pucher et al., 1989

Better marketing and
innovative advertising

Indices

Long term planning
and research  

Data sharing

Miller et al., 2005

Fair representation of
members in region

Centralized
administration

Uniform set of policies
among agencies to
reduce conflict

Consolidation of
training

Cook et al., 2003

Shared staff training
in multi-modal
information provision

TfL, 2001

UK Commission,
2001

Clearly defined roles
and responsibilities;
Political commitment
to integration
Market compatibility of
services
An authority with
Integrated institutional
coordination role
arrangements
Regulatory and
institutional framework
Network integration
(institutional)
Benchmarks to
measure progress
Index for measuring
integration
Integration with other
(external)
organizations
Active policy at all
authority levels to
implement
coordination

NEA, 2003

Shared regional vision
and strategy  

Regional concept of
operations

Shared Ridership
statistics
Incident rates

Federal Highway
Admin., 2002

Note: TfL, 2001, Transport for London, Best Practices; NEA, 2003, NEA, Integration and Regulatory Structures; U.K. Commission, 2001, U.K. Commission for Integrated
Transport.

Organizational/ Institutional

Type of
Coordination

Table 3. Regional Coordination Indices, Organizational/Institutional

Shared use of
Coordina Coordinated
information/
ted staff marketing/
availability of
training advertising
information

Coordinated
goals and
Policies

Overseeing
agency/
institutional
framework

Coordinated and centralized
administration/ governance
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Table 4. Regional Coordination Indices, Financial/Institutional

Financial/
Institutional

Type of
Coordination

Indices
Shared/
coordinated
funding
arrangements

Miller et al., 2005
Joint funding proposals

Cook et al., 2003
Dedicated regional
funding source

UK Commission, 2001
Integrated funding
arrangements

Joint procurement of
Shared
equipment
purchasing of
equipment

Table 5. Operationalized Indices of Regional Coordination
Type of
Coordination

Regional Coordination/
Integration Indicator

Service Schedule
Coordination

Managerial/
Operational

Information Coordination

Fare Coordination

Operationalized Indices

Data Needed

Coordination in timetables
between entities/modes to
accommodate transit users
(TUs’) transfers

Waiting time at major
transfer points, headway
times, on-time arrival
rate, total average delay,
(regional), average
point-to-point delay time,
coordinated bus scheduling
system

Coordination/ Consistency
in daily/ weekly operating
time schedule to
accommodate TU’s needs

Daily & weekly operating
schedule

Information of multiple
transit systems shared
and provided to TUs,
disseminated jointly?

Information on web sites,
brochures, maps, web
apps, etc.

Computerized shared
information system for TUs
in real-time (e.g., web site,
iPhone apps)

Information on web sites
and web applications.

Computerized shared
information system for
operators in real-time

Technologies to share
real-time information for
operation (e.g., automatic
vehicle location system)

Coordinated regional fares,
regional system-wide
transit passes (one-day,
weekly, monthly, annual,
off-season, discounted to
universities, companies
shared medium passes)
Provision of regional
passes in all districts
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Locations where to
purchase transit passes
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Table 5. Operationalized Indices of Regional Coordination (continued)
Type of
Coordination

Regional Coordination/
Integration Indicator

Intermodal Facilities
Coordination
Managerial/
Operational

Operationalized Indices

Data Needed

Joint intermodal facility
operation and maintenance

Operation and maintenance

Proximity and directness
between stops/stations

Design of transit facilities at
transfer points

Shared signage

Signage

Shared security force and
system

Security force and system

Shared park & ride lot

Park & ride lot

Coordinated Service/
Expansion

Route expansion, increased
Information on routes,
service frequency, service
service frequency, vehicle
quality improvement, Joint
upgrades
vehicle upgrades

Coordinated Marketing/
Advertising

Joint marketing

Coordinated Staff Training Joint staff training

Organizational/
Institutional

Information on training

Data Sharing

Shared system usage/
ridership information

Data sharing system or
activities

Coordinating Goals/
Policies

Shared goals/policies

Information on transit
agencies’ goals and
policies

Intermodal Facilities
Coordination

Joint intermodal facility
planning/ construction/
maintenance

Presence of such facilities
and coordination between
operators, MPO’s
involvement for planning

Regulatory framework

Presence of such
regulations

Authority created with
coordination role

Presence of such
authorities

Policies to implement
coordination

Presence of such policies

Creating Institutional
Framework

Coordinated
and Centralized
Administration/
Governance

Financial

Information on
advertisements

Shared/ Coordinated
Funding Arrangements

Shared purchasing of
equipment

Monitoring of coordination/
integration with indices
to measure integration in
place

Presence of such a system
and indices

Joint funding proposals

Presence of such practices

Joint funding arrangements

Presence of such
arrangements

Dedicated regional funding
source

Presence of such sources

Joint vehicle/ equipment
purchase

Presence of such practices

Note: Operators in this table can mean either public transit operators or private transit service contractors
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EMPIRICAL STUDY: EFFECTS OF TRANSIT CONTRACTING
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of regional transit service provision through privatization. The unique
circumstances, where one private firm has been contracted separately by two districts—
Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish—to provide public transit service, have made it possible
to address this second question, regarding regional coordination.
This study examines two main hypotheses:
1. Given carefully designed contractual terms, a private firm has a strong incentive to perform
well and meet requirements specified in contracts in order to receive compensation and
rewards and avoid penalties, and that this good performance by a contractor will lead to
more cost-efficient and effective provision of transit service to the public.
2. Given carefully designed contractual terms, a private firm has an incentive to improve
regional coordination, increase ridership, generate more fare revenue, and present a
good performance for future contracts by combining services in the two separate areas
through internal coordination.17
The first hypothesis addresses very common questions pertinent to privatization of public
services: the consequences of the transit service privatization on changes in quality, costefficiency, and cost-effectiveness of service provision. Of particular interest in this question
is the effects of “delegated management contract” implemented by New Orleans Regional
Transit Authority (RTA). After a significant degradation in the quality of transit service
following Hurricane Katrina, RTA decided to contract out a large portion of functions and
responsibilities to a private firm—significantly more than regular contracting arrangements
made in the U.S.—and started a series of interim contracts with a multinational private sector
operator of multi-modal transit, Veolia, in October, 2008. Following this provisional period,
RTA and Veolia entered into an official contract with an initial term period of five years,
starting in September 2009.
Veolia Transportation is the North American business unit of France’s Veolia Transport,
a multinational, multimodal transportation provider operating in 28 countries. Veolia
Transportation 200 operates contracts in the U.S. and Canada, and cites over 100 years
of experience in the U.S., including operations in Jefferson Parish since 1949. Veolia
Transportation offers a variety of transit contract options, ranging from strictly management
or strictly operational contracts to delegated management and public-private partnerships,
encompassing design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance of transit
networks. Although Veolia Transportation’s website promotes its delegated management
option and touts the success of such contracts in Europe, Veolia’s delegated management
contract with RTA is its first in the U.S.
17 In other words, a private firm may provide more cost-effective transit service with better regional
coordination than do two separate public agencies, if the firm is given appropriate incentives (such as
adequate compensation and the prospect of continuation of contracts in future).
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Veolia Transport’s parent company is Veolia Environnement, a French-based corporation
offering services in three areas in addition to transit: water, waste management, and
energy.
Veolia has also contracted with Jefferson Parish Transit (JeT) for operation, basic
management, and vehicle maintenance of transit service since July 2006.18 Under these
circumstances, we examine the efficiency and effectiveness of providing transit service
at each of these two agencies in New Orleans separately, carefully taking into account
differences in contractual terms and conditions for regional transit service in New Orleans
over years.19
The second hypothesis examines a potential benefit to regional coordination that may
arise from having one private firm provide services for multiple jurisdictions in a region.
In other words, this study will examine whether or not, and how efficiently, one private
firm that contracts with two different jurisdictions can achieve better regional coordination
for transit service in multiple aspects, such as planning, management, operation, and
adopting new technologies, while avoiding geographic equity issues and other jurisdictional
problems.20
Given appropriate coordination and regulation (e.g., incentives to increase fare box
revenues by encouraging ridership), a private firm may create a more coordinated system.
Although it is often difficult generalize the analysis findings of a case study of one or
more agencies, it can provide experiences that contribute to a better understanding
of the advantages and limitations of transit contracting as it relates to regional service
coordination.

BACKGROUND
Greater New Orleans Region
The Greater New Orleans region offers a unique opportunity to study the effects that
contracting transit provision has on cost efficiency and effectiveness, quality of service
delivered, and regional coordination.21 As it is important to understand the economic and
social settings in which RTA and JeT operate public transit service in order to examine the
effects of contracting, this section documents the background conditions of transit service
outsourcing in two contrasting jurisdictions: (1) New Orleans Regional Transit Authority
18 The original contract was signed with ATC/Vancom, which had recently been acquired by Veolia. The
contract was later amended to change the name to Veolia Transportation services.
19 It should be noted that two separate contracts do not specifically require regional coordination per se.
Thus, RTA and JeT each focus on their own system performance, not regional coordination.
20 This situation is not widely seen in the U.S., but is often found in the U.K. (Stagecoach services in
the Tyne and Wear Metropolitan Area). For example, as one private firm operates transit service in both
Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish, which includes the New-Orleans Airport (served by the “Blue Van”
shuttle), this firm is expected to improve coordination in services across jurisdictional boundaries, which
has been problematic for many years.
21 A quick GIS analysis of urban areas with more than one transit agency, combined with contractor
data for those agencies from the NTD, indicated that there are only four areas in the country in which one
provider has been separately contracted by two adjacent jurisdictions to provide the operational services
of public transit.
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(NORTA or RTA) in the city of New Orleans and (2) Jefferson Transit (JeT) in Jefferson
Parish, made up of several suburban cities adjacent to New Orleans.22
The city of New Orleans has played an important role in the history of the United States.
Its port, located on the Mississippi River, brought the city to international prominence in the
19th and early 20th centuries (City of New Orleans 2010). During this period, New Orleans
grew significantly in size and population.
Infrastructure projects, most notably a drainage system built between 1896 and 1925,
allowed for rapid expansion and growth. New neighborhoods were built, extensive streetcar
tracks were laid, and public health improved in the 19th and early 20th centuries (City of
New Orleans 2010).
Like many cities, New Orleans underwent dramatic changes after World War II, as urban
renewal projects, the construction of the Interstate Highway System (featuring I-10 in
the New Orleans region), and suburbanization took place (City of New Orleans 2010).
Eventually all streetcar lines, except the Saint Charles line, were removed as buses
became the dominant mode of public transit. Despite dramatic expansion and changes,
New Orleans still retained much of its historic character, which is essential to one of its
main industries, tourism. The population in the city of New Orleans reached its peak with
627,525 in 1960 and fell steadily in the ensuing decades (City of New Orleans 2010).
The oil and gas industry spurred significant economic development during the 1970s and
1980s. During this time, the region added 100,000 new jobs, an increase of 25 percent
(City of New Orleans 2010). However, the economy drastically changed when the oil and
gas boom ended in 1985. The oil and gas bust, along with decreased federal funding, led to
a period of economic stagnation (City of New Orleans 2010). Household incomes fell and
the population shrank. This stagnation stabilized as the national economy began to grow
in the 1990s, but the New Orleans economy never fully recovered. The city’s tourism and
creative industries became the new backbone of the economy after oil and gas companies
moved their operations to Houston and Dallas (City of New Orleans 2010). The Port saw
significant investment and growth during the 1990s, but the New Orleans region, on the
whole, failed to diversify and compete in other industries (City of New Orleans 2010).
Economic and social problems persisted through the 1990s and 2000s, and were widely
exposed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which hit the city in late August 2005 (City of
New Orleans 2010).
The New Orleans urbanized area, located in Southeastern Louisiana, consists of seven
parishes spread over an area of 198 square miles (Federal Transit Administration 2008a).
In 2009, the population of the entire seven-parish urbanized area was estimated to total
about 1.19 million. The two largest parishes by population, Orleans and Jefferson, are
served by two transit systems: RTA and JeT, respectively. After Hurricane Katrina, the
population in the New Orleans metropolitan area plummeted as refugees scattered all
over the country (Figure 4). The region’s largest parish by population, Orleans, fell from
22 While it is important to take into account the certain effects of Hurricane Katrina on local conditions, this
is more so for Orleans Parish than for Jefferson Parish. To examine this, it would be useful to conduct an
analysis of longitudinal data, such as monthly data of operation indices and ridership for two jurisdictions,
controlling for other variables such as population and economic indicators.
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455,000 residents in July 2005 to 158,253 in December 2005,23 a decrease of 64 percent,
reaching an estimated 208,000 the following year, a drop of 54 percent from 2005 (Figure
5). Jefferson Parish also lost population during the aftermath of Katrina, though the loss
was not as dramatic. Jefferson Parish’s population fell from 451,000 in July 2005 to
420,000 by July 2006; a loss of about 31 thousand people (seven percent). Since then,
Orleans Parish has recovered much of its lost population, but is still not back to preKatrina levels. As of July 2009, Orleans Parish had an estimated population of 354,000,
which is 78 percent of its pre-Katrina population. As of July 2009, Jefferson Parish’s
population was estimated to be 443,000, which is 98 percent of its pre-Katrina population
(Federal Transit Administration 2008a).
1,400,000
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900,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 4. Population Estimates for New Orleans MSA (2000–2009)
Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center 2010

Hurricane Katrina not only impacted the residents in the region—its effects extended to
the region’s transportation system as well. The situation created after the storm is unique
for transportation planners. Hundreds of millions of dollars of physical assets were lost and
transit users relocated or were left homeless, resulting in losses of farebox revenue and
ridership. In response transit providers were forced to scale back operations. Forecasts
made before the storm are no longer useful (New Orleans Regional Planning Commission
(RPC) 2009).
In addition, the Greater New Orleans region has been going through suburbanization
of both residents and jobs. Over the past several decades, residents of Orleans Parish
have been moving from the urban core in Orleans Parish to suburban Jefferson Parish.
Jefferson Parish now has the largest population in the New Orleans Region (Plyer and
23 Another study by Frey and Singer (2006) reports that the city went from a pre-Katrina population of
437,186. Only since March 2009 has the population surpassed 300,000.
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Campanella 2010). Along with the region’s population, jobs have also been moving away
from the city core. Labeled “job sprawl,” this dispersing of job centers has made the task of
providing transit service much more difficult as more and more people rely on automobiles
to access employment opportunities located in suburban areas rather than taking jobs in
the central city. Suburban Jefferson Parish now has more jobs in all employment sectors
than the urban core in Orleans Parish (Plyer and Campanella 2010).

600,000
500,000

Population

400,000
300,000
200,000
Orleans Parish

100,000

Jefferson Parish

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 5. Population Estimates for Orleans and Jefferson Parishes (2000–2009)
Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center 2010

As illustrated in Figure 6, the differing urban forms of the two parishes are reflected in
their commuting characteristics. Orleans Parish, which includes inner-city New Orleans,
has more commuters that rely on public transportation than Jefferson Parish, which has
a much more dispersed urban form. As such, a larger percentage of suburban Jefferson
Parish residents rely on automobiles to access their jobs, whereas Orleans Parish has far
more public transit users, walkers, and cyclists. While seven percent of Orleans Parish
residents used public transit to access their jobs in 2008, only one percent of Jefferson
Parish residents used public transit. Eighty-one percent of Jefferson Parish workers drove
alone to work, compared to 67 percent in Orleans Parish.
As shown in Table 6, the differences between Orleans and Jefferson Parishes are also
reflected in their economic characteristics. Suburban Jefferson Parish has a much higher
median household income and a far lower percentage of people living below the poverty
level. A greater percentage of Jefferson Parish residents have access to a vehicle, and
have a slightly longer average commute time than those living in Orleans Parish.
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Figure 6. Mode of Transport to Work in Orleans and Jefferson Parish, 2008
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008

Similarly, Orleans and Jefferson Parish have divergent income distributions. The disparity
in household incomes between Orleans and Jefferson Parish is stark. As mentioned
previously, Jefferson Parish has attracted more jobs and residents than Orleans Parish.
Jefferson Parish not only has a larger population than Orleans parish, but it also has
far more wage earners than the latter. Additionally, according to the U.S. Census, wage
earners in Jefferson Parish make more money than their counterparts in Orleans Parish.
Jefferson Parish has a higher percentage high-income households ($75,000 or more)
and middle-income households ($25,000 to $75,000) (Figure 7). At 36 percent, Orleans
Parish has a far greater percentage of households earning less than $25,000 per year
than Jefferson Parish.
Jefferson and Orleans Parishes also have very different racial/ethnic composition. Like
many American cities and suburbs, the demographics and socio-economic characteristics
of New Orleans vary greatly between the inner city and the surrounding suburbs. As
Figure 8 shows, Jefferson Parish’s population is predominantly white at 59 percent,
while Orleans Parish has a majority black or African American population of 61 percent.
Jefferson Parish also has a larger Hispanic or Latino population at nine percent, while
Orleans Parish’s Hispanic or Latino population is five percent.
With these economic and social background conditions, the two transit operators in
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes face very different challenges in providing service to their
respective areas.
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Table 6. Selected Economic Characteristics of Orleans and Jefferson Parish
Median Household Income
Percentage of People Living
Below the Poverty Level
Households without Access to
a vehicle
Mean Travel Time to Work
(workers 16 and over)

Orleans Parish

Jefferson Parish

$37,751

$47,135

22.6%

12.5%

20%

7%

22.7 minutes

24.1 minutes

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008

Figure 7. Household Income Distribution in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes in 2008
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008
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Figure 8. Race/Ethnicity of Residents in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes in 2008
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008

New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA)
The New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) is by far the largest fixed route transit
operator in the New Orleans area. The agency operates buses and streetcars in New
Orleans and the nearby city of Kenner. Before Hurricane Katrina in 2005, RTA recorded
38,762,811 annual boardings, an operating budget of over $103 million, and employed
over 1,300 people (New Orleans Regional Planning Commission 2005).
Even before Hurricane Katrina, the authority was already burdened by high pension
payments and extremely high operating costs from inefficiencies that developed while
RTA was publicly owned and operated. Subsequently, RTA’s in-house service experienced
a significant decline in productivity and patronage due to the direct damage to its transit
system and also the losses in population, jobs, and resources caused by Hurricane
Katrina in 2005. RTA lost 205 buses and 31 streetcars to the storm and flooding.24 By
2007, ridership had decreased to 12 million. In addition to the direct loss of resources
and riders, two of RTA’s primary funding sources, hotel and sales taxes, were drastically
reduced after the hurricane.
Despite these unprecedented challenges, RTA has continued to provide transit service to
the New Orleans area. With the help of funding from FEMA and the Louisiana Recovery
Authority ($121 million has been obligated as of December 29, 2009) (Federal Emergency
Management Agency 2009), most of the streetcar and bus lines are up and running again,
although service has been substantially scaled back. For the year 2008, RTA provided
more than 12.2 million unlinked passenger trips to the smaller post-Katrina population in
24 In 2005, RTA operated service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with 302 peak buses operating 59
fixed bus routes, 66 streetcars operating on three route alignments, and 92 paratransit vehicles providing
service on demand. In 2007, RTA was operating 18 hours a day, consisting of 63 peak buses operating
on 28 fixed routes, 14 streetcars operating on three route alignments, and 63 paratransit vehicles (New
Orleans Regional Transit Authority 2008).
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a relatively dense urban area, and spent over $82 million on operations with a much larger
fleet and more extensive routes than JeT, as Table 7 shows (Federal Transit Administration
2008b).
Table 7. Service Characteristics of RTA and JeT
RTA
Service Area
Population Served
Vehicles Operated in Maximum
Service
Vehicles Available for Maximum
Service
Routes Operated
Fare Revenues Earned

JeT
75 square miles
195,000

94 square miles
438,765

109

42

206
33
$10,529,956

68
13
$2,558,502

Bus
Bus
Modes Operated
Light Rail
Demand Response
Demand Response
Annual Passenger Miles
31,157,218
11,586,415
Annual Unlinked Trips
12,273,303
2,104,408
Annual Vehicle Revenue Miles
4,369,008
1,632,872
Annual Vehicle Revenue Hours
392,617
119,061
Total Operating Funds Expended
$82,828,828
$11,920,947
Source: Federal Transit Administration 2008b

While RTA provided all of its service in-house from 2002 to 2008, it began contracting out
transit service to Veolia Transportation, a subsidiary company of Veolia Transport, based in
France. Veolia is faced with the pre-existing inefficiencies in the RTA system, high pension
payments, and Katrina-related obstacles as it takes over management and operation. Due
to a significant reduction in the number of vehicles in the fleet as well as the patronage,
the entire transit system has been going through a complete restructuring based on the
current travel patterns of current customers. In addition, RTA/Veolia has been working
also on amenities at bus and streetcar stops, including shelters, benches, time schedules
and route maps. In short, RTA/Veolia has been improving these basic elements that are
important to accommodate the needs of transit riders within the system.

Jefferson Transit (JeT)
While RTA primarily serves the city of New Orleans, Jefferson Parish Transit (JeT) operates
primarily outside of New Orleans in suburban Jefferson Parish, including the cities of
Metairie, Gretna, Terrytown, Harvey, and Marrero. JeT, however, has a few bus lines that
provide service to New Orleans, including an express bus that runs to the central business
district. JeT operates 52 buses, 16 paratransit minibuses, and has over 100 employees
(Federal Transit Administration 2008b; Office of Parish President Aaron F. Broussard
2009). It has 10 fixed routes and two park and ride facilities (Office of Parish President
Aaron F. Broussard 2009).
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While JeT is a much smaller transit operator than RTA, it serves what has become the
most populous Parish in the New Orleans region, serving 438,000 people and providing
2.1 million unlinked passenger trips with the total operating expenses of $11.9 million in
2008 (Table 7) (Federal Transit Administration 2008b). Ridership on JeT increased by
five percent from 2007 to 2008 (Jefferson Parish Transit 2008). In 2009, voters approved
a measure to renew a millage (property tax) to support JeT’s operations. Sixty-seven
percent of voters approved the measure to support paratransit, while 61 percent supported
the tax for improved fixed route service. The renewed millage will help with improvements
such as replacing buses, new bus shelters, a new terminal, and improved security (Office
of Parish President Aaron F. Broussard 2009). JeT faces challenges serving a large,
dispersed, suburban area, but given Jefferson Parish’s new status as having the most
jobs and people in the region, JeT’s operation certainly has the potential to grow (Plyer
and Campanella 2010).
Although Hurricane Katrina brought both agencies to a standstill, JeT sustained
considerably less damage than RTA and returned service to its parish on September 28,
2005, after the threat posed by Hurricane Rita had passed (Jefferson Parish 2005). While
RTA lost 236 fixed-route vehicles in addition to greatly reduced ridership levels (Luczak
2007), JeT lost only one bus, and Jefferson Parish’s population and resources remained
more stable than Orleans’ did after Katrina.

Data, Data Sources, and Data Collection
This report presents a case study examining how transit contracting influences the quality
and productivity of transit service in two adjacent jurisdictions in the New Orleans region.
Four distinctive data sets are analyzed in this study: (1) financial and operating data from
the National Transit Database (administered by the Federal Transit Administration of the
U.S. Department of Transportation) from 2001 to 2008;25 (2) data and documents on
transit management, operation, finance and contracting from public agencies in the Greater
New Orleans region;26 (3) original transit user survey data; and (4) information collected
through a questionnaire and interviews on regional coordination that we conducted with
transportation planners at RTA, JeT, and the Regional Planning Commission (RPC), the
metropolitan planning organization in the New Orleans region, in comparison to the data
collected from the nationwide survey.
The first and second sets of data were used to examine processes and contractual terms
of transit service outsourcing in two contrasting jurisdictions, and analyze performance of
transit service. The factors examined were not just those that are easily quantified—cost
efficiency measured by cost per vehicle hour and cost per vehicle mile—but also the
service quality that transit users perceive in transit systems, using the third set of data.
25 The NTD contains a wide array of operating and financial data for all public transit systems that are
recipients or beneficiaries of FTA Urbanized Area Formula Program (Section 5307; formally Section 9)
grants and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) program funding.
26 These include governments’ reports, reports prepared by the staff at public agencies, meeting minutes
of city council, request for proposals, and contracts between public agencies and the contractor, and
document background conditions, processes, and contractual terms of transit service outsourcing in two
contracting jurisdictions. Table 36 in Appendix C lists the documents that we received from the public
agencies in the Greater New Orleans Region.
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These factors include the level of satisfaction that users have on a variety of service
components, such as safety, security, on-time performance, information, and amenities.
The fourth data set was used to assess the level of regional coordination in New Orleans’
transit service.

CONTRACTUAL TERMS
Transit Service Contracting in the New Orleans Region
In January of 2008, the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority issued a request for
proposals for transit management services that were previously contracted to Transit
Management of Southeast Louisiana (TMSEL). TMSEL had operated the system starting
in 2002, when RTA cancelled its contract with Metro New Orleans Transit Inc., stemming
from fraud allegations within the company that were later proven accurate.27 Since 1979,
the transit system had been operated by the RTA, a political subdivision of the State of
Louisiana (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority 2008). TMSEL had played a role in
the delivery of transit service in New Orleans since 1983, however, when the previously
privately owned and operated system came under public control. The private owner, New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI, also the city’s energy company), partnered with RTA
and the City of New Orleans’ Office of Transit Administration jointly formed TMSEL. Since
NOPSI’s existing transit staff were union-represented, rather than subject to civil service
rules, TMSEL was originally created to negotiate wage and other employment matters.
A request for proposals for transit management services was issued on January 28, 2008,
with a submission deadline of March 18, 2008. The RFP called for a single contractor to
provide service of fixed-route, paratransit, and streetcar services in Orleans Parish. Since
1979, the transit system had been operated by the Regional Transit Authority, a political
subdivision of the State of Louisiana (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority 2008).
The contracted firm would be responsible for operations, maintenance, planning, funding,
and management, with overall policy issues, such as fare structure, decided by the RTA
Board of Commissioners (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority 2008). The uniqueness
of this contract lies in these functions, and the RTA’s decision to negotiate the terms with
the selected provider rather than strictly outline them within the RFP.
Bids received from First Transit Inc. of Cincinnati, Veolia Transportation, and TMSEL were
reviewed by a private consultant, Anthony Mumphrey, hired by the RTA. He presented his
recommendation to the RTA board on June 26, 2008. Mr. Mumphrey stated that Veolia
rated the highest in the area of management team experience, strategic approach to
delivery of services, plans for hiring disadvantaged companies as subcontractors, and in
its use of creative ideas, justifying his recommendation to the RTA Board of Directors to
award the contract to Veolia (Donze 2008).

27 On May 24, 2006, Glenn A. Haydel, the majority stakeholder of Metro Transit New Orleans Inc.,
pleaded guilty to committing federal program fraud. Mr. Haydel also served as the president of TMSEL and
had embezzled monies from the cash-strapped RTA during his tenure (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2006).
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After receiving a recommendation from the RTA consultant, in October 2008, RTA’s board
of commissioners unanimously voted in favor of a delegated management contract with
Veolia Transportation. Under the new agreement, Veolia is responsible for all functions
below the board level, including “operations, safety, maintenance, customer care, routes
and schedules, capital planning, budgeting, employee salaries and benefits, human
resources, marketing, ridership growth, grant administration, as well as all the other
typical functions of a transit authority” (Veolia Transportation 2009). After the initial trial
period from October 2008 to August 2009, the official contract period began September
2009, and will last for five years, with the option to extend an additional five years.
In April of 2005, three years prior to the request for proposals sent out by RTA, Jefferson
Parish commenced its own process of securing a single private firm to provide operation
of fixed-route bus service (69,721 revenue hours per year28 ). The parish, which is divided
by the Mississippi River into two unattached landmasses, previously had three separate
contracts with three different operators to provide fixed-route bus service to the Westbank
and Eastbank, and ADA complimentary paratransit service to the parish as a whole.29
In its request for proposals, Jefferson Parish stated that the consolidation of the three
contracts into one would “create efficiencies and reduce redundancies that have resulted
from having three [separate] providers.” Jefferson Parish utilized a competitive tendering
process where bids received were evaluated based on scoring criteria inclusive of (1)
qualifications and experience of the contractor, (2) general requirements, and (3) the price
of the proposal. ATC/Vancom, Inc. was awarded the contract, which was signed in July of
2006. In January of 2007, an amendment was signed (Amendment 2), acknowledging the
name change from ATC/Vancom to Veolia Transportation Services, which had acquired
the company in September of 2005.
Although the transit provider for these adjacent parishes is the same, the type of contract
utilized and range of responsibilities given to Veolia by each authority are very different.
In Jefferson Parish, Veolia’s contract and responsibilities are along the lines of what is
traditionally seen in the U.S., consisting of operations and maintenance roles. Conversely,
RTA in Orleans Parish approached contracting in a unique way compared to customary
contracts in the U.S. by fully allocating the responsibilities for operations, maintenance,
management, planning, and funding to Veolia negotiating with the company to produce a
delegated management contract.
Table 8 compares the functions contracted out to Veolia by RTA and JeT, and illustrates the
differences between the two. The table is separated into five categories: (1) operations,
(2) maintenance, (3) management, (4) planning, and (5) funding, showing what tasks
Veolia is responsible for. These varied approaches to contracting in Orleans and Jefferson
Parishes offer a unique opportunity to examine the differences between each parish in
the process of securing a private provider, and how much control each authority retains
over Veolia.

28 Prior to Hurricane Katrina, when the first RFP was issued, there were 167, 405 bus revenue hours per
year.
29 Louisiana Transit operated service on the Eastbank, ATC on the Westbank, and East Jefferson
General Hospital provided parish-wide paratransit service.
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Funding

Planning

Maintenance of all vehicles and facilities.
Following suggested maintenance schedules for
all equipment.
All transit system functional responsibilities.
Grants.
Administration of service contracts with outside
contractors.
Marketing and advertising.
Safety and security program.
Staff levels and labor relations.
Formal training and safety program submitted as
part of the proposal.
Short- and long-term service planning.
Submission of annual plan for services and
budget to RTA Board.
Capital planning, projects, and procurement.
Route and schedule planning.
Applying for grants and government funding.
Exploring new funding options and programs.

•
•

Maintenance

•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

Operation of fixed-route bus service, streetcar
and paratransit services, and related tasks that
are usually assumed for regular operation.

•

Operation

RTA

•

•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

Table 8. Responsibilities, Reporting, and Requirements at RTA and JeT

Veolia is not responsible for procuring funding.

Veolia is not responsible for any transit planning
functions.

Operation of fixed-route bus service.
Vehicle utilization reporting, inclusive of bicycle rack and
wheelchair lift usage.
Data reporting of total hours operated by line.
Accident reporting.
Reporting of customer service issues and steps taken to
rectify issues.
Maintenance of all vehicles and facilities.
Following preventative maintenance plan that was
submitted as part of the proposal.
Report employee training and pay.
Formal training and safety program submitted as part of
the proposal.

JeT
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Interim Services Management Contract and Outcome of Negotiations between
RTA and Veolia
RTA used negotiations with Veolia to structure a contract that would reflect the shared goals
of each entity (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and Veolia Transportation
Services 2008). The scope of responsibilities that RTA required Veolia to provide and
negotiations between the two led to a contract that is less rigid than that of Jefferson
Parish. This left Veolia much room to decide how to efficiently manage transit in New
Orleans.
While RTA and Veolia were in negotiations, they collectively decided to enter into a shortterm interim contract. The Initial Interim Services Management contract would serve
as a test period while the prior service provider, TMSEL, worked with RTA to transfer
its responsibilities to the control of Veolia. Before the full transition could take place,
RTA stipulated that Veolia fulfill certain transitional tasks to show that they were capable
of handling the complex transit system (Table 9). The transitional terms illustrate the
complexity of the contract and the vast range of responsibilities that were allocated to
Veolia, such as requiring Veolia to invest their own funds in establishing the Lil’ Easy Bus
service, and generating plans for long-term capital improvements and rail programs. It
also signified the increased contract term, from three years with two one-year renewal
options that were outlined in the RFP, to a ten-year contract (New Orleans Regional
Transit Authority (RTA) 2008; New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and Veolia
Transportation Services 2008). The terms were eventually met,30 and the Delegated
Management contract between Veolia and RTA commenced on July 1, 2009.
Table 9. RTA Transitional Contract Requirements
Veolia is required to:
• Invest their own resources in acquiring and implementing the Lil’ Easy bus system.
• Create a plan to establish a full-time rail program that would examine the feasibility of rail
options.
• Plan for the transition of employees from temporary offices to renovated, permanent offices.
• Generate and present a plan for cost savings within the system.
• Produce a long-term fleet replacement plan, introducing unique and different vehicle
options.
• Plan for long-term capital improvements.
• Generate a reorganization plan intended to improve service delivery.

Contractual Terms and Monitoring for Quality Control
Mechanisms to ensure quality service delivery by Veolia are present in both the RTA and
JeT contracts to different degrees, and enforced in different ways. Jefferson Parish’s
contract is designed to include financial incentives for efficient operation, including
elements typically found in performance-based contracts such as growth in service

30 The time frame for completion of these tasks was 90 days after the Initial Interim Services contract
was signed. By mutual agreement, this was extended by six months.
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levels (Hensher and Wallis 2005).31 Although there are no direct financial incentives
for increases in ridership, on-time performance, or maintaining cleanliness of vehicles,
these aspects are accounted for through financial penalties for poor performance or risk
of termination if problems persist. Veolia’s contract with RTA has much less emphasis
on the specifics of quality, and takes a more holistic and possibly naïve approach by
assuming that quality service will be achieved because Veolia has expressed their shared
goal with RTA in “improving the delivery of public transit service to the citizens of the New
Orleans Metropolitan Area” (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and Veolia
Transportation Services 2008, p. 1).
Jefferson Parish explains that it is establishing a system of controls and standards to
prioritize customer satisfaction, and require the operator to provide service that is high in
quality, clean and courteous, and performed in a timely manner (Department of Transit
Administration 2005). These aspects show a level of commitment by the parish to ensure
quality bus service, and recognition that low operating costs are not the only important
factor. In order to monitor the quality of service, Jefferson Parish requires Veolia to submit
monthly reports that detail day-to-day operations, inclusive of customer usage of special
features (e.g., bicycle racks, wheelchair lifts), operator training and upkeep training
programs, and complaints from customers and how they were handled. These reporting
requirements allow Jefferson Parish to keep a close eye on Veolia, but may increase the
cost of contracting because of the amount of monthly reporting required.32 Service is also
monitored by parish staff members, who randomly check the quality of service by riding the
buses to gauge timeliness, passenger treatment, and cleanliness of vehicles, and report
any problems discovered to Jefferson Parish. Finally, Veolia is required to assist the parish
in developing methods to sample transit users to measure their perception of service.
If Veolia fails to comply with the service quality standards and reporting required by
Jefferson Parish, they may be terminated from their duties as a contracted operator.
Consistent reference to service quality and customer satisfaction, penalties for poor
performance, and a financial retainer to safeguard Jefferson Parish against inadequate
service delivery add a layer of protection for the parish. Unfortunately, similar protections
and justifications for termination33 are not seen within the RTA contract. It may be assumed
that negotiations between RTA and Veolia allowed for a less stringent outline of quality
control requirements because RTA was entrusting Veolia to manage the entire system,
and the contract was jointly designed based on a shared set of goals between RTA and
Veolia.34
31 Cox and Love (1988) outline performance measures that could be used in a performance-based
contract. They include: (1) on-time performance, (2) driver courtesy, (3) cleanliness of vehicles, (4) safety
and maintenance measured by break-down rates, and (5) trip completion.
32 Cox and Love (1988) warn that contractors take into account excessive penalties or reporting
standards when bidding on a contract, and will increase the bid price accordingly.
33 The termination policy by RTA allows for a 30-day remedy period, and only refers to the material
obligations of the contract. Since the RTA contract does not include details of service quality, there are no
direct references to termination based on poor service quality.
34 These common goals include: (1) a commitment by both parties to improve the delivery of public
transit services in New Orleans, (2) reducing costs and reinvesting savings, (3) finding alternative public
transit system delivery methods to respond to the varying city needs, and (4) funding a Comprehensive
Improvement Program.
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One feature to control quality that is seen in both the RTA and JeT contract is preventative
maintenance standards. Preventative maintenance requirements are intended to ensure
that buses are operating efficiently for both cost saving and service quality concerns.
This includes requiring that Veolia follow strict preventative maintenance and cleaning
schedules, so long as they comply with the manufacturers’ suggested maintenance. The
management component of the RTA/Veolia contract made it possible for RTA to be less
involved in making such schedules, while Jefferson Parish has increased involvement in
managing the transit system and generating maintenance and cleanliness schedules for
Veolia. It is also a testament to the different stages RTA and JeT were in when the contracts
were signed that JeT looked to Veolia to provide basic operations of a relatively organized
transit system, while Orleans looked for an all-encompassing provider to help restructure
and improve the transit system as a whole. Although each parish made it apparent that
preventative maintenance was a concern, JeT clearly outlined the repercussions of failing
to comply by including in the contract that a $100-a-day fine would be levied against
Veolia if they were found in non-compliance with the maintenance and cleanliness terms.
While both Jefferson Parish and RTA have indicated that cost savings is not the only
concern that should be accounted for, Jefferson Parish has been more directive in how
Veolia is expected to perform when it comes to quality of service, and has made quality
customer experiences a much larger part of these requirements. RTA has focused more
on expanding and improving physical services, perhaps because the system was in a
worse position in terms of efficient operation than Jefferson Parish was.

Labor Issues in Contracts
While RTA in Orleans Parish does not outline worker relations in such detail, Jefferson
Parish makes it clear in the contract that outsourcing should not have any negative impacts
on existing employees. The contracts by both agencies require that Veolia work with those
operators who were employed by the agencies prior to the contract period, and that Veolia
maintain working relations with the labor unions that serve the operators. In addition, both
Jefferson Parish and RTA have outlined the mandated federal provisions that must be
followed in reference to the Equal Opportunity Act, Disadvantaged Business Enterprises,
and Title VI Civil Rights Act. Since Jefferson Parish has retained this responsibility,35 it
is necessary for the Parish to outline the details of standards and expectations in regard
to Veolia’s hires. For this reason, Jefferson Parish clearly indicates the importance of
workers’ rights in both its Request for Proposals and its contract. Jefferson Parish states
that it recognizes the need for operators to pay wages sufficient to attract quality workers.
It also outlines rules for overtime pay (which is the standard time-and-a-half), and requires
the operator to honor current union labor agreements and those that were in effect prior
to awarding the contract.36
Thus, Jefferson Parish has taken adequate measures to ensure that workers will be
protected and that cost savings will be based on efficiency of operations, and not on
cuts in service quality or employee compensation. This is important, especially in light of
35 Although Veolia does not retain any management responsibilities, they are required to provide safety
and worker training and refresher courses, which could be seen as a management component.
36 Jefferson Parish has two separate labor agreements, one for the Eastbank, and another for the
Westbank.
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research that has identified these cuts as prevalent when transit operations are contracted
out (Frick, Taylor, and Wachs 2006; Kim 2005; Nicosia 2002).

Compensation and Cost Saving Incentives
Jefferson Parish and RTA approached compensation of Veolia in different ways, although
each includes a variable cost payment to cover operating costs. This is due to the varied
level of responsibilities found within each contract. Although RTA utilized negotiations in
securing Veolia as a provider, similar to those of performance-based contracts, RTA does
not include an incentive payment in the final Delegated Management contract. Jefferson
Parish followed a more traditional bidding process and created a more rigid contract, but
the parish offers an incentive payment based on quality performance. This exemplified the
mixture of performance-based contract format and traditional competitive tendering format
found within each of the parishes’ contracts. Table 10 presents details of payments and
incentives to Veolia in three different contracts: (1) RTA’s transitional contract, (2) RTA’s
final delegated management contract, and (3) JeT’s final contract.37
Comparing the RTA Initial Interim Services contract and the RTA Delegated Management
contract, one can see how Veolia and RTA collectively worked together to negotiate the
changes in contractual terms towards common goals. In particular, the change in cost
per vehicle hour is substantial when comparing the Initial Interim Services contract and
the Delegated Management contract (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and
Veolia Transportation Services 2008). Because Veolia received documents and data on
RTA’s existing transit system, Veolia was able to examine potential measures for cost
savings. Within the first contract, the cost per vehicle hour for fixed-route, paratransit,
and streetcar were $85.52, $77.24, and $115.21 respectively, resulting in a 10 percent
decrease in fixed-route cost, 12 percent decrease in paratransit cost, and nineteen percent
decrease in streetcar cost from the initial payments RTA had anticipated making. Hensher
and Stanley (2008) better explain this process by suggesting that in negotiations, parties
perceive one or more problems between them and work together toward a common goal
of resolution.
Aside from the variable cost per vehicle hour, Veolia is also compensated by RTA with
a fixed rate per month of $1,390,732 for the length of the contract to cover costs mainly
associated with administrative and management costs.38 Such a payment is not found
in the Jefferson Parish contract because Veolia does not have the level of responsibility
in Jefferson Parish that it does in Orleans Parish. Veolia is responsible for planning and
management functions (Table 8) that greatly increase its costs incurred in the RTA/Veolia
contract. Although some of the costs, such as insurance payments, and labor and benefits
of administrative staff, are covered by Veolia in Jefferson Parish, it is assumed that these
costs were factored into the cost per revenue vehicle hour that Veolia is reimbursed for.
37 It should be noted that RTA/Veolia did not supply more details than provided in this report despite
our repeated requests to obtain documents and reports that supplement two documents that RTA/Veolia
initially provided: (1) 2008 Request for Proposals, and (2) Transit Management Services First Amendment
to Transit Management Agreement (Transitioning to Delegated Management).
38 The fixed fee covers all administrative, supervisor, and dispatcher employee labor and benefit;
Workers’ Compensation Insurance; casualty and liability insurance; administrative equipment and supplies;
data processing and technical services; security; armored car services; travel; and advertising and
promotion.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Empirical Study: Effects of Transit Contracting

52

Table 10. Payments and Incentives in RTA and JeT Contracts
RTA

Fuel Cost

Fares

Cost-Saving Incentives

Management
Fee

Payment

Transitional Contract

Fixed fee: $1,109,544 from
October 2008 to December
2009
Variable fee:
$85.52/hr (fixed route),
$77.24/hr (paratransit), and
$115.21/hr (light rail)

Final Delegated
Management Contract
Fixed fee: $1,390,544
made in monthly
installments for 299,388
fixed route vehicle hours
(VH),
77,020 paratransit VH,
120,583 light rail VH
Variable fees:
$76.86/hr (fixed route),
$68.32/hr (paratransit), and
$93.47/hr (light rail)

JeT
Final Contract

$88.97 per fixed route
revenue VH for 75,347
revenue VH; increases
of more than 20,000
revenue VH will be
renegotiated

$45,984 for first month, then
$147,938 per month during
Same as Transitional
interim management period
Contract
Additional $16,573 per
month for EZ bus service

Built into cost per
revenue VH

Veolia will receive 25% of
the total savings achieved
each year if it meets
service quality performance
standards:
Maintenance Effectiveness:
Miles between road calls
Operating Effectiveness:
Percent missed trips
Safety: Accidents per
100,000 miles
Service effectiveness:
Ridership per hour

No incentive program

Veolia receives 10% of
the difference between
projected costs and
actual costs when
the actual costs are
lower, without stated
requirement to meet
certain performance
criteria*

Property of RTA

Property of RTA

Property of Jefferson
Parish

Same as Transitional
Contract

Fuel is calculated
at $2.18 per gallon;
each quarter Veolia
reports increases in
fuel costs and will be
compensated for the
difference

Reimbursed by RTA as a
part of operating expenses

* JeT outlines performance standards and penalties associated. It is unclear whether Veolia will receive
cost difference payments if they are not meeting performance standards, but there are penalties attached
to underperformance.
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Veolia has the opportunity to increase its compensation in different ways throughout both
contracts. In Jefferson Parish, Veolia is awarded 10 percent of the difference between
the actual annual audited budget, and any cost savings realized by Veolia. There is also
a component for compensation built into the cost per revenue hour. Jefferson Parish has
built into the contract a way in which the budget can be renegotiated if necessary, but
warns that any renegotiations that take place will also include a renegotiation of the set
management fee. The risk of renegotiations leading to Jefferson Parish decreasing the
management fee paid to Veolia may be viewed as a way to deter Veolia from working
inefficiently, and consequently increasing the cost of operations. On the other hand, if
Veolia is able to decrease operating costs, it will share the benefit with Jefferson Parish
because the contract allows Veolia to receive 10 percent of any cost savings realized.
The matter of incentive payments to Veolia by RTA is another aspect of the contract that
changed significantly from the Initial Interim Services contract to the Delegated Management
contract. In the transitional contract, Veolia was compensated 25 percent of any cost
savings achieved, as long as certain performance standards were met. These standards
included a variable to account for maintenance effectiveness, operating effectiveness,
and safety and service effectiveness. Any shortcomings in meeting any of these standards
were to result in a reduction of the incentive payments. Once the transition to the Delegated
Management contract was made, these incentive payments were removed in their entirety.
The rationale behind this decision to remove the incentive payments is unclear from the
available documents.39
As shown, each public agency has approached contracting transit services in a very
different way. Each contract holds similarities to those found in the adjacent parish, but
RTA’s decision to contract out a wider range of responsibilities has created the necessity
for a less rigid, more financially complicated contract. JeT in Jefferson Parish has placed
a great deal of emphasis on quality control and customer service to ensure that standards
will continue to be met while Veolia is discovering new ways to efficiently cut the costs
of bus operation. As for RTA in Orleans Parish, a desire to reorganize the structure and
effectiveness of the transit system while decreasing the previously high operating costs is
reflected throughout the contract.

TRANSIT USER SURVEY
Methodology of Transit User Survey Data Collection
A survey was designed to assess transit user’s perceptions of quality and regional
coordination of transit service in the Greater New Orleans region, and to capture any
changes in users’ perceptions during the 12-month period prior to the time when each
participant took the survey, representing the period in which RTA service provision strategy
changed from in-house to contracting. The main survey questions were related to riders’
perceptions of various attributes of transit service and regional coordination that influence
transit users’ experience, ranging from safety and cleanliness to waiting times and route
39 As previously stated, RTA/Veolia has not responded requests for more details of the contract as of
November 24, 2010. This lack of transparency to the public is often problematic, and might lead to more
serious problems once more information on the contract is revealed.
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information. Additionally, the survey included questions regarding transit users’ demographic characteristics and their trip characteristics at the time of survey taking.40 The
survey was designed so that survey respondents could complete it within 15 minutes, as
they would have limited time to complete the survey while waiting for their next bus or
streetcar.
Bus/streetcar stop locations for conducting the survey were selected based on the presence
of trip generators/attractors and transfer points of more than two transit lines, and on
consultation with RTA and JeT. Although initially an equal number of bus/streetcar stops in
both jurisdictions was selected, the plan was changed due to a substantially lower number
of people observed waiting at bus stops in Jefferson Parish. Instead on-board surveys
were conducted on JeT vehicles.41 A total of four graduate and undergraduate research
assistants went into the field and approached individuals waiting at transit stops, ensured
that they were over the age of 18, and requested participation in our transit user survey.
Each respondent could either fill out the survey or provide responses to the research
assistant, who could fill out the survey on behalf of the survey taker. In general, people
were very cooperative, and were eager to express their opinions on transit service.A total
of 461 surveys were collected over a three-month period.
There are a few concerns arising from the way this survey was conducted. First, the
survey was conducted on people who are already using transit service, which may have
caused a selection bias; for example, people who are so dissatisfied with the level of
transit service that they no longer use it would not be captured by this survey. Second,
some respondents may have provided answers for multiple questions in seconds without
carefully reflecting on their perceptions of transit service attributes. In this case, although
recorded responses may not reflect real perceptions possessed by transit users, there
are no measures to distinguish them from other responses.

Transit User Survey Data Analysis
In all, 461 transit users completed surveys: 231 at RTA stops, 77 at JeT stops or onboard
JeT buses, and 153 at transfer points between the two systems. After collecting the survey
data, we inputted them into a Microsoft Access database. Then the data set was exported
and converted to a Stata format. The user survey data was analyzed using standard
descriptive statistics (frequency tables, and cross-tabulations) and the importancesatisfaction (IS) analysis method, distinguishing responses in the RTA system from those
in the JeT system.

Demographic and Trip Characteristics
Trip Characteristics
Only transit patrons over the age 18 were interviewed, so the results represent the
characteristics of adult riders and their trips. Almost 40 percent of the respondents were
40 The actual survey sheet used in this study is included in Appendix E.
41 Questions on the transit user survey were kept the same. Instead, survey respondents were asked to
think about the transit stop with their most frequent use to answer some of survey questions.
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going to or from work. The next most common trip purposes for respondents were for
shopping or personal business (26 percent), and school or college (18 percent) (see
Appendix F, Figure 32). Approximately 69 percent of the riders were on a trip that they
regularly made (see Appendix F, Figure 33).42 Sixty-six percent of respondents expected to
make at least one transfer (see Appendix F, Figure 34), and 34 percent reported that their
trip would include a transfer between RTA and JeT (see Appendix F, Figure 35).
Rider Characteristics
A total of 385 respondents reported that they used public transportation weekly. Of those, 75
percent used transit four or more times a week (see Appendix F, Figure 36). Respondents
reported that they definitely or probably could not have used a car for the trip they were on
(see Appendix F, Figure 37).
Almost two-thirds of all respondents reported an income below $50,000 a year. Of those,
46 percent had incomes below $15,000, 33 percent had incomes between $15,000 and
$30,000, and 20 percent had incomes between $30,000 and $49,000 (see Appendix F,
Figure 38).
Almost half of the adult riders reported that they were between 18 and 35 years; while only
five percent were over 65 (see Appendix F, Figure 39).
Finally, there were significant differences in the racial profiles of riders from each transit
system (Appendix F, Table 36). Overall, 74 percent of respondents were African American,
12 percent were white, five percent were Latino, and nine percent were Asian, Native
American, or some other race. However, JeT’s proportion of African American riders
surveyed is much lower than RTA’s and its proportion of White riders is higher. Seventynine percent of riders surveyed at RTA stops were African American, as opposed to 57
percent of JeT riders, and only nine percent of RTA riders were Caucasian, compared
with 25 percent in the JeT system.43 In both parishes, African American ridership is
disproportionately high and white ridership is disproportionately low, compared to the racial
breakdowns of populations in each parish; in comparison, Jefferson Parish’s population
is 27 percent African American and 59 percent white, while Orleans’ is 61 percent African
American and 31 percent white (Figure 9).

Importance and Satisfaction (IS) Analysis
Importance-Satisfaction (IS) analysis was developed in the marketing field, and is often
used to evaluate the relative importance of attributes of transit services and facilities.
IS-analysis helps transportation planners and managers maximize the impact of new
investments on customer satisfaction by focusing improvements in areas where customer
satisfaction is low and importance to customers is high (ETC Institute 2006). Thus, using

42 Respondents could choose more than one purpose, so the total of the percentages for all categories is
greater than 100 percent.
43 See Appendix F, Table 36 for more detailed results of survey respondents’ race and ethnicity by
agency.
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indices of improvement need (IS rankings), transit agencies can direct investments toward
improvements that will be most beneficial to their customers.44

Figure 9. Race/Ethnicity of Survey Respondents
To obtain an attribute’s importance rating, researchers calculated the proportion of
respondents who ranked it “Very Important” out of the total number of valid answers in the
survey. To obtain the satisfaction rating, we calculate the proportion of survey respondents
who indicate satisfaction with the attribute (“Strongly agree” or “Agree somewhat”). These
ratings are expressed in percentages. Based on the ratings of all attributes, one may
determine rankings for both importance and satisfaction.
Then the Importance-Satisfaction (IS) rating is computed for each attribute by multiplying
the importance rating by 1 minus the satisfaction rating.
Equation 1: Importance-Satisfaction
					IS
=
						=

[Importance x (1-Satisfaction)]
[Importance x Dissatisfaction]

The maximum rating of 1.00 occurs when all respondents consider an attribute “Very
important,” but no respondents are satisfied with the current quality of the attribute. The
minimum rating of 0.00 occurs when one of the following is true:
44 This analysis has been adapted from research that one of the authors has been conducting with
researches at UCLA. See (Iseki and Taylor 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2007).
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1. No respondents consider the attribute “Very important,” and
2. All respondents are at least somewhat satisfied with the current quality of the attribute
(i.e., all respondents chose “Strongly agree” or “Agree somewhat” with a satisfaction
statement in the survey)
The IS rating is thus an index that assesses the need for improvement; the higher the IS
rating, the greater the improvement need. Ideally, an agency would prioritize improvements
to attributes with high IS ratings. Based on IS ratings for each of the attributes across
facilities surveyed, we rank them for importance and satisfaction levels. In this study,
the results are aggregated across a multiple facilities and routes to compare levels of
importance and satisfaction between the two transit systems.45
The quality of service factors that transit users were asked to rank for both importance and
satisfaction were the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

This station/stop area is clean.
There are enough places to sit.
There is shelter here to protect me from the sun or rain.
The signs here are helpful.
It is easy to get schedule and route information at this station.
I usually have a short wait to catch my bus/train.
My bus/train is usually on time.
It is easy to find my stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
I feel safe here at night.
This stop is well lit at night.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar schedule/route maps of RTA.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar schedule/route maps of JeT.
It is convenient to pay for fare.
It is easy to get around this stop.
It requires a short waiting time to make a transfer at this stop.
Overall, this is an easy place to transfer to another bus or streetcar.

In addition to asking about users’ importance and satisfaction ratings for each of these
issues, researchers also asked each respondent if s/he had noticed any change in the
quality of service within the last twelve months, and if so, approximately when the change
became noticeable, but too few users could recall a change or when it occurred to make
this data useful.
Importance
The percentages of RTA and JeT users surveyed who indicated that each attribute was
“very important,” and how their responses rank the importance of each attribute, are shown
in Table 11 and Table 12. For eight of the 17 attributes, differences between RTA and JeT
users were found to be statistically significant in t-tests that compare the proportions of
45 If these data and IS ratings were to be used for planning purposes, the data reported on here would
need to be disaggregated by facility to produce more meaningful results for transit customers.
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respondents in each system who answered “very important” (highlighted in the tables).
Most notably, RTA riders ranked the ease of obtaining information (attribute M) about
JeT routes and maps last, with only 80.4 percent indicating that JeT information was
very important to them. JeT users on the other hand, not only ranked the importance of
ease of obtaining JeT information sixth (94.4 percent), but they ranked the importance of
obtaining RTA information (attribute L) even higher—in third place, with 94.9 percent. RTA
users ranked the importance of obtaining RTA information seventh, with 92.0 percent of
respondents giving it the highest importance level.
After ease of obtaining JeT schedule and route information, convenience in paying fares
was the next most significant difference (attribute N). More JeT users ranked this “very
important” (95.8 percent), than any other category. 90.8 percent of RTA respondents rated
fare convenience “very important,” putting it in ninth place.
Short transfer waiting times (attribute P) were another significant difference between the
two systems. Although respondents from both systems placed greater value on a short
wait overall, 94.1 percent of JeT users rated transfer waiting times as very important,
placing it at seventh rank, while 90.7 percent of RTA users found it very important, in tenth
place.
Other responses with statistically significant differences in importance ratings were: (1)
shelter from the elements (attribute C), which JeT users rated higher at 93.7 percent and
twelfth place compared to RTA users’ 91.2 percent and eighth place; (2) overall ease
of transferring to another bus from the stop/line in question, which RTA and JeT users
both rated highly, but JeT users slightly more so, with 95.3 percent considering it very
important compared to 93.2 percent of RTA users; on-time buses/streetcars, which was
very important to 94.8 percent of JeT users and 92.8 percent of RTA users (attribute
G); helpful signs, with a 90.4 percent rating from RTA users and an 86.5 percent rating
from JeT (attribute D); and ease of getting schedule and route information at the stop or
station where the survey was completed (attribute E), with 89.4 percent of RTA users and
86.5 percent of JeT users rating this very important.
JeT riders place more importance on regional coordination than RTA riders. Among JeT
riders, ease of getting bus/streetcar schedule/route maps of RTA came as the fourth highest
in ranking (attribute L), and the three other attributes related to regional coordination are
also ranked within the top seven. In contrast, RTA riders ease of getting bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of JeT placed (attribute M) at the bottom of the list, and three other
attributes related to regional coordination at seventh, ninth, and tenth overall. This finding
may actually indicate that many JeT riders in fact need to make transfers within the RTA
system to complete their trips.
Satisfaction
RTA and JeT users surveyed differed more substantially in their levels of satisfaction.
The average percentage of “strongly agree” or “agree somewhat” answers for RTA
respondents was 61.5 percent, whereas for JeT respondents the average was 75.1
percent. Satisfaction ratings and rankings for each agency are shown in Table 13 and
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Table 14. In the case of satisfaction, there were only three quality factors that users of the
two systems did not differ on significantly: feeling safe during the day (attribute I), which
users of both systems ranked highly, in second place for both; convenience of paying fare
(attribute N), which was ranked fourth among RTA responses and fifth for JeT; and ease
of getting around the stop where the survey took place (attribute O), ranked third among
both systems’ respondents (highlighted in tables).
Satisfaction with the ease of finding their stop (attribute H) received the most high
satisfaction ratings from both systems’ users, although the difference between them was
still statistically significant: 87.6 percent of RTA users surveyed were very or somewhat
satisfied, compared to 94.7 percent of JeT users.
Table 11. RTA Riders’ Importance Rankings
Survey Question
H
F
Q

O
I
G
L
C
N
P
D
E
K
J
B
A
M

It is easy to find my stop.
I usually have a short wait to
catch my bus/train.
Overall, this is an easy place
to transfer to another bus or
streetcar.
It is easy to get around this stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
My bus/train is usually on time.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of RTA.
There is shelter here to protect
me from the sun or rain.
It is convenient to pay for fare.
It requires a short waiting time to
make a transfer at this stop.
The signs here are helpful.
It is easy to get schedule and
route information at this station.
This stop is well lit at night.
I feel safe here at night.
There are enough places to sit.
This station/stop area is clean.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of JeT.

Category

Rating

Ranking

Access
Connection &
Reliability
Overall

95.0%
94.2%

1
2

93.2%

3

Access
Security & Safety
Connection &
Reliability
Regional
Coordination
Amenities

92.9%
92.9%
92.8%

4
5
6

92.0%

7

91.2%

8

Regional
Coordination
Regional
Coordination
Information
Information

90.8%

9

90.7%

10

90.4%
89.4%

11
12

Security & Safety
Security & Safety
Amenities
Amenities
Regional
Coordination
AVERAGE

89.0%
87.5%
86.3%
84.1%
80.4%

13
14
15
16
17
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Table 12. JeT Riders’ Importance Rankings
Survey Question
N

It is convenient to pay for fare.

Q

Overall, this is an easy place
to transfer to another bus or
streetcar.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of RTA.
I usually have a short wait to catch
my bus/train.
My bus/train is usually on time.

L
F
G
M
P
I
C
O
H
J
D
E
K
B
A

It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of JeT.
It requires a short waiting time to
make a transfer at this stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
There is shelter here to protect me
from the sun or rain.
It is easy to get around this stop.
It is easy to find my stop.
I feel safe here at night.
The signs here are helpful.
It is easy to get schedule and route
information at this station.
This stop is well lit at night.
There are enough places to sit.
This station/stop area is clean.

Category

Rating

Ranking

Regional
Coordination
Overall

95.8%

1

95.3%

2

Regional
Coordination
Connection &
Reliability
Connection &
Reliability
Regional
Coordination
Regional
Coordination
Security & Safety
Amenities

94.9%

3

94.8%

4

94.8%

5

94.4%

6

94.1%

7

93.8%
93.7%

8
9

Access
Access
Security & Safety
Information
Information

93.4%
92.6%
89.2%
86.5%
86.5%

10
11
12
13
14

Security & Safety
Amenities
Amenities
AVERAGE

86.3%
85.4%
84.4%
91.5%

15
16
17
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Table 13. RTA Riders’ Satisfaction Rankings
Survvey Question
H
I
O
N

It is easy to find my stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
It is easy to get around this stop.
It is convenient to pay for fare.

Q

Overall, this is an easy place
to transfer to another bus or
streetcar.
The signs here are helpful.
This station/ top area is clean.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of JeT.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of RTA.
It requires a short waiting time to
make a transfer at this stop.
My bus/train is usually on time.

D
A
M
L
P
G
C
K
E
F
J
B

There is shelter here to protect
me from the sun or rain.
This stop is well lit at night.
It is easy to get schedule and
route information at this station.
I usually have a short wait to
catch my bus/train.
I feel safe here at night.
There are enough places to sit.

Category

Rating

Ranking

Access
Security & Safety
Access
Regional
Coordination
Overall

87.6%
86.2%
85.4%
81.7%

1
2
3
4

76.8%

5

Information
Amenities
Regional
Coordination
Regional
Coordination
Regional
Coordination
Connection &
Reliability
Amenities

65.5%
62.9%
60.3%

6
7
8

56.8%

9

56.7%

10

52.4%

11

47.5%

12

Security & Safety
Information

47.4%
47.1%

13
14

Connection &
Reliability
Security & Safety
Amenities
AVERAGE

45.1%

15

44.4%
42.2%
61.5%

16
17
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Table 14. JeT Riders’ Satisfaction Rankings
H
I
O
Q

N
A
D
M
L
P
C
E
G
B
F
J
K

Survey Question
It is easy to find my stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
It is easy to get around this stop.
Overall, this is an easy place
to transfer to another bus or
streetcar.
It is convenient to pay for fare.

Category
Access
Security & Safety
Access
Overall

Rating
94.7%
87.5%
84.9%
83.7%

Ranking
1
2
3
4

Regional
Coordination
This station/stop area is clean.
Amenities
The signs here are helpful.
Information
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
Regional
schedule/route maps of JeT.
Coordination
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
Regional
schedule/route maps of RTA.
Coordination
It requires a short waiting time to
Regional
make a transfer at this stop.
Coordination
There is shelter here to protect me Amenities
from the sun or rain.
It is easy to get schedule and
Information
route information at this station.
My bus/train is usually on time.
Connection &
Reliability
There are enough places to sit.
Amenities
I usually have a short wait to catch Connection &
my bus/train.
Reliability
I feel safe here at night.
Security & Safety
This stop is well lit at night.
Security & Safety
AVERAGE

83.2%

5

82.3%
80.2%
73.3%

6
7
8

72.2%

9

72.1%

10

71.6%

11

70.8%

12

68.8%

13

68.8%
65.6%

14
15

61.4%
56.3%
75.1%

16
17

Importance-Satisfaction
The average IS rating for survey questions at RTA stops was .345, while the average at
JeT stops and lines was .227, indicating that RTA has more high-priority improvements
to make to satisfy its users. Table 15 and Table 16 show the IS ratings and rankings for
each survey question for RTA’s and JeT’s, respectively, and compare the agency’s scores
(Figure 10).
While “it is easy to find my stop” (attribute H) received the highest importance rating
from RTA users, it has the lowest need for improvement based on IS rankings, as the
riding public are very satisfied with this attribute. For both systems, this survey suggests
that ease of finding stops and safety during the day (attribute I) are of low priority to
improve, despite their importance levels, falling in last and second-to-last place for both
agencies. Transit riders are not as concerned about safety during the day as we expected,
considering the crime rates in New Orleans, although safety is a serious concern at night.
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Short waits (attribute F) and safety at night (attribute J) are two of the three highest-rated
quality issues for both agencies; waiting time is first for RTA (with a rating of 0.518) and
third for JeT (rating of 0.326), and safety at night is third for RTA (0.486) and second for JeT
(0.344). JeT riders’ concern for nighttime safety is further emphasized by the importancesatisfaction rating for bus stop lighting at night, which ranks first for JeT at 0.377.
Ease of getting around the stop (attribute O) and convenience of paying fares (attribute N)
are of relatively low priority for both RTA and JeT, although fare-paying convenience ranks
higher for JeT at 12th place compared to RTA’s 14th (it is rated similarly for both agencies:
0.161 for JeT, and 0.166 for RTA).
Table 15. RTA Riders’ Importance-Satisfaction (IS) Ratings and Rankings
Survey Question
F
B
J
C
E
K
G
L
P
M
D
A
Q

N
O
I
H

I usually have a short wait to
catch my bus/train.
There are enough places to sit.
I feel safe here at night.
There is shelter here to protect
me from the sun or rain.
It is easy to get schedule and
route information at this station.
This stop is well lit at night.
My bus/train is usually on time.

Category

Rating

Ranking

Connection &
Reliability
Amenities
Security & Safety
Amenities

0.518

1

0.499
0.486
0.479

2
3
4

Information

0.473

5

0.468
0.442

6
7

0.397

8

0.393

9

0.319

10

0.312
0.312
0.217

11
12
13

0.166

14

0.136
0.128
0.117
0.345

15
16
17

Security & Safety
Connection &
Reliability
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
Regional
schedule/route maps of RTA.
Coordination
It requires a short waiting time to Regional
make a transfer at this stop.
Coordination
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
Regional
schedule/route maps of JeT.
Coordination
The signs here are helpful.
Information
This station/stop area is clean.
Amenities
Overall, this is an easy place
Overall
to transfer to another bus or
streetcar.
It is convenient to pay for fare.
Regional
Coordination
It is easy to get around this stop. Access
I feel safe here during the day.
Security & Safety
It is easy to find my stop.
Access
AVERAGE

Matters of regional coordination are in the middle range of IS rankings for both agencies.
Based on these IS ratings, ease of obtaining RTA route and schedule information (attribute
L) is the highest priority regional coordination to both agencies’ users (ranking eighth for
RTA, with a rating of 0.397, and seventh for JeT, with a rating of 0.264). Shorter transfer times
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(attribute P) are close behind for both RTA and JeT, ranking ninth and eighth respectively,
with scores of 0.393 and 0.263. Although JeT riders place higher importance on regional
coordination attributes, RTA riders are still less satisfied. While recent improvements in
terms of new vehicles, installation of new shelters and benches, and service rescheduling
have been observed, our analysis shows that RTA/Veolia is not yet making significant
progress toward changing users’ perception of their regional coordination efforts.
Table 16. JeT Riders’ Importance-Satisfaction (IS) Ratings and Rankings
K
J
F
G
B
C
L
P
E
M
D
N
Q
A
O
I
H

Survey Question
This stop is well lit at night.
I feel safe here at night.
I usually have a short wait to catch
my bus/train.
My bus/train is usually on time.
There are enough places to sit.
There is shelter here to protect me
from the sun or rain.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of RTA.
It requires a short waiting time to
make a transfer at this stop.
It is easy to get schedule and route
information at this station.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar
schedule/route maps of JeT.
The signs here are helpful.
It is convenient to pay for fare.
Overall, this is an easy place to
transfer to another bus or streetcar.
This station/stop area is clean.
It is easy to get around this stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
It is easy to find my stop.

Category
Security & Safety
Security & Safety
Connection &
Reliability
Connection &
Reliability
Amenities
Amenities

Rating
0.377
0.344
0.326

Ranking
1
2
3

0.296

4

0.267
0.266

5
6

Regional
Coordination
Regional
Coordination
Information

0.264

7

0.263

8

0.252

9

Regional
Coordination
Information
Regional
Coordination
Overall

0.252

10

0.171
0.161

11
12

0.155

13

Amenities
Access
Security & Safety
Access

0.149
0.141
0.117
0.049

14
15
16
17

AVERAGE

0.227
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Figure 10. RTA and JeT Importance-Satisfaction Scores (IS)
Overall, while both RTA and JeT transit riders consider (attribute Q) overall ease of making
transfer and (attributes F and G) two connection- and reliability-related attributes import to
them, they also have different priorities within the top six. While RTA riders list two accessrelated attributes (attributes H and O), JeT riders place three regional coordination related
attributes (attributes N, L, and G) among the top six. In terms of the level of satisfaction,
both groups of riders are well-satisfied with access-related attributes, but are concerned
with a lack of sitting space (attribute B), short waiting time (attribute F), and safety at night
(attribute J). In addition, RTA users are less satisfied with most attributes, in contrast
to JeT riders, indicating continued challenges that RTA/Veolia will have to overcome in
regard to customer satisfaction.
IS analysis takes into account both the importance and satisfaction levels in transit users’
perception of transit service quality, and shows findings that cannot be obtained by using
only one measurement at a time.46 Both RTA and JeT riders rank regional coordinationrelated attributes in the middle range in the same order, short waiting time, safety at night,
sitting space in the top range, and access-related attributes and safety during the day at
the bottom. In this respect, both RTA and JeT can address improvements with similar
priority levels.

PERFORMANCE INDICES
The literature on public transit service privatization shows that governments are often
motivated to privatize by economic reasons: reducing public spending and increasing
productivity in the provision of transit service. Decisions regarding privatization can
46 If RTA planners considered importance rankings alone, ease of finding stops (attribute H) would appear
to be the most critical need to address, while its IS ranking is actually the lowest. Similarly, JeT planners
might be misled by the low importance level of bus stop lighting at night (ranked 15th in importance), which
is actually a high priority because of the low satisfaction about lighting.
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sometimes be politically or ideologically driven, however (Iseki 2004; Sclar 2000).
Inadequate contract design with insufficient economic analysis prior to privatization could
actually lead to an overall cost increase, including transaction and monitoring costs, as
well as lower quality of service. A level of privatization that transfers significant control
over fare levels, service coverage, operating hours, or service frequency from a public
agency to a private firm could potentially reduce both the quantity and quality of service
to the public.
This section analyzes financial and operating data directly obtained from the New Orleans
Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and Jefferson Transit (JeT), in combination with data from
the National Transit Database (NTD) from 2004 to 2009, to assess the performance of
these two transit systems under different privatization schemes. Examining data from these
sources determines each agency’s operating expenses, quantity of service provided, and
level of consumption of transit service. Also evaluated are several performance indicators
for efficiency and effectiveness. It should be noted that data from RTA for 2005 was
not included, as RTA was not required to report 2005 data to the NTD due to Hurricane
Katrina, and that this make graphs appear discontinuous.

Operating and Financial Indices
Operating Expenses
Two variables examined are related to overall operating expenses. One variable is total
modal expenses (TME), or all expenses categorized under operation (as opposed to capital
expenses), which include labor, fuel, supplies, vehicle and non-vehicle maintenance,
administration, insurance, and taxes. The second variable is vehicle operating expenses
(VOE), which primarily includes salaries, wages, and benefits for operators, and fuel costs.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show TME and VOE for RTA’s fixed-route bus and streetcar
services and JeT’s fixed-route bus service from 2004 to 2009.
Figure 11 shows the relative change in TME for each agency since 2004. Expenses for
transit service in the Greater New Orleans Region substantially declined after Hurricane
Katrina, but service levels dropped substantially as well, as is shown later. Both agencies
had similar percentage drops in TME from 2004 to 2006: 35.3 percent for RTA’s bus and
streetcar services combined (38.7 percent for bus expenses alone), and 39.2 percent for
JeT’s bus service, but the differences in the actual reductions in dollars spent are more
dramatic: $37.0 million for RTA bus and streetcar combined, and $35.1 million for bus
alone (dropping from $104.8 million and $90.5 million, respectively, to $67.7 million and
$55.4 million), and $5.2 million for JeT buses (dropping from $13.4 million to $8.1 million).
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Figure 11. Total Modal Expenses (TME) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data available for RTA in 2005

From 2006 (when Veolia commenced its contract with Jefferson Parish, and management
of JeT’s East- and Westbank services were combined) to 2009, JeT’s TME increased
gradually from $8.1 million to $10.2 million, a change of 26 percent overall. RTA’s TME for
bus and streetcar service combined was slightly lower in 2009 than it was in 2006, shortly
after resuming post-Katrina service. RTA’s TME went down from $67.7 million to $66.1
million (a 2.4 percent drop). 2008–2009 was a turning point for RTA with a distinct drop in
bus TME and a rise in streetcar TME.
Two important changes occurred in 2008 for RTA regarding substantial changes in TME.
First, Veolia took on management of the system in October. Second, repairs to all streetcar
lines were completed in June, bringing them back to their former lengths, and obviating the
need for buses to continue serving the restored portions of these lines. The Canal Street
streetcar line began partial service in December 2005 and resumed its full length in April
2006 (New Orleans Regional Transit Authority 2006a, 2006b), but the highly popular Saint
Charles line—which ran through areas that had not been flooded or that had seen limited
flooding and were quick to repopulate—did not begin any rail service until December
2006, and then only in New Orleans’ central business district (RTA 2006d). A substantial
extension of Saint Charles rail service was completed in December 2007 (RTA 2007), and
the streetcar line reopened its full pre-Katrina route in June 2008 (Faciane 2008).
For JeT, vehicle operating expenses (VOE) were 29 percent lower in 2009 than they were
in 2004, the year before Hurricane Katrina. JeT’s VOE fell to their lowest point in 2006,
and rose from there until dropping again between 2008 and 2009. RTA’s VOE were more
volatile. System-wide costs fell 32.7 percent from 2004 to 2006, and continued to drop
in 2007, when the number of vehicles in peak service fell from 74 to 59. VOE rose by
24.5 percent from 2007 to 2008—the same year that a new fleet of biodiesel buses were
rolled out (RTA’ 2006c), but also a year in which gas prices were exceptionally high. Bus
operating costs fell to their lowest level of all in 2009, but streetcar VOE rose in the first full
year of fully restored streetcar lines. RTA’s system-wide VOE dropped from its 2008 level
in 2009, but not as far as its 2007 low.
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Figure 12. Vehicle Operating Expenses (VOE) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

Service Provided
As noted, reductions in operating expenses accompanied reduced service levels. Figure
13 and Figure 14 show the amount of service provided by each agency in terms of revenue
vehicle hours and revenue vehicle miles. Revenue miles and hours are those in which
buses or streetcars are providing service to the public, excluding those when they are
running but not in public service (e.g., “deadheading,” or traveling between the storage
facility and the route).
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Figure 13. Annual Total Revenue Vehicle Hours (in Thousands) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005
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Figure 14. Annual Total Revenue Vehicle Miles (in Millions) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

While RTA’s operating expenses decreased by 35.3 percent from 2004 to 2006 in terms
of TME, and 32.7 percent in terms of VOE, revenue vehicle hours and miles dropped by
68.0 percent and 70.9 percent, respectively, indicating a substantial loss of productivity.
JeT also experienced a drop in productivity, but a smaller one. From 2004 to 2006, JeT’s
TME decreased by 39.2 percent and its VOE decreased by 37.3 percent, but its revenue
vehicle hours dropped by only 48.5 percent, and its revenue vehicle miles dropped by 49.4
percent. The amount of service provided by RTA has been increasing steadily since 2007,
though, while JeT’s service levels remained relatively constant. RTA’s revenue vehicle
hours rose by 42.4 percent from 2007 to 2009, and revenue vehicle miles rose by 26.9
percent; JeT’s revenue vehicle hours and miles rose by 19.3 percent and 20.8 percent,
respectively.
The post-Katrina drop in service is also reflected in the number of vehicles operated in
maximum service: RTA went from 306 in 2004 to 74 in 2006, a loss of 75.8 percent, while
Jet went from 53 to 23, a loss of 56.6 percent. Over the next few years, however, the
number of RTA vehicles operated in maximum service actually dropped further, even while
revenue hours and miles were increasing. In 2009, RTA reported 58 vehicles operated in
maximum service, a drop of 28.4 percent from 2006. JeT’s number of vehicles operated in
maximum service rose by 21.7 percent in the same period. See Appendix G, Table 37 for
each agency’s vehicles in maximum service from 2000–2009.
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show revenue vehicle hours and miles indexed to 2006 figures
in order to illustrate the changes through 2009. All fixed-route services at both agencies
increased over the four-year period, but RTA streetcar service rose by more than 300
percent (from 100 vehicle hours in 2006 to 497 in 2009) because of progress on repairing
damaged lines and vehicles, and thus cannot be attributed to changes in management or
policy.47 Veolia began its interim operation of RTA in October 2008, and 2008–2009, was
the most marked period of service increase for RTA’s bus service, with a 19.5 percent
47 For greater legibility of the graph, the full extent of the rise in streetcar revenue hours and miles is not
shown in Figure 15 or Figure 16, but is shown separately in Figure 17.
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jump in revenue vehicle hours and a 20.3 percent jump in revenue vehicle miles—despite
the removal of bus service along part of the Saint Charles route after the streetcar repairs
were finished. JeT’s service increases in that same period were more modest, with a 7.7
percent rise in revenue hours and a 7.9 percent rise in revenue miles.
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Figure 15. Revenue Vehicle Hours for RTA and JeT Indexed to 2006 Numbers
RTA’s bus revenue hours remained fairly constant from 2006 through 2008, but bus
revenue miles declined by 9.0 percent from 2007 to 2008, a period when substantial
additions to the Saint Charles streetcar line were being made.
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Figure 16. Revenue Vehicle Miles for RTA and JeT Indexed to 2006 Numbers
Impacts of the Saint Charles streetcar extensions from December 2007 to June 2008
can clearly be seen in Figure 17, illustrating the growth in both hours and miles. Rail
revenue vehicle hours rose to 301 percent of the 2006 baseline, and miles to 461 percent.
There was a 134 percent increase in revenue vehicle hours from 2007 to 2008, and a

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Empirical Study: Effects of Transit Contracting

71

235 percent increase in revenue miles. It should be remembered, though, that the 2006
baseline represents only one streetcar line that was not serving its full pre-Katrina length
until April.
RTA did make some extensions to bus services in 2007, including in areas that had been
badly flooded and that were slower than most to recover population density (New Orleans
Regional Transit Authority 2006), but the replacement of buses with streetcars along the
Saint Charles route still resulted in an overall decline in bus mileage. The fact that bus
revenue hours rose by 2.5 percent in the same period that vehicle mileage decreased by
9.0 percent indicates a drop in RTA’s bus operating speed. In 2009, bus revenue hours
increased to 120 percent of the service provided in 2006.
500
450

RTA Rail - VH
RTA Rail - VM

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 17. Revenue Vehicle Hours and Miles for RTA Streetcars

Ridership and Passenger Miles Traveled
Figure 18 shows changes in the number of unlinked passenger trips48 for RTA and JeT
from 2004 through 2009. RTA ridership has steadily increased since Katrina at an average
of 2.78 million additional trips per year (bus and rail combined), while JeT has dropped
from 2.24 million trips in 2006 to 1.98 million in 2009.

48 If a trip involves any number of transfer, it will be counted as more than one trip.
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Figure 18. Annual Unlinked Passenger Trips (in Millions) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

Figure 19 shows passenger miles traveled for both agencies. RTA’s passenger miles
are shown from 2006 to 2009, with 2004’s figures omitted to preserve the legibility of the
graph because of the precipitous post-Katrina drop (combined bus and rail passenger
miles in 2004 were 109.7 million, 302.9 percent higher than its 2006 passenger miles of
27.2 million).
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Figure 19. Annual Passenger Miles Traveled (in Millions) for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2004 and 2005. For greater legibility of the graph, RTA’s passenger miles for
2004 are not shown. Bus passenger miles in 2004 were 92.2 million, rail passenger miles were 17.5 million, and
combined passenger miles were 109.7 million.

2007 is a turning point for passenger mileage at both agencies, especially RTA. Miles
traveled continued to decline in 2006 for the bus service and overall fixed-route service
at both agencies. Rail passenger miles increased from 2006 to 2007 (0.76 million to 1.62
million), but 2006 began with very little streetcar service available at all, and routes were
extended over the following year. RTA’s bus passenger miles fell by 25.5 percent in its
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first year back in service following the hurricane, and its combined rail and bus passenger
miles fell by 21.6 percent. JeT’s passenger miles fell by 11.3 percent from 2006 to 2007,
began to climb again from 2007 to 2008, but dropped again in 2009 to its approximate
level in 2006, 10.82 million. RTA’s bus passenger miles increased by 12.5 percent and rail
passenger miles increased 406.9 percent as restoration proceeded, for a total growth in
passenger miles of 42.5 percent.
The decline in RTA ridership from 2004 to 2006 is more acute than the decline in vehicle
hours of service provided: 85.2 percent, compared to 68.0 percent. This can be attributed
not only to lower productivity, but to population loss (especially lower income households
more likely to depend on transit) and uncertainty about when and where population
recovery would occur in the city while it was being hotly debated whether many New
Orleans neighborhoods could, or should, be rebuilt.
Figure 20 shows the average number of trips per capita (in thousands) for each transit
system and mode. Compared to JeT, RTA has gained more ridership per capita since 2007.
What is notable is the change in RTA’s ridership per capita from 2007 to 2009, an increase
of 30.6 percent. From 2008 to 2009, bus ridership per capita, which had been falling since
2006, began to rise, and ridership per capita of the recently completed streetcar lines
continued to rise, albeit at a slower rate than when service was still being added. This
suggests that RTA was increasing its public service effectiveness throughout this period,
and that while modal substitution may have affected bus ridership levels during streetcar
restorations, bus service was nevertheless continuing to increase its effectiveness under
Veolia’s management in 2009.
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Figure 20. Average Number of Trips per Capita (1,000)
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

Fare Revenue
Figure 21 shows the fare revenue collected by both agencies from 2004 to 2009. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), together with the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), funded free fares on all RTA buses and streetcars from October 2,
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2005 to August 6, 2006 (DeLong 1998; Pickrell 1992; Rubin and Moore 1996). This free
fare until 2006 accounted for the more dramatic rise in RTA fare revenue than in revenue
miles or hours from 2006 to 2007. In its first year of full fare collection after Katrina,
RTA fare revenue increased by only 2.2 percent, with a sharp drop in bus fare revenue
accompanied by a rise in streetcar revenue suggesting a modal shift. Revenue from both
buses and streetcars rose by 16.2 percent from 2008 to 2009, however. JeT recovered
from its 2006 low of $918,000 to $2.3 million in 2007, but remained relatively constant
afterward.
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Figure 21. Annual Fare Revenue for RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2004 and 2005. RTA’s 2004 data are not shown to preserve the legibility of the
graph

Efficiency Indices
To evaluate the efficiency and productivity of the two transit systems, one must examine
efficiency indices that can be calculated by dividing one output variable by one input
variable. These efficiency measures normalize an output variable by the input variable,
and are more comparable among different agencies and time periods.
Cost Efficiency
Although one might guess that productivity declined in both Orleans and Jefferson
Parishes immediately after Hurricane Katrina, after comparing both agencies’ drop in
revenue vehicle hours from 2004 to 2006 (68.0 percent for RTA and 48.5 percent for
JeT) to the drop in their total modal expenses (35.3 percent for RTA and 39.2 percent),
and then reviewing the information from Figure 11 to Figure 16 the relationship is not
entirely clear. Cost per revenue vehicle hour by total modal expenses (Figure 22) and cost
per revenue vehicle hour by vehicle operation expenses (Figure 23) were computed to
examine cost efficiency in RTA’s and JeT’s transit services.As these figures show, RTA’s
cost per revenue vehicle hour for buses drastically declined from 2008 to 2009—by 29.4
percent in terms of TME, and 37.4 percent in terms of vehicle operation expenses. As this
number remained relatively constant from 2006 to 2008, efficiency certainly improved in
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RTA’s first full-year of management and operation under a new contract. However, these
figures also show that streetcar efficiency declined in 2009.
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Figure 22. Cost (TME) per Revenue Vehicle Hour by Mode, for Agency by Year
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005
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Figure 23. Cost (VOE) per Revenue Vehicle Hour by Mode, for Agency by Year
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

Farebox Recovery
Figure 24 illustrates RTA’s and JeT’s farebox recovery ratios. Farebox recovery is the ratio
of fare revenue to total modal expenses. Farebox recovery ratios for 2004, 2007, 2008,
and 2009 are shown, with 2005 and 2006 omitted because of RTA’s free fare period.
This data suggests that JeT is recovering less and less of its expenses from fares; as
its farebox recovery ratio decreased from 28 percent in 2006 to 23 percent in 2009. In
contrast, RTA’s buses have seen a reversal from earlier trends, as farebox recovery ratios

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Empirical Study: Effects of Transit Contracting

76

have increased, from a low of 11 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 2009. RTA’s streetcars
have seen a five percent decline in farebox recovery ratios in 2009, but the system as
a whole has improved its ratio by three percent, as the bus system makes up a larger
proportion of operating expenses and fare revenue.
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Figure 24. Farebox Recovery Ratios for RTA and JeT, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005. Total modal expenses were used to calculate this ratio. Data in 2005 and
2006 of RTA’s free fare period were not included.

Effectiveness Indices
Effectiveness measures how well transit service providers serve the riding public. In many
cases, indices are normalized by input variables, such as operating costs or the number
of employees. The major difference between efficiency and effectiveness indices is that
many factors outside the control of transit operators can affect the public’s consumption
of transit services (as measured by ridership and passenger miles), and consequently,
transit service effectiveness. Factors external to transit providers include the state of the
regional economy, household incomes, private vehicle ownership, availability of parking,
and levels of congestion on highways (Miller et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 2009). At the same
time, it is the goal of public provision of transit services subsidized by tax revenue to
meet a public need for transportation, and that the service be well utilized.49 Thus, it is
important to evaluate cost effectiveness ratios.

Cost Effectiveness
Ridership per revenue vehicle hour (Figure 25) evaluates how effectively the service
provided by each agency increases its ridership. JeT has consistently attracted a similar
level of ridership per unit of operation, averaging 26.3 riders per vehicle hour over the
period studied, but slowly declining from a high in 2006. RTA attracted far fewer riders
49 In reality, the political motivations of elected officials to serve their specific constituencies often leads
to more dispersed transit service than is necessary, in areas that cannot expect even moderate ridership
given local demographics and built environments.
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per unit of operation after the hurricane than before, dropping from 54.2 riders per vehicle
hour in 2004 to only 25.1 in 2006, but increased that number by 52 percent to 38.2 riders
from 2006 to 2009.
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Figure 25. Ridership per Revenue Vehicle Hour, RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005

Ridership per revenue vehicle mile (Figure 26) is another effectiveness measure. JeT’s
ridership per mile has hovered between one and two over the entire period, while RTA’s
bus ridership has risen slightly since Katrina, and streetcar ridership has risen more
dramatically, contributing to an overall increase for RTA of 64.5 percent. As seen in both
figures, streetcar effectiveness is substantially higher than bus effectiveness. The Saint
Charles and Canal Street streetcar lines are exceptionally popular routes, with the Saint
Charles line alone commanding 25.1 percent of RTA’s ridership in 2009.
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Figure 26. Ridership per Revenue Vehicle Mile, RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005
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While effective in terms of ridership, the cost (as a share of total modal expenses) of an
unlinked passenger trip on an RTA streetcar rose sharply in 2009 (Figure 27). Prior to
Hurricane Katrina, RTA streetcars had the lowest cost per trip of either agency or mode,
at approximately $1.60. Although initially high post-Katrina streetcar costs per tip dropped
to a low of only $3.07 in 2008, in 2009—the first full year of completely restored streetcar
service—the cost more than doubled, to $6.22.
RTA bus costs per passenger trip have fallen each year since their high of $8.70 in 2006,
with the sharpest decline (of 32.8 percent) occurring from 2008 to 2009, the system’s
first full year under Veolia. JeT, on the other hand, has seen rising costs per passenger
trip since 2006. JeT’s 2009 cost per passenger trip was $5.16, higher than RTA’s cost of
$4.66 for bus alone, and of $4.31 for bus and rail combined.
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Figure 27. Cost (TME) per Unlinked Passenger Trip, RTA and JeT
Source: No data avaialble for RTA in 2005. Cost per unlinked passenger trip for light rail was substantianly higher,
$20.34, due to the limited level of service, and is not included for legibility in this graph.

Summary of Analyses
While both RTA and JeT experienced losses in productivity in the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the analysis of operating and financial data show different performance
trends for these two agencies from 2006 to 2009. Since 2006, the JeT transit system has
been operated by Veolia under a contract that gives the company much less decisionmaking latitude than the delegated management contract between RTA and Veolia
allows. Overall, while JeT has not seen dramatic changes over the five year period, RTA
has made significant improvements in several indicators that could be attributed to a
significant restructuring of RTA transit service management and operation under the RTA/
Veolia contract.
While RTA made many gains following its resumption of service in 2006, some are
attributable to the fact that the city and the transit system have begun to recover from
the profound lows of 2006. This is especially noticeable when looking at RTA’s data by
mode and comparing it to the rate of streetcar line restoration, particularly since the Saint
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Charles and Canal lines have the system’s highest ridership. Through 2008, streetcar gains
in revenue hours and mileage, passenger trips, fare revenue, and operating cost efficiency
were accompanied by corresponding losses on the bus side. In 2009, however, RTA buses
made gains in revenue miles and hours, trips per capita, cost efficiency, and cost per
passenger trip—despite 2009 being the first complete year of fully restored streetcar lines.
These gains could be attributed to bus line re-alignment, rescheduling, and reallocation
of vehicles implemented under new Veolia management. At the same time, researchers
observed a considerable loss in cost efficiency in the RTA streetcars operation compared
to 2008, although their effectiveness in terms of ridership per vehicle mile and hour is
notably higher than buses. This loss in cost efficiency for streetcars is due to a significant
increase in operating costs, which may be due to the higher platform hour rate charged by
Veolia to ensure that supervisors keep even intervals between streetcars. Still, the gains
made by RTA buses were sufficient to offset the declines in streetcar efficiency, as the
system has improved as a whole.
One important question arising from this study’s analysis is whether Veolia can reverse
2009 declines in streetcar efficiency and increases in operating costs. Although there is
still an ongoing debate for efficacy of light rail in terms of cost-effectiveness (DeLong
1998; Pickrell 1992), New Orleans has historically enjoyed very high effectiveness on its
streetcar lines, and under its delegated management contract, Veolia has been charged
with exploring rail expansion as one of its planning tasks. Additionally, it remains to be
seen whether Veolia can effect much change in Jefferson Parish over the remainder of its
contract. While neither JeT nor Jefferson Parish was devastated by Katrina to the extent
that RTA and Orleans Parish were, some of the minor decreases in effectiveness and
efficiency may be due in part to circumstances beyond JeT’s or Veolia’s control, as the
entire region contends with population and land use changes.
While some indication of the effects of the RTA/Veolia contract on efficiency and effectiveness
in providing transit service to the New Orleans public were obtainable, the limited amount
of data made available to researchers—due to a short analysis period after the contract
and limited cooperation from RTA—has made it difficult to draw more definitive findings.
It was not possible to obtain any of the more detailed documents that were referred to in
the initial request for proposals, the contracts, those related to the bidding and selection
processes, or the post-selection negotiations between RTA and Veolia. Therefore, if the
contract is renewed, further analysis—with more data—is warranted to more thoroughly
evaluate the performance of Veolia’s management of RTA over the next four, or possibly
nine, years.

REGIONAL COORDINATION IN GREATER NEW ORLEANS
Regional coordination of public transit is an important issue in metropolitan areas where
transit riders travel across multiple transit systems to reach destinations spread out across
a region. In the New Orleans region, suburbanization of both housing and jobs, combined
with a central business district that continues to be of importance in downtown New
Orleans, requires many people to travel between Orleans, Jefferson, and several other
suburban parishes. It is important for RTA and JeT to coordinate their transit services to
better accommodate the needs of travelers across the two jurisdictions—particularly those
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who do not have easy access to private automobiles and must depend on public transit
service for their mobility.
This section addresses the following questions: (1) whether or not a private firm, given
proper incentives (such as adequate compensation and the prospect of continuation
of contracts in future), provides more cost-effective transit service with better regional
coordination than do two separate public agencies, and (2) if it does, how efficiently the
one contractor can achieve better regional transit coordination. Specifically, this section
discusses findings from a questionnaire and interviews regarding regional coordination
in the Greater New Orleans region, comparing them with the findings of the nationwide
survey on the status of regional coordination that are discussed in more detail in the
next chapter, “Nationwide Regional Coordination Survey.” Transportation planners at the
Regional Planning Commission (RPC: the metropolitan planning agency in New Orleans),
and transit directors and planners from RTA and JeT responded to the questionnaire and
participated in the follow-up brief interviews (Table 17).
Table 17. Agencies and Positions of Respondents for Questionnaire and
Interviews
New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA)/Veolia:
• Chief Operating Officer
• Director of Planning and Scheduling
Jefferson Transit (JeT):
• Director of Transit Administration
Jefferson Transit/Veolia:
• Operations Manager
Regional Planning Commission (RPC):
• Director of Planning
• Transportation Planner
• Transportation Planner
GCR & Associates:
• Senior Planner
Note: GCR & Associates are contracted out to provide the planning function for JeT.

Table 18 and Table 19 summarize the questionnaire responses from the planners and
directors at the New Orleans agencies and from the nationwide survey on regional transit
service coordination, respectively. Both tables list the 17 indicators of regional transit
coordination that we developed based on the literature review, which are grouped into the
following five major categories.
•

•

Fare, Pass and Discount Programs (Fare Coordination) include setting a regional
fare structure, selling tickets and tokens for services outside the agency’s own
jurisdiction, offering shared tickets and free or discounted transfers, and offering
special discounts programs with other public or private entities;
Service Schedule is related to coordination of service schedules that carefully takes
into account other agencies’ service availability and vehicle schedules for transfers;
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Information refers to joint provision of information on service schedules, system/line
maps, fare information and real-time operation (i.e. automotive vehicle location—AVL),
Facilities and Vehicles refer to sharing of transit facilities and vehicles, clear
designation of transfer points, and planning for transfer points, and
Others include any joint agreements between the transit agencies to: (1) expand transit
system and/or increase transit service, (2) make marketing efforts, (3) implement
smartcards as fare media, (4) provide worker training programs, (5) share data for
planning and operation purposes, and other agreements that would promote regional
coordination. Coordination in these areas would require a high degree of cooperation
by both parties.

In Table 18,50 either a “yes” or a “no” answer is shown for each of RTA, JeT, and RPC with
specific notes from their responses. Percentages in Table 19 represent the proportion of
transit agencies that provided an affirmative response for each regional coordination index
in the nationwide survey.
The Unified Planning Work Program for 2010, which was prepared by RPC in April of
2009 and documents all federally funded planning activities in the urbanized area, clearly
states, “[S]ignificant inroads toward regional transit provision have been achieved with the
selection of a single operational provider for JeT, RTA, and RPTA,51 Veolia Transportation
(RPC 2009).” However, responses to the questionnaires from the three agencies in New
Orleans revealed the relatively low level of coordination in this region. Among seventeen
indices measuring the level of regional coordination, the Greater New Orleans region
has a full positive response to only three of them: availability of transit fare media in the
other transit agency’s service area (indicator 2), joint provision of information (indicator 8),
and sharing facilities (indicator 10) (Table 18). In contrast, for these three issues, more
than half of the responding agencies nationwide gave positive responses, indicating a
significant level of coordination: 55 percent for fare media, 75 percent for joint provision of
information, and 69 percent of sharing facilities (Table 19).

50 Note that five indicators are combined into Item 13, “Others” in Table 19.
51 The River Parishes Transit Authority, RPTA, was created in February 2009 to serve St. James, St. John
the Baptist, and Saint Charles Parishes with demand-response service. Saint Charles Parish shares a
border with Jefferson Parish, and RPTA offers connections to JeT, RTA, and Baton Rouge, as well as to St.
James Parish’s fixed-route service (River Parishes Transit Authority 2010).
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Agreements to (1) increase service frequency or
expand routes, (2) jointly markey transit service, (3)
introduce regional transit smart card, (4) joint worker
training, and (5) share data on ridership, accidents
etc.

Discussion of possibly locating and designing
facilities to better accommodate transfers

Sharing facilities (e.g., terminal, shelter, park & ride
lot)
Clearly designed transfer points

Real-time information for operation (e.g. AVL) shared
between the two transit systems

Coordination in time scheduling to accommodate
transfers
Joint-provision of information on transit service

No

Yes

Yes

Yes All: Both transit agencies provide links to each other's web sites/phone
numbers
No (Yes) No RTA: Both JeT and RTA use similar AVL systems and this will be
considered. RPC: RTA considering using this for real-time rider
information.
Yes Yes Yes JeT: Two bus terminals; RTA: facilities at three transfer points, and plan
to expand one of them.
No
No
Yes RPC: There are transfer points within both RTA and JeT service areas,
designated with signage from the appropriate agency. RTA/JeT: No
clear desgination that these are transfer points.
Yes
No
No RPC: RTA plans improvements to transfer points which will benefit JeT
passengers but JeT is not involved in the project. RTA and JeT:
Discussion about locating joint terminals, but no formal plan.
No
No
No RPC: Project to encourage non-single occupant commute modes. This
program will market the use of transit in general, regardless of transit
provider

No

N/R RPC/JeT: Informal (internal to Veolia ) communications when routes are
disrupted in order to assists passagners who are transfering. Plan to
work together in future.
Yes RPC: Attempts were made. RTA: not currently, but is planning.

No

-

JeT: 3% discounted monthly passes to select state agencies

No

No

N/A RPC: In the near future RTA will install fare kiosks at major transfer points,
and they may also sell JeT tickets.
No -

No

Yes

No

Yes

Availability of passes, tickets, or tokens in the other
Yes
transit agency's service area
Passes, tickets, tokens or transfers usable in the other No
transit system's
Special discount program with other public or private
N/R
entities
Free or discounted transfer from the other transit
No
system
Consideration of the other transit system's service
No
availability in service scheduling

A coordinated regional fare system

Note
RPC
No Some discussion among three agencies, but JeT has some reservations.

Note: The “other (13)” category of this table contains five separate questions for a total of seventeen questions.

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

JeT
No

Current Condition

RTA
No

Indicator

Table 18. Responses to the Questionnaire on Regional Coordination of Transit Service in the Greater New Orleans
Region

Fares/passes/ discount
programs

Service
Schedule

Information

Facilities/vehicles

Others
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Others

Facilities/Vehicles

Information

Service Schedule

Fares/passes/discount programs

63%

Free or discounted transfer from the other transit system

17%
27%
29%
9%
10%

Agreements to jointly market transit services
Agreements to introduce a regional transit smart card
Agreements to jointly train transit workers
Agreements to jointly share data on ridership, accidents, etc.

43%

74%

Discussion of possibly locating and designing facilities to better
accomodate transfers**
Agreements to increase service frequency or expand routes

Clearly designed transfer points

69%

6%

75%

Joint provision of information on transit service
Real-time information for operation (e.g., AVL) shated between
the two transit systems*
Sharing facilities (e.g., terminal, shelter, park & ride lot)

68%

70%

Consideration of the other transit system’s service availability in
service scheduling
Coordination in time scheduling to accomodate transfers

54%

55%

64%

Nationwide
Yes %
52%

A coordinated regional fare system
Availability of passes, tickets, or tokens in the other transit
agency’ service area
Passes, tickets, tokens or transfers usable in the other transit
system’s
Special discount program with other public or private entities

* 51% responded that their agency is using real-time information, but not sharing with other agencies.
** Only includes responses from agencies that do not already clearly designate transfer points with other agencies.
*** In this table, the “other” category is broken down to five different issues.

13
14
15
16
17

10
11
12

7
8
9

4
5
6

3

2

1

Indicator

Table 19. Summary of Findings from the Nationwide Regional Coordination Survey
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While the questionnaire responses obtained from the three agencies are not consistent,
one of the three agencies indicates that some level of regional coordination exists for each
of the following: clearly defined transfer points (indicator 11), and discussion of possibly
locating and designing facilities to better accommodate transfers (indicator 12). While 74
percent of agencies in the nationwide survey provided a positive response on designation
of transfer points (Table 19), it is surprising to find that two of the three agencies disagree
that there is clear designation of transfer point between RTA and JeT systems, taking into
account that their transit system maps actually indicate several locations considered as
transfer points. These inconsistent responses may stem from different understandings
of the current conditions, and the different perspectives that each agency has regarding
transit service coordination in the region.
JeT indicated (3) a special discount program with other public and private entities and (9)
real-time information for operation, both of which have potential to expand to the regional
level. However, as RTA has not implemented either program or technology, neither has
been included in enhancement of regional transit service. Thus, the Greater New Orleans
region has a very slow rate of progress in special discount programs, compared to 64
percent of agencies in the nation that have such programs (Table 19). In contrast, if RTA
and JeT can work together on automatic vehicle location (AVL), it would be a good step
forward for regional coordination, as only 6 percent of the transit agencies responding to
the aforementioned nationwide survey currently feature AVL coordination.
RTA and JeT also show lower levels of coordination in vehicle scheduling than most
agencies in the nation. There is no official agreement or consideration for coordinating
vehicle scheduling between the two agencies in New Orleans, while about 70 percent of
agencies that responded to our nationwide survey have such an agreement. However,
as will be discussed,, RTA and JeT have informal coordination of vehicle scheduling
through a staff-level channel within Veolia. Finally, the New Orleans agencies lag behind
the national trend in terms of coordination of fare/pass programs, providing a positive
response only for the sale of passes, tickets, tokens or transfers for the other agency.
In contrast, more than half of the agencies that responded to the nationwide survey are
implementing programs in each of five indicators listed under the “fares/passes/discount
programs” category of coordination (see Table 19).
In short, although there is a certain expectation among the agencies that regional
coordination both between the transit agencies and through the internal channel of Veolia
will be improving in the future, current coordination of transit service in the Greater New
Orleans region was found very limited and not as pervasive as the transit coordination
among many of the agencies responding to the nationwide survey.
In order to obtain details of management, operation, and planning by each of RTA and
JeT to supplement information obtained from the questionnaire, and to find reasons that
regional coordination has not made much progress in the New Orleans region, follow-up
interviews were conducted. The findings from these interviews with planners and directors
of RTA, JeT, and RPC are discussed in the following sections. First, the issues in each
of the five categories in Table 19 are addressed in detail. Next, the politics and funding
issues that make the relationship between RTA and JeT difficult, as well as the role of
RPC and the possibility of future coordination are described.
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Examination of Regional Coordination between RTA and JeT
Fare/Passes/Discount Programs
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, RTA and JeT held informal monthly meetings to discuss various
issues including coordination, according to interviewees from both agencies. From 2002 to
2005, RTA and JeT jointly offered day passes that allowed transit riders to use a single oneday pass ($5.00) to travel in both transit systems without paying a transfer fare, providing
seamless travel to pass users. The director of planning and scheduling for RTA/Veolia
explains that this was the only real instance of regional fare coordination between the two
systems in the past.
This fare media sharing system used a day pass with stubs that indicated in which transit
system the pass was purchased, that is, whether RTA or JeT collected the fare. Fare
revenue from day passes was redistributed in each period by first counting stubs52 that
both RTA and JeT collected from passengers and then transferring fare revenue equivalent
to half of the ticket price multiplied by the difference in the number of stubs that each
agency collected. With this method of fare media sharing, however, it was difficult to
ensure that each agency was receiving its appropriate share of fare revenue. One reason
is that it was not possible to figure out how many transfers each traveler made within each
system, as well as between the two systems. This could mean that one agency carried
the passenger multiple times on one day, the other agency only carried the person once,
and each agency still received half of the original ticket revenue. Another concern related
to day passes is that passes left at a bus stop could be used more than once by multiple
riders—the person who purchased the pass and someone else who found the discarded
pass. In this case, two people would be riding for the price of one, and the transit agencies
would lose expected revenue.
Although Hurricane Katrina brought both agencies to a standstill, JeT sustained
considerably less damage than RTA,53 and returned to service shortly after the storm.
Once JeT resumed services, it decided that it would not renew the day pass program
with RTA. Throughout the lifetime of the program, JeT had continuously been concerned
with fare allocation. As there were more people traveling from the RTA system to the JeT
system, RTA was collecting more fares, and JeT collected more stubs to get reimbursed
for the shared fare revenue. Also, according to a transportation planner at RPC, transit
planners at JeT believed that the methodology used to determine fare revenue sharing
was not transparent and that JeT was unfairly losing money to RTA.
In addition, the technology inconsistency due to the different types of fareboxes that
RTA and JeT used over the past several years—RTA had an older one—created friction
and did not allow easy introduction of common fare media. RTA has been introducing
fareboxes with newer technology, as well as new fare media called “Jazzy Passes,” which
are magnetically striped tickets good for either 3 days or 5 days. These new technologies
will allow RTA to collect fares before passengers board the vehicle, as passes are sold at
52 The collection of a stub indicated that the purchase of Day Pass and its use for travel occurred in two
separate transit systems.
53 For example, JeT lost only one vehicle, while 205 RTA buses and 31 RTA streetcars were damaged.
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machines, not by operators, in this new system. This will help RTA prevent the employee
errors and fraud often found in fare transactions, but user fraud will still be hard to stop.
Although the questionnaire indicates that there is no longer a fare media-sharing program,
a comment made by an RPC interviewee suggests that a more coordinated fare system
may be on the horizon. An RPC interviewee commented that there is a possibility that
RTA could offer tickets that are used for both RTA and JeT systems at ticket kiosks that
RTA is planning to install in the near future.54 However, a fare revenue allocation method
was not mentioned. This was the only sign of any real plan for a joint ticketing venture to
come out of interviews with RTA, JeT, and RPC representatives.
Hesitation remains regarding any fare media-sharing program, as the director of
transit administration at JeT indicated that politics, revenue transparency, and equal
representation of both RTA and JeT interests would need to be worked out before any new
fare media/revenue sharing system could be possible. In addition, an RTA interviewee
also provided an explanation from the JeT perspective regarding avoidance of a regional
fare structure:55 because of the difference in size between the agencies and their funding
structures, JeT could lose a larger proportion of its fare revenue with a regional fare
program than RTA. Clearly, this would be unacceptable for JeT, which tends to emphasize
the revenue-expenditure balance more than does RTA.

Service Schedule
Scheduling of operating hours and transit routes is an important indicator of the level of
regional coordination. Responses to the questionnaires show that neither RTA nor JeT
takes into consideration the schedule of the other system when deciding timetables for
bus/streetcar stops at transfer points, although the director of planning and scheduling at
RTA indicated that he is planning to introduce this concept. This point was also discussed
further with the operations manager at JeT, who indicated that some level of coordination
between the two systems does indeed exist occasionally and informally through the
internal connection within Veolia.
One such example of coordination is illustrated through the actions of this JeT operations
manager and the RTA chief operating officer, when they discussed and adjusted the timing
of when JeT buses pick up passengers from RTA’s streetcars on Canal Street. It had been
brought to the attention of the JeT manager that JeT buses were scheduled to leave right
before the Canal streetcars arrived. He explained that particularly during special events
or temporary disruptions in service due to road construction, he contacts RTA to ensure
that schedule changes in one system do not interfere with the other’s scheduling at major
54 RTA announced, “RTA will introduce the Jazzy Pass and ticket vending machines in summer 2010,
providing riders with a state-of-the-art transpass system to make boarding more efficient and convenient”
(New Orleans Regional Transit Authority nd).
55 JeT’s fare is higher than RTA’s fare. The fare structure is one sticky point. A lack of the regional fare
structure poses another challenge to RTA operation. Although it is not productive to provide service
on one line that historically has run on Veterans Boulevard in Jefferson Parish and permits access to
shopping, removing this RTA line forces people to pay double fares due to the lack of a regional fare
structure. Removing it also raise a problem regarding Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that requires
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance (Civil Rights Act 1964).
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transfer locations. In cases where buses are running behind schedule due to disruption on
a specific JeT line, he can make a request to an RTA operation manager that RTA take late
arrivals of JeT buses into account and accommodate JeT passengers’ smooth transfers to
RTA buses, rather than make them wait for the next bus.
Although these are not formal examples of joint service scheduling, it does suggest that
there is an open communication path through the contractor’s internal channels to ensure
that customer’s needs be met. Indeed, Chisholm (1989) discusses this essential form of
informal coordination in his classic study of transit coordination in the San Francisco Bay
Area in the 1980s.

Information
Information sharing was one of the two categories where there were clear indications of
regional coordination. Transit users can access bus and streetcar schedules of RTA’s
system via a web link provided on JeT’s website. In addition, both transit agencies provide
riders with the telephone number to obtain arrival information for the next bus/streetcar.
However, neither system offers paper time schedules for the adjacent system’s lines onboard buses or streetcars.
JeT offers information on real-time next bus arrivals, using the automatic vehicle location
(AVL) system at two terminals that are transfer points between RTA and JeT. The fact
that these facilities are located in Jefferson Parish explains the difference in responses
to this question between RTA and JeT. The director of planning and scheduling at RTA/
Veolia also indicated on his questionnaire response that RTA will utilize an AVL system
similar to JeT’s, and that it may make information sharing feasible in the future. It should
be noted that at least this director at RTA/Veolia thinks of it as a reasonable option to
choose a similar AVL technology for future coordination at this point, taking into account
the technology that the operating unit of Veolia for JeT uses. While his consideration will
not necessarily lead to the selection of the same or similar technology, he could advocate
a particular technology. A “champion” often plays a very important role in the introduction
of a new technology to a public organization (Achilladelis, Jervis, and Robertson 1971;
Ettlie, Bridges, and O’Keefe 1984; Howell and Higgins 1990; Rothwell et al. 1974; Schön
1963; Yoh 2008).

Facilities/ Vehicles
Facility sharing was among those categories that showed positive signs of regional
coordination. Interviewees at both RTA and JeT constantly mentioned five major transfer
points where RTA and JeT transit systems meet and transit riders transfer between them:
(1) two terminals on the West Bank located in Jefferson Parish where RTA buses pick up
commuters to downtown New Orleans, and (2) three intersections in Orleans Parish.56
Although both RTA and JeT answered “no” to the question of whether there were “clearly
designated transfer points,” the system maps available on the agencies’ web sites and
56 These are the Wilty and Walkertown Terminals, and intersections of Canal Boulevard & City Park
Avenue, S. Carrollton Avenue & S. Claiborne Avenue, and S. Carrollton Avenue & Tulane Avenue.
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printed copies, clearly indicate transfer points between the two transit systems.57 The two
transit agencies provided inconsistent responses regarding a future plan to locate a joint
transfer facility, for example, at the intersection of Canal Street and Carrollton Avenue. On
one hand, the RTA interviewee briefly explained that there has been a discussion on this
issue, but that a formal plan has yet to be made. On the other hand, the JeT interviewee
provided a negative response, expressing JeT’s cautious position on an issue that may
require funding allocations that do not exclusively benefit Jefferson Parish.
Transferring between RTA and Jefferson Parish is necessary for many riders who work
in one parish and reside in the other, as was also revealed in our transit user survey.
How well the two systems facilitate transfers between parishes is also one indication of
their level of coordination with each other. The JeT website homepage has a link to an
interactive system map that identifies transfer points from the JeT system to RTA (shown
in Appendix D, Figure 30).58 From the same page as the interactive map, one can also
download a printable PDF version of the system map with more detail than the web
version, including a complete list of connecting RTA lines (Appendix D, Figure 31).
The RTA website does not provide riders with much information on how to transfer from
one system to the other.59 Similarly, RTA does not provide a detailed list of lines that
intersect with JeT lines on their webpage. Neither a phone number for JeT nor a link for
the JeT website is available on the RTA website, making it difficult for those who want
to travel between RTA and JeT. Finally, RTA does not identify their travel to the Wilty
Terminal, which is located in and maintained by Jefferson Parish. The RTA runs one bus
to the Wilty terminal, but neither the system nor route map identify this point by name,
only by a colored line indicating a stop.
While its system and route maps are more difficult to use, RTA offers an online trip planning
tool, which helps transit users to find a travel route and time.60 The Trip Planner tool is
helpful to use when traveling within RTA’s service area, but does not have the capability

57 Transit systems maps of RTA and JeT are included in Appendix D.
58 Clicking on a route shown on the map leads to a more detailed map of that route, and information
including amounts of fares and transfers, connecting routes (including RTA buses), a link to the JeT route
schedule in PDF format, and a link to the RTA website homepage for those routes that connect with RTA.
59 The system map provided, as of August 2010, is a Google map that does not allow users to zoom in to
see the system in detail, although scrolling is possible. Similar Google maps are available for each route,
labeled “interactive” maps, and “printable” PDF maps are also offered although the PDF file is a copy of
the route’s entire map and schedule brochure, designed to be printed on 29.67” x 9.67” paper.
60 After filling in information for an origin and a destination of trip, travel date, and either desired
departure or arrival time, users are presented with a table that identifies walking distances, bus numbers
and transfer information. There is an advanced search allowing users to dictate maximum walking
distances, routes to avoid, and mode options. Once the proper information is filled in, users are presented
route options that include estimated departure times, arrival times, bus numbers, approximate total travel
time, and walking distances to and from bus stops. A link to another mapping tool (not Google Maps) is
provided, which does allow zooming and jumping to points along the trip.
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to take into account a transfer between the RTA and JeT systems.61 In addition, although
it may also be useful to those who are already acquainted with the transit system and
New Orleans geography, this tool may be difficult for those who are first-time riders or not
familiar with the area to understand and use. Jefferson Parish has done a relatively good
job of informing passengers of the different ways and routes to transfer from JeT to RTA by
providing RTA contacts, transfer points and bus lines directly on the website.
In short, while RTA offers its users customizable route planning within its own service area,
the agency has yet to improve transfer information accessibility to their customers via their
website in either static or dynamic form as well as in other conventional media.

Issues to be Addressed for Future Coordination
Although study authors found a need for improved regional coordination in our transit
user survey, and our review of the literature on regional coordination supports its value for
improving mobility and quality of life for people dependent on transit, the current condition
of coordination between RTA and JeT is limited, lagging behind the average level we found
in our survey of national transit agencies. In follow-up interviews with transit planners and
directors, they identified some of the impediments to improved coordination and learned
their thoughts on the potential for improving coordination in the near future.

Politics and Funding
In 1983, the Regional Transit Authority of New Orleans was established as an outgrowth
of the city management office and was charged with operating the transportation system
in the New Orleans area. State law provided RTA with the authority to operate regionally,
although adjacent parishes declined the offer to have RTA provide transit service in their
areas.62 The Director of Planning at the RPC explained that the adjacent parishes, including
Jefferson Parish, were concerned with political corruption, which had plagued the city for
years, and were apprehensive that working with RTA could bring similar problems to their
parishes.
The second issue that has created hesitation on the part of JeT regarding general
coordination with RTA is funding. Jefferson Parish partially relies mainly on millage (parish
property tax) in funding its transit service; 19 percent of operating funds and 20 percent
61 When using the Trip Planner to travel from Orleans to Jefferson Parish, the end point provided by
RTA is not the rider’s final destination. Instead, the end point is either a RTA/JeT joint transfer point, or
the nearest RTA point to the final destination, requiring riders to walk the remainder of the distance. While
walking distances are indicated, transferring to the JeT system is not. Instead, the final destination is a
joint transfer point and not the destination that was requested, with no indication that a transfer to another
system must be made. In one instance, the rider must take a ferry across the Mississippi River from the
final RTA bus stop to the final destination in Jefferson Parish, but this is not indicated in the Route Details
section. It would be beneficial for RTA to either indicate or include transfers from RTA to JeT so riders are
aware that they must travel on both systems during their journey. There is also an issue with utilization on
certain browsers like Google Chrome where the RTA graphics interfere with the Trip Planner and other
links, making it difficult to navigate the site.
62 In particular, RTA attempted to purchase Louisiana Transit that was providing transit service to the East
Bank within Jefferson Parish. However, Jefferson Parish disagreed with the deal, and prevented it from
happening.
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of capital funds in 2008 were generated locally, in addition to the 21 percent of operating
funds generated by fares. This large proportion of local funds attracts more attention from
taxpayers than the use of state and federal funds. In the case of Jefferson Parish, this
property tax has to be renewed every ten years (Bureau of Governmental Research 2009;
Jefferson Parish Transit 2009). In this setting, elected officials and directors of public
service agencies are concerned with ensuring that all tax funds are properly accounted
for and effectively used to provide services to their taxpayers. This clear obligation for
a public agency to return benefits to its taxpayers significantly limits the prospects of
revenue sharing through transfer exchanges and/or a regional fare media, or other
coordination efforts that could lead to an outflow of funding from Jefferson Parish. The
same concern was revealed in an interview with RTA transit planners, when they stated
that RTA would not be able to provide direct service from Orleans Parish to a re-opened
WalMart store in St. Bernard Parish in the foreseeable future—which could be a big trip
generator—because RTA also has to be concerned about keeping tax money within the
Orleans Parish jurisdiction, i.e., by providing transit service there.

Role of Metropolitan Planning Organization
Researchers included RPC, the metropolitan planning organization in the Greater New
Orleans region, in the questionnaire and interviews to examine its level of involvement in
facilitating and promoting regional coordination for transit service. However, they found
via interviews that RPC takes a passive role on this account. RPC planners explained
that RPC faces substantial challenges in encouraging coordination between the two
transit systems in the region because it has no authority on policy decisions by the transit
agencies as is often the case with metropolitan planning organizations throughout the
country.
One of the RTA interviewees stated that RPC has developed planning initiatives in
response to Federal requirements regarding regional transportation planning, and that he
is pushing for a regional transit plan. Taking into account the fact that many residents in
Orleans Parish are trying to reach jobs in other areas, particularly in Metairie in Jefferson
Parish, it is important for transit agencies to meet this transit demand. He emphasized the
importance of having policy-making discussion on how services are allocated between
parishes, and the need to collect data for transit planning in future years. For example, a
regional travel survey has not been conducted for more than 30 years.
RPC often approaches issues related to regional coordination as a mediator between
all of the transportation service providers (including railroad companies), with a focus
on solving conflicts and problems among providers and attaining the highest level of
satisfaction with the outcome among providers, rather than achieving the goals and
objective that may bring more benefits to the region as a whole.

Future Coordination
All interviewees agree that regional coordination of transit service is important to
accommodate travel in the region. Planners at RTA/Veolia commented them that the
questionnaire actually reminded them of these important issues that will have to be
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addressed in the future if not now. As a matter of fact, RTA’s director of planning and
scheduling stated that he first has to work on the basics within his own transit system. These
basics were being managed to less than adequate levels by the previous management at
RTA, even three years after the hurricane.
The chief operating officer at RTA/Veolia, the director of transit administration at JeT, and
Transportation Planners at RPC have all expressed optimism that regional coordination is
more likely to occur now, since there is a common interest within Veolia. Planners at RPC
commented that the involvement of Veolia in management, operation, and planning for
the RTA transit system has increased the discussion of coordination and that their goal is
now more accessible, while the JeT director of transit Administration believes that Veolia
is the mechanism that has the potential to increase regional coordination. There was little
discussion in any of the interviews, however, of specific plans for improving coordination.

Summary of Analysis
In analyzing responses to the questionnaires and interviews, the current coordination of
transit service in the Greater New Orleans region is found limited and is less advanced
than transit coordination in most of the agencies consulted in the nationwide survey. There
is a certain level of expectation of improved regional coordination, both between public
transit agencies, and through the internal channel of Veolia, and there has been discussion
of increased coordination. Throughout the interviews, a few issues were repeatedly
mentioned, and, therefore, could be candidates for formal implementation. These issues
include: (1) installing a shared facility in Orleans Parish, (2) jointly working on vehicle
scheduling to provide seamless travel to transit riders, and (3) discussing the potential
for revisiting fare media sharing programs. However, many of the testimonies often lack
concrete plans.
Interviews revealed three main political and financial concerns that could potentially hinder
future implementation of these plans. These are: (1) equal representation of both agencies
in a decision making body for regional coordination issues, (2) justification and assurance
for benefits for all taxpayers and transit riders in both parishes, and (3) fair and transparent
mechanism for fare sharing. In addition, as is often the case with many metropolitan
planning organizations, RPC also has been playing a limited role in regional coordination,
often as a mediator among transit agencies.

CONCLUSION
This chapter examined two main hypotheses regarding: (1) the performance of a transit
service contractor with respect to cost efficiency and cost effectiveness under different
contracts, and (2) the level of regional coordination attained with involvement of a contractor
for multiple transit agencies in the region. Economic and social settings where RTA and
JeT operate their service were carefully taken into account to examine related questions.
Although it was not possible to fully examine the details of request for proposal and contracts
between RTA and Veolia (due to insufficient documents provided by RTA), the differences
between RTA’s contract and JeT’s contract were clearly identified. RTA and Veolia had
substantial negotiation and transition time to craft common goals as well as contractual
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terms after the bidding selection. RTA transfers substantially more responsibilities to Veolia
in its delegated management contract than does JeT. However, despite expectations,
RTA did not include any performance incentives in the final contract, in contrast to JeT’s
contract, but decided to compensate Veolia with fixed management fees and variable
fees based on fixed per-vehicle-hour rates and amount of service provided.
Analysis of the transit service based on transit user surveys and financial and operation data
showed that while RTA/Veolia has been improving cost efficiency and cost effectiveness,
RTA riders are still less satisfied with the quality of transit service in many aspects than
JeT riders are. In particular, sitting space, length of waiting time, and safety at night
are the three main attributes of transit service that RTA needs to improve to enhance
customer satisfactions.
In contrast, through analysis of financial and operating data, some positive impacts
of the Veolia’s management and operation on cost efficiency and effectiveness in the
RTA system, compared to the JeT system, were evident, even taking into account that
the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that New Orleans and its transit system
had to contend with in 2005 and 2006. After the inception of Veolia’s initial transitional
contract in October, 2008, RTA buses made gains in several indices, such as revenue
miles and hours, trips per capita, cost efficiency, and cost per passenger trip in 2009,
compared to the slightly declining productivity in the JeT’s system. However, we also
observed a considerable loss in cost efficiency in the RTA streetcars operation compared
to 2008, mainly due to a significant increase in operating costs. This cost increase
for the streetcar operation could be attributed to the higher platform hour rate for the
supervisor/management level staffing by Veolia. At the same time, as insufficient amount
of details of the bidding and selection processes, the post-selection negotiations between
RTA and Veolia, and contractual terms, as well as a short time period after the contract
implementation did not permit a full analysis, further analysis is warranted to examine its
long-term effects of RTA/Veolia’s delegated management contract—in particular on the
effectiveness of the streetcar operation and planning.
Regarding regional coordination, the analysis of information collected through the
questionnaire and interviews showed that RTA and JeT are behind many other agencies
in the U.S. regarding the level of regional coordination of transit service. Three political
and financial concerns were identified as major barriers for the regional coordination in
the Greater New Orleans region. These concerns need to be addressed and resolved
before successful attempts at further coordination can move forward. As long as it will
not impose a substantial financial burden on any party, it is likely that a few technical
issues, such as different technologies for fare collection, bus scheduling, and information
sharing will be resolved in the future. Uncertainty still remains, primarily with respect
to the political structure and funding at both JeT and RTA. In addition, initiative on the
part of RPC, the metropolitan planning organization for the region, is needed beyond its
traditional role as a mediator for improving transit service coordination in the Greater New
Orleans region.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to establish a baseline from which to compare the level of regional coordination in
New Orleans, a nationwide survey was conducted to evaluate the status of several aspects
of regional coordination throughout the United States. The survey employed the measures
of regional coordination identified in the literature review to design a survey for fixed-route
transit operators throughout the country. Data from this survey were used to compare and
evaluate the level of regional coordination in the New Orleans region as discussed in the
previous chapter. This section discusses the details of findings from this nationwide survey.

DATA, DATA SOURCES, AND DATA COLLECTION
The time frame of the nationwide survey was two months from April 12, 2010 through June
11, 2010. The 2008 National Transit Database (NTD) administered by the Federal Transit
Administration was used to identify 590 transit agencies with fixed-route services.
All of these agencies were invited to participate in the survey through an email letter, the text
of which is included in this report in Appendix H. The initial invitation explained the purpose of
the survey, and asked respondents to complete the survey, clearly indicating that participation
was voluntary. Respondents to the survey were directed to a web-based survey,63 which
provided a general overview of the project, the purpose of the survey, survey instructions,
and a statement assuring confidentiality of identity and individual responses. After sending
two more follow-up e-mail invitations, researchers sent an invitation letter via U.S. post to all
agencies that had not yet responded, including those for which we had no email address. In
addition, two reminder emails were sent to agencies which had not responded or which had
started the survey, but not completed it. Finally, the survey was closed on June 11, 2010.
The survey consisted of two parts. The first part asked questions related to agency profile and
contracting characteristics, such as the number of contractors employed and the functions
contracted out. The second part of the survey asked a set of questions related to the following
areas of regional coordination which were identified in the literature review:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Fare coordination,
Service schedule coordination,
Information coordination,
Facilities/Vehicle coordination, and
Joint agreements.64

202 agencies in 45 states responded, giving an overall response rate of 34 percent. The
sample represents different sized agencies from 45 states and all major regions of the United
States. As Table 20 shows, the survey captured agencies that were closely representative
of the fleet sizes of the entire population of fixed-route agencies provided by the NTD. The
63 The survey was conducted using SurveyMonkey, www.surveymonkey.com.
64 A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix H.
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sample population, however, captured a significantly smaller percentage of agencies with
fewer than 25 vehicles, and a larger percentage of agencies with 100–249 vehicles. Of
these respondents, approximately 45 percent indicated that their agency is the only fixedroute transit agency operating in their region. The survey did not require respondents from
these agencies to answer questions related to regional coordination, as they were the sole
provider and thus, not required to partake in such activity. The remaining 111 respondents
answered questions on several aspects of regional coordination. Respondents who
answered questions on regional coordination represented 111 transit agencies from 31
different states and 81 different urbanized areas, as classified by the NTD.
Table 20. Fleet Sizes of Agencies Surveyed and Entire Population
Vehicles Operated at
Maximum Service (Total Fleet
Size)
Under 25
25–49
50–99
100–249
250–499
500–999
Over 1,000

Survey Sample

Entire Population of Fixed-Route
Agencies

28%
23%
14%
19%
7%
4%
5%

43%
19%
16%
11%
6%
3%
3%

STATUS OF REGIONAL COORDINATION IN THE U.S.
Contracting
Agencies were polled on several questions related to contracting (Table 21). Almost half
of respondents (48 percent) indicated that their agency contracts out some level of fixedroute service to either private or other public agencies. A small percentage of agencies
had contractors (15 percent) that were involved with improving regional transit service
coordination, although many of the transit agencies polled are in regions with few or no
other fixed-route transit agencies.
Respondents indicated that operations and maintenance are the functions most frequently
contracted out (Table 22). A few of the respondents indicated that their agency contracts
out all functions in Table 3, but more commonly agencies contract out a combination
of operations, maintenance, and management without contracting out planning. As
mentioned in previous sections, the RTA/Veolia contract provides that Veolia take on all
functions “below the board level,” including all four functions mentioned in Table 3 below.
RTA is somewhat unique in the U.S. in engaging in this level of contracting. Nevertheless,
there were some respondents to the survey that noted that their agency contracts out all
functions. In addition, among agencies operating in regions with other fixed-route transit
agencies, 20 percent reported that there was a contractor involved with improving regional
coordination.
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Table 21. Questions Related to Contracting
Yes
N
%
Does your agency contract out functions related to the provision of fixed-route transit service to private firms or other public
transit agencies?
In the event of an emergency (e.g., natural disaster), are there
any existing agreements between your agency and contracted
transit providers to provide service?
Are there any particular roles that contractors have in improving regional transit service coordination among multiple transit
systems in your region?
N=number of respondents

No
N

%

Total
N

97

48

105

52

202

64

32

134

68

198

30

15

166

85

196

Table 22. Functions Contracted Out by Transit Agencies
Operations
Maintenance
Management
Planning
Other
Total number of respondents: 97
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
82
65
34
13
11

%
85
67
35
13
11

Fare Coordination
Agencies were polled on a number of questions related to fare coordination (Table 23). Of
the 111 responses, 52 percent indicated that a coordinated fare system is in place in their
region. A little over half of the agencies sell transit tickets, passes, or tokens that can be
used on other transit systems and a similar number of agencies sell tickets through other
transit systems in their region. A majority of agencies (63 percent) accept discounted or
free transfers from other agencies.
While more than half of respondents indicated that a coordinated fare system has been
established in their region, our data suggests that there are still a large number of agencies
operating in regions without them. As Miller et al. (2005) have suggested, coordinated fare
systems are generally considered beneficial to customers, but agencies may have a difficult
time implementing a coordinated fare system for a number of reasons associated with
institutional, financial, or technological constraints (Yoh 2008; Yoh, Iseki, and Taylor 2008).
While these difficulties may prevent agencies from providing their customers with a fully
coordinated fare system, agencies may provide customers with the benefit of accepting
free or discounted transfers. Allowing free or discounted fares may encourage ridership
among transit riders who use more than one transit system by bringing the overall cost of
their trip down. About 44 percent of the 111 respondents indicated that their agency allows
transfers from other transit systems without an additional fare, while 17 percent said that
their agency allows transfers if an additional fare is paid.
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Transit agencies in the New Orleans region currently have little fare coordination in place.
With the exception of the RTA selling JeT passes, fare coordination is non-existent in
Greater New Orleans, and a rider using both transit systems is required to pay two full
fares. This lack of fare coordination may be a hindrance to many customers who need
to travel on both transit systems, and may be discouraging customers from using public
transit for regional trips altogether. This is not only bad for customers, but also reduces
the two transit agencies’ effectiveness at accommodating customers who need to take
regional transit trips.
While the New Orleans region currently has little fare coordination in place, officials from
the two agencies have commented that they have had discussions about implementing
a coordinated regional fare system. Before Hurricane Katrina, the two agencies offered
day passes for use on both systems. After Hurricane Katrina, JeT decided not to renew
the program because it was concerned with the allocation of funding, i.e., RTA had been
collecting more fare revenues and the method of allocating revenues was not transparent.
Table 23. Questions Related to Fare Coordination
Yes
N %
Has a coordinated regional fare system (including the charging
of a transfer fare) been established in your region?
Does your agency sell transit passes, tickets, or tokens that can
be used on other transit systems?
Do other transit agencies in your region offer or sell transit passes, tickets, or tokens that can be used on your transit system?
Does your agency allow transfers from other transit systems for
free or with a discounted fare?
N=number of respondents

No
N %

Total
N

58 52 53 48

111

60 54 51 46

111

60 55 50 45

110

70 63 41 37

111

For those 58 respondents that reported having a coordinated fare system established in
their region, the most common fare structures were agreements between certain operators,
followed by integrated fare structures based on flat fares (Table 24). It seems that the
terms of fare integration needed to be worked out between agencies in most instances
rather than relying on other criteria. This was the case for the New Orleans region before
Katrina, where arrangements had been made between RTA and JeT regarding their oneday pass.
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Table 24. Interoperator Fare Structure Used by Agencies in Regions with
Coordinated Fare Systems
Which of the following interoperator fare structures has/have been implemented in
your region?
N
%
Transfer agreement(s) between/among certain operators
46
79
Integrated fare structure based on flat fares
19
33
Integrated fare structure based on distance
7
12
Integrated fare structure based on multiple operator criteria
7
12
Other
14
24
Total number of respondents: 58

Of the 60 transit agencies that sell fare media for use on other transit systems or whose
fare media are sold by other transit systems, the most popular form of media was a paper
pass valid for one week or longer (Table 25). This fare medium is used by more than half of
respondents’ transit agencies. The second most popular fare media is the one-ride ticket
or token. Compared to smart card or magnetic swipe card systems, which often require
new equipment and incur ongoing expenses, these paper fare media are inexpensive
to implement. These cost factors may account for the popularity of paper passes. In
many regions, the costs associated with purchasing and maintaining a technologicallysophisticated fare collection system, such as a smart card system, may prohibit its
implementation (Iseki et al. 2008). This is especially true with agencies that have low
ridership, where it is difficult to justify the upfront costs associated with a smart card system
(Iseki, Yoh, and Taylor 2007). Paper passes that are shared between agencies, on the
other hand, can provide a low cost way to coordinate fares in a region.
Table 25. Fare Media Sold (1) by Respondent’s Agency for Use on Other Transit
Systems, and (2) by Other Agencies for Use on Respondent’s Transit
System

Paper pass (valid for one week or longer)
One-ride ticket or token (including tickets valid for
transfer within a few hours)
Magnetic swipe card (one week or longer)
Smart card
One-day/few-day paper ticket
Magnetic swipe card (less than one week)
Other
Total number of respondents: 60
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

(1) For use on
Other Transit
Systems
N
%
30
50

(2) Sold by
Other Transit
Systems
N
%
31
52

21

35

25

42

17
15
11
7
8

28
25
18
12
13

16
15
15
6
9

27
25
25
10
15
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Service Schedule
Agencies were polled on two questions related to service schedule (Table 26). Of the
111 responses, close to 70 percent of agencies coordinate both their daily and weekly
service schedules and timetables with other agencies in their region. While matching
service schedule and time schedule is a very basic level of coordination, it can be very
beneficial to transit passengers by reducing passenger wait time. However, this type
of coordination may also produce benefits to transit operators as well, as ridership has
been shown to increase, customer complaints decrease, and a number of other benefits
take place when transit systems are able to coordinate schedules for the convenience
of their passengers (Miller et al. 2005). Given the win-win situation that service schedule
coordination can have, it is understandable that this was one of the most popular
categories of coordination in the survey.
The coordination of daily and weekly service schedules and timetables in the New Orleans
region is very limited as it stands now. There is no officially scheduled coordination
that takes place on a regular basis for published timetables. However, informal service
schedule coordination occasionally takes place through staff-level communication. For
example, when an operation manager finds out a significant delay for feeder buses due
to, for example, an accident, the manager may direct commuter bus drivers to wait for
feeder buses to arrive, so that commuters do not miss their chance to transfer. In addition,
RTA/Veolia’s transit director and manager mentioned that some schedule coordination
also takes place during large events, such as New Orleans Jazz Festival and French
Quarter Festival. However, like fare coordination, RTA and JeT have been discussing a
plan to try and match service schedules in the future.
Table 26. Questions Related to Service Schedule

Does your agency take into account the service schedule of
other transit agencies in the region to determine the daily and
weekly service schedules of your agency?
Does your agency determine time schedules of buses, streetcars or other fixed-route transit services in coordination with
the schedules of other transit systems, taking into account
transfer time for users at major transfer points?
N=number of respondents

Yes
N
%

No
N
%

Total
N

78

70

33

30

111

76

68

35

32

111

Information
The survey asked several questions on the joint provision of information. Of the 111
respondents, 83 or 75 percent provide information jointly with other transit agencies
(Table 27). Those agencies provided a variety of information. The most common jointly
provided information was in the form of a route map and time schedules, which 67 percent
of agencies provided (Table 28). Integrated information provision can make it easier
for customers to use transit to travel across areas served by multiple agencies (Miller,
Englisher, and Kaplan 2005).

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Nationwide Regional Coordination Survey

99

Table 27. Jointly Provided Information
Yes
N %
Does your agency jointly provide information to customers in
conjunction with other transit agencies?
N=number of respondents

No
N %

Total
N

83 75 28 25

111

Table 28. Types of Jointly Provided Information
Time schedule
Route map
Transfer information
System map
Fares
Other
Total number of respondents: 83
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
56
56
52
51
50
14

%
67
67
63
61
60
17

The 83 agencies indicated that they employ a variety of media to provide joint information
(Table 29). The most commonly used media were information pamphlets, used by 65
percent of the agencies, and shared websites, used by less than half of the agencies. A
few agencies noted that while they do not share websites, they do provide links to other
agencies’ websites. The use of shared websites for a region, such as the 511.org site in
the San Francisco Bay Area or the tripplanner.mta.info site in the New York City area, can
be very helpful for planning routes across more than one transit system or finding transit
information easily and quickly. However, information pamphlets may be a more popular
media to jointly provide information as they are accessible to everyone, including those
who do not have access to the Internet.
Table 29. Media Used in Jointly Provided Information
Information pamphlets
Telephone service numbers
Transfer centers that provide information
Shared websites
On-board display
Other
Total number of respondents: 83
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
54
49
44
37
14
15

%
65
59
53
45
17
18

The provision of regional transit information in the New Orleans Region is inadequate, as
discussed in the previous chapter. Both agencies provide very limited information about
the others’ services, and there is no joint provision of information. A quick visit to the RTA
or JeT websites will show this lack of information. The trip planner on the RTA website, for
example, does not include routes run by JeT.
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The use of real-time information was widespread among agencies we polled, though
regional coordination of real-time information is not (Table 30). Most agencies indicated
that they are currently using real-time information such as automatic vehicle location
systems. About one-third indicated that they do not use real-time information. Most
agencies use real-time information within their own agencies, but are not sharing the use
of real-time information with other agencies.
This is the case for both JeT and RTA, which use or will soon use automatic vehicle
location systems for their systems’ operation. Planners at RTA have noted that the system
that RTA will install will be similar to JeT’s system, and that they are hoping to coordinate
their real-time information in the future.
Table 30. Use of Real-Time Information
No
Yes, for the agency’s operation
Yes, for the agency’s operation and for transit users
Yes, shared by multiple agencies for operation
Yes, shared by multiple agencies for operation and for transit users
Other
Total number of respondents: 111

N
37
31
25
1
6
11

%
33
28
23
1
5
10

Facilities
The last measures of regional coordination that we polled agencies on were related to
facility sharing and sign design (Table 31). Sharing facilities such as bus shelters is done
on some level by most agencies that were polled. About 69 percent of the 111 agencies
shared facilities (e.g., bus shelter, terminal). The extent to which those agencies share
facilities could make a big difference in the level of coordination. For example, agencies
that share only a few bus shelters with other agencies still may have other facilities that
could be coordinated.
Nearly three-quarters of the 111 respondents reported that they jointly designate transfer
points with other transit agencies, clearly indicating where customers need to transfer. It
appears that this form of coordination is relatively easy to implement, as the designation
of transfer points requires minimal effort.
The sharing of signage design was not a very common practice. Of agencies polled,
only 35 percent of respondents share sign design with other agencies. This may be
due to the fact that agencies develop their own unique brand, or find it difficult to come
to an agreement with other transit agencies on signage. Shared sign design can give
customers the perception that they are working within a unified transit system, rather than
a disjointed one.
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Table 31. Questions Related to Facilities and Signage
Yes
N %
Does your transit agency share facilities (e.g. terminal, shelter)
with any other fixed-route transit agencies in the region?
Are transfer points in your region clearly designated for the
convenient transfer between different transit systems?
Does your agency share the design of system signage with other
agencies?
N=number of respondents

No
N %

Total
N

77 69 34 31

111

81 74 29 26

110

39 35 71 65

110

Agencies were asked to list the types of facilities shared between agencies (Table 32).
Shelters were the most commonly shared type of facility (75 percent of respondents), while
terminals were the second most commonly shared facility (62 percent of respondents).
Shared facilities for passengers such as bus stops or terminals can make transferring
from one system to another convenient for passengers by eliminating the need to walk to
a new stop or shelter. Agencies may have trouble sharing facilities when agreements on
maintenance cannot be reached. While it may be relatively easy to come to agreements
on bus shelters, it may not be as convenient to agree on sharing maintenance facilities, as
only nine percent of responding agencies had such arrangements.
Table 32. Types of Facilities Shared Between Agencies
Shelter
Terminal
Park and ride lot
Station
Maintenance facilities
Other
Total number of respondents: 77
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
58
48
39
32
7
7

%
75
62
51
42
9
9

Facility sharing in the New Orleans region is limited. According to the RTA/Veolia director
of planning and scheduling, RTA and JeT share facilities at three transfer points located
in Orleans Parish. According to JeT transit maps, there are only eight designated transfer
points between RTA and JeT. Since there are relatively few areas of overlap between
the two systems, it follows that the transfer points and facilities shared between them is
limited, and as noted above, the agencies are not in complete agreement about plans to
build another shared transfer facility.

Other Indicators
The survey included a few questions regarding other existing agreements between
agencies. Often, respondents indicated that their agency currently has agreements with
other agencies to expand routes. The coordinated expansion of routes can help link
locations that do not have service, connect service from multiple agencies, or eliminate
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unnecessary coverage provided by more than one agency. The second most frequently
cited agreement was the introduction of a regional smart card. It seems that quite a few
regions in the U.S. are moving forward with plans implement smart cards. In the New
Orleans region, there are currently no agreements between the two agencies from the list
in Table 33.
Table 33. Existing Agreements between Agencies
To expand routes
To introduce a regional transit smart card that can be used on multiple systems
To jointly market transit services
To jointly share data on ridership, accidents, etc.
To increase service frequency
To jointly train transit workers or share the same training materials
Other
Total number of respondents: 90
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
34
26
24
16
15
8
47

%
38
29
27
18
17
9
52

The last question related to regional coordination concerned discount programs. Discount
programs may not be directly related to regional coordination, but they have been shown
to help agencies increase ridership. When multiple agencies within a region provide
discounts, it can encourage ridership in a region (Pucher and Kurth 1989). Nearly twothirds of the respondents indicated that their agencies have some kind of discount
program. College and university discounts were the most popular, perhaps because these
institutions have large student populations that do not own cars.
For the New Orleans Region there are few discount programs. Both of the region’s transit
agencies offer free or discounted fares for seniors and persons with disabilities, and JeT
currently offers discount passes for public agencies.65 However, discount programs that
are quite popular nationally, such as university/college and school discounts, have not
been implemented in the New Orleans region (Table 34).
Table 34. Discount Programs
Colleges/Universities
Grade schools (K-12)
Public agencies
Corporate entities
Events/Festivals
Other
Total number of respondents: 131
Note: Respondents provided multiple answers

N
89
59
52
32
32
17

65 As indicated in JeT response to the nationwide survey.
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Respondent Comments
In addition to the multiple-choice section of the questionnaire, we asked respondents to
answer open-ended questions regarding regional coordination. Respondents commented
on a variety of issues related to regional coordination, noting some of the difficulties in
implementing regional coordination and also highlighting some of their successes.
As noted by some of the responding transit agency executives, agencies face challenges in
coordinating transit systems in an environment where long-standing financial, institutional,
and political situations exist. Finding ways around these obstacles is likely to be a key step
in advancing a region’s level of coordination. One respondent referred to some of the
difficulties of coordinating with other agencies, stating that “it's not the practicalities that
create the challenge,” but rather “the political and personal realities.” Where home rule is
well established and counties are responsible for providing transit service, many of these
agencies are unwilling to cooperate if they don't have to, and it is extremely difficult to force
them to cooperate.
Other respondents pointed out the complexity in achieving coordination efforts when
working with multiple agencies. Several executives commented on the difficulty in getting all
of the players to the table to reach an agreement. They pointed out that in order for multiple
transit agencies to coordinate effectively, there needs to be strong regional governance
as well as a focus away from the individual to the collective (e.g., agency fare collection
to a regional revenue sharing scheme base on smart card technology). In addition, some
respondents revealed that transit coordination is hampered by local funding requirements,
as is also the case in the New Orleans region. A respondent remarked that when operating
funds are secured through countywide sales tax levies, it is difficult to cross county borders
to service other counties, even when there are destination points across county lines. The
respondent suggested that one way to alleviate the situation might be for federal or state
governments to provide operational funding.
Several other respondents commented on their successes in regional coordination, noting
the benefits that passengers receive from having a coordinated regional transit system.
As the demand for travel grows in a region, transit demand for trips across service area
boundaries also grows. In some cases, transit agencies have formulated agreements
to address the demand for better coordination, such as joint purchases of fareboxes,
combining grant funds, and offering a regional information hotline. Other respondents
remarked that at the regional or state level, it might be advantageous to develop legislation
that allows for the development of regional transit authorities.
One clear message from comments received is the need for transit agencies to establish
working relationships with other agencies in their region in order to achieve regional
coordination goals. Regional coordination explicitly demands that agencies work
together. Without functioning relationships between agencies and/or government bodies,
coordination is not likely to happen.
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Conclusion
The results of the nationwide survey revealed that many of the regional coordination
measures listed in our survey are commonplace, but there is clearly a need for coordination
in many regions. Broadly speaking, regions either had very high levels of coordination, or
very low levels of coordination. A good example of this is the Los Angeles urbanized area.
Several agencies from this region participated in the survey, where respondents reported
high levels of regional coordination between transit agencies. Almost all respondents
from the Los Angeles urbanized area noted that their agencies were coordinated in all
areas, including fares, service schedules, information provision, and facility sharing. On
the other hand, agencies from some other areas reported very low levels of coordination.
The status of regional coordination in the New Orleans urbanized area is clear. RTA and
JeT have very low levels of coordination for most aspects covered in our survey, including
fare, service schedule, information, facilities, and joint agreements. Despite low levels
of coordination, officials from the two major agencies in the region have acknowledged
the need for greater coordination and have expressed a desire to work on coordination
efforts.
Given the struggles that the New Orleans region has undergone in recent years, it is not
surprising that difficulties with regional coordination have arisen. However, as the region
continues to recover from the effects of Hurricane Katrina, there is a widely held optimism
among the people living in the region. As the transit agencies move forward with major
changes to the structure of their agencies and new players get involved, perhaps there
will be renewed efforts to coordinate transportation services in the area. The region is
presented with a unique challenge, but also a unique opportunity to change long-standing
norms throughout the region.
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Many local governments and transit agencies in the U.S. face financial difficulties in providing
adequate public transit service in individual systems, and in providing sufficient regional
coordination to accommodate transit trips involving at least one transfer between transit
systems. These difficulties can be attributed to the recent economic downturn, continuing
withdrawal of the state and federal funds that help support local transit service, a decline in
local funding for transit service in inner cities due to ongoing suburbanization, and a distribution
of resources that responds to geographic equity without addressing service needs.
This study examined the effects of the “delegated management” contract executed by New
Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) with a multinational private firm, Veolia. This contract
was designed to allow RTA to outsource more functions (e.g., management, planning, funding)
to Veolia than has been typical in the U.S. This study has also explored the possibility of
improving regional coordination of transit service among multiple public agencies.
As Veolia has also been contracted by another transit agency in an adjacent jurisdiction—
Jefferson Transit (JeT) in Jefferson Parish—the presumption is that Veolia may potentially
have economic incentives to improve regional coordination in order to increase the productivity
and effectiveness of its transit service provision. To this end, the study examined two unique
issues that have not yet been explored in the U.S.: (1) the effect of a “delegated management”
contract on efficiency and effectiveness within a single transit system, and (2) the effects of
a single private firm, contracted separately by more than one agency in the same region, on
regional coordination.
In exploration of these two principal issues, this study combined three methodological
approaches: (1) a transit user survey to ask passengers about their perceptions of service
quality, (2) an analysis of operation and financial data obtained from the two transit agencies
as well as from the National Transit Database, and (3) a questionnaire and a set of interviews
focusing on regional coordination, as it compares to the results of a nationwide survey of
transit agencies on regional coordination. These analyses carefully took into account
conditions surrounding the transit operations at RTA and JeT, such as demographic changes
and specific contract terms.
Analysis of the transit user survey data indicated that compared to JeT, RTA has more work
to do to improve many service qualities including safety, amenities, and connections for its
customers. In particular, transit users in the RTA system are generally less satisfied than
JeT users with attributes related to regional coordination—such as ease of getting service
information about the other agency, transfer times, or convenience in paying fares—while
JeT riders place more importance on the same attributes. In addition, most RTA riders do
not recognize improvements in the last twelve months in the service quality of almost all the
attributes asked about in the survey, despite clear physical improvements made by RTA/
Veolia, which include introducing new vehicles, installing new shelters and benches, and
realigning bus lines. While this lack of recognition may be attributed to a negative image of
RTA on the part of the public, RTA/Veolia has attempted to address this perception issue in
order to better serve its customers. In addition, since many JeT riders make transfers to the
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RTA system, it is very important that RTA foster better coordination with JeT to accommodate
those who travel across the region.
Analysis of operation and financial data for the two transit agencies was also revealing.
Overall, while JeT has not seen dramatic changes over the three year period from 2006
to 2008, RTA/Veolia (with a delegated management contract) has made significant
improvements in several areas. These changes can be attributed to a restructuring of
RTA transit service management and operation, which feature bus line realignment,
rescheduling, and reallocation of vehicles implemented under the new management
by Veolia. Until 2008, gains in streetcar revenue hours and miles, passenger trips, fare
revenue, and operating cost efficiency were accompanied by corresponding losses on
the bus side. However, in 2009, the first complete year of fully restored streetcar lines,
RTA buses made gains in revenue miles and hours, trips per capita, cost per passenger
trip, and farebox recovery ratio.
At the same time, analysis revealed that in 2009, the RTA streetcar operation experienced
a loss in cost efficiency compared to the previous year, although its effectiveness in terms
of ridership per vehicle mile and hour is notably higher than that of buses. This loss in
cost efficiency for streetcars is largely due to a significant increase in operating costs,
which may be related to the costs of increased levels of supervision and management.
Nevertheless, the gains made by RTA buses were sufficient to offset the declines in
streetcar efficiency.
Still, the limited amount of available operation and financial data—due to both a short period
of analysis following the execution of the contract, and to a variable level of cooperation
on the part of RTA—has made it difficult to draw more definitive conclusions. Further
analysis will be required to more thoroughly evaluate the performance of the RTA/Veolia
management over the next several years. One important question that arose from our
analysis is whether Veolia can reverse 2009 declines in streetcar efficiency and increases
in operating costs with its involvement in planning streetcar expansions. A future study
might also explore the prospect of Veolia developing a regional transit monopoly with the
execution of its contract to provide demand-response service to a third transit agency in
Southeast Louisiana (River Parishes Transit Authority) in February, 2009, as well as how
that may further influence regional coordination. The lack of RTA/Veolia cooperation in
providing more details on their requests for proposals, contracts, and related documents
is a serious concern, as lack of transparency in a contract between a public agency and a
private firm tends to be a negative sign of not executing the contract appropriately—e.g.,
not properly transferring risks and responsibilities in exchange for the compensation that
the private firm receives, which might result in a substantial loss of public resources
(Checherita and Gifford 2007; Iseki and Houtman 2010, 2011; Ortiz and Buxbaum 2008;
Sclar 1997).
The analysis of the questionnaire responses and interviews regarding regional coordination
in Greater New Orleans in comparison with the nationwide survey suggested that current
coordination of transit service in Greater New Orleans is limited and is not comparable to
the average level that we found in the nationwide survey. Of the 17 indices used to measure
levels of coordination, Greater New Orleans only scored favorably on three: availability
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of transit fare media in the other agency’s service area, joint provision of information,
and sharing facilities. The inconsistent manner in which respondents answered the
questionnaire may be due to agency variations in the understanding of current conditions,
as well as different agency perspectives on transit service coordination in the region.
While interviewees mentioned the importance of internal channels within the contractor’s
organization and past discussions on the need to increase coordination in a few areas,
there is generally a lack of financial and strategic planning for funding or implementation.
With respect to adoption of new technologies that substantially benefit regional transit
operation (e.g., smart cards, automated vehicle location, real-time vehicle information),
there was some evidence of prioritization on the part of the contractor, and an interagency
prospectus calling for the adoption of new technologies. However, no clear planning or
strategy implementation was evident.
Constraints preventing the agencies from moving forward with coordination include the
tendency—shared with many agencies—to use politics to protect their own interests and
benefits, financial concerns with seeing that tax revenues raised within their jurisdiction
are spent there, and misgivings that the mechanism for allocating fare media revenue
regionally could be inequitable. These political and financial issues are major barriers to
regional coordination, and are consistent with past studies on geographic equity and on the
adoption of new technologies among multiple public agencies. At this point, these concerns
are inhibiting any economic incentives that might be identified by the private contractor
the agencies share, although there is a certain level of expectation regarding regional
coordination through Veolia’s internal channels, as well as between the two public transit
agencies. These concerns are not well addressed, partly due to the lack of strong initiative
on the part of the metropolitan planning organization, the Regional Planning Commission
(RPC). This report’s literature review, as well as its nationwide survey identified the potential
role that a regional planning entity can play in the promotion of interagency cooperation
and service coordination, such as a common set of transfer policies, establishment of a
smart card network.
This study’s findings reveal that common political and financial concerns need to be
addressed and resolved before successful attempts at further coordination can move
forward. In contrast, some technical coordination issues, such as bus scheduling,
information sharing, or agreeing on and implementing common fare collection technology,
could be resolved, as long as they do not incur an undue financial burden on one or the
other party.
Although it was not possible to draw as definitive a set of conclusions as initially hoped, the
findings of this multifaceted study should provide valuable information on a transit service
contracting approach new to the U.S., delegated management. This study also identified a
coherent set of indices with which to evaluate the regional coordination of transit service,
the present status of coordination among U.S. transit agencies, and barriers that need to
be resolved for regional transit coordination to be successful.
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APPENDIX A: PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC TRANSIT SERVICE:
THE U.K.
The contracting of transit service by public agencies began to attract particular attention
when the U.K. Transport Act of 1985 virtually deregulated bus transportation. Britain’s White
Paper on Buses (Department of Transport 1984), recommended that the U.K. bus industry be
deregulated, namely, that it be operated under free market conditions. The period immediately
following release of the White Paper was characterized by concerns over public operator
efficiency and continuous government subsidy (Gwilliam, Nash, and Mackie 1984; White
1990). Positions taken in the Bus White Paper were effectively used to achieve passage of
the Transport Act of 1985, leading to the deregulation and privatization of bus transit service
in the U.K.
Following deregulation of the U.K. bus industry, a number of researchers (Colson 1996;
Evans 1988; Glaister 1997; Gwilliam, Nash, and Mackie 1984; Gwilliam and van de Velde
1990; Karlaftis 2006) sought to determine whether this legislation had brought about positive
effects on ridership and service quality. In the 25 years since enactment of the Transport Act
of 1985, a number of studies have analyzed the effectiveness of deregulation and competitive
tendering in delivering quality services and cost savings (Colson 1996; Glaister 1997; White
1990, 1995).
Prior to the full deregulation of bus services throughout Britain (London and Northern Ireland
excluded), the Transport Act of 1980 had established trial areas to experiment with new
models for the provision of transit service (Evans 1988). These trials were to test how service
quality would be affected by the private provision of bus service. The most interesting of the
three trial areas was Hereford, a civil parish located in Herefordshire, which volunteered
to participate in the trial. The Hereford case is notable because of its geographic makeup,
which includes both rural and urban areas, as well as because of its experiment with both
deregulation and tendering of services. Differences in the application of local bus regulation,
i.e., deregulation vs. competitive tendering may have led to different outcomes in terms of
both service quality (e.g., number of operating buses per route, on-time service) and fare
prices.
The Hereford trial study was separated into two distinct regimes. In the rural area, regulators
retained control over policy issues and instituted competitive tendering schemes to award
contracts for subsidized bus service. The rural councils retained policy control over bus
service, because the rural areas were characterized by low demand, due to low density
and high car ownership rates. To ensure that bus service would continue in the countryside,
councils gave their current transit providers the option of either providing service without
subsidy, or risk losing the routes in a competitive tendering process. Competitive tendering
was a success during the trial period, with many formerly subsidized routes being run without
subsidies, and the subsidy levels for the remaining routes falling as a result of bidding (Evans
1988).
In Hereford’s urban areas, demand for bus service was high enough to sustain a marketbased approach to transit provision. Under the urban model, complete deregulation allowed
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private companies to freely enter and exit the market. During the trial period, these
deregulated areas witnessed increased competition—in many cases, multiple carriers
operating the same routes. Increased competition for profitable routes created instability,
with fare prices rising and falling sporadically, operators entering and exiting the market
frequently, and safety and quality standards repeatedly ignored by operators who were
more interested in gaining market share from their competitors than in providing reliable
service.
Evans (1988) discusses the basis for the differences in stability between the urban and
rural areas during the trial period by examining fare prices, vehicle-miles operated, and
patronage levels from 1979 (pre-trial) to 1988, distinguishing between urban and rural.
He cautiously concludes66 that stability was achieved in rural areas because county
councils remained key decision makers on service levels, schedules and fare prices.
Lack of regulation in the completely market-dominated urban trial areas caused chaotic
conditions, with uncoordinated scheduling, fare fluctuations, and poor safety and quality
standards, perhaps an early warning to the government that the potential impacts of
deregulation had not been carefully considered and that competitive tendering of private
services might actually be an adequate incentive to private operators.
Based on these trials with deregulation on the one hand, and competitive tendering for
unprofitable routes on the other, the White Paper on Buses (Department of Transport
1984) recommended eliminating the barriers to entrance into the public transportation
market, and allowing privately-owned and operate companies to begin providing service,
deciding routes and schedules, setting fares, and making service and planning decisions
traditionally left to the local authorities (Alexandersson, Hulten, and Folster 1998). The
recommendations regarding bus industry deregulation were implemented through the
Transport Act of 1985 for most of the U.K., except for London and Northern Ireland. In the
case of London, the decision to not deregulate would allow researchers a unique situation
with which to measure the effectiveness of deregulation.67
The Transport Act 1985 introduced the privatization of bus services—transfers to the private
sector of publicly owned bus companies and the competitive tendering of services—into a
public transportation model that had previously been dominated by a few national public
providers (Simpson 1996). In addition, it eliminated many of the regulations previously
placed on bus operators outside of London. The principal ambitions of deregulation and
privatization in this Act were to decrease government spending on public transportation
by encouraging the creation of a competitive market that would incentivize cost-effective
entities and improve resource allocation without causing undesirable spin-off effects
(Glaister 1997; Gwilliam, Nash, and Mackie 1984). Privatization of bus service in the U.K.
divided the National Bus Company into numerous components for sale to multiple private
companies. Deregulation (outside of London) eliminated road service licensing, and only
66 The Hereford trial period coincided with the creation of Midland Red West, a nationalized bus
company created to introduce more local management into the transit system. Midland Red West’s
performance improved during this period, but it is difficult to assess whether the improvement was due to
the competitive nature of the trial period, or to increased local management (Evans 1988).
67 The “White Paper on Buses” was written after the trial period in Hereford. According to Evans (1988),
the decision to support full deregulation was not supported by conclusions drawn from the trials, but by
general arguments and presumptions.
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required that private companies register with the Traffic Commissioner to report their
scheduled routes and timetables. Outside of London, authorities were only charged with
tendering fiscally undesirable yet socially necessary routes, so that these services would
remain in operation (Glaister 1997).
While London also underwent a period of privatization with the breakup of bus operations
under London Transport, it was one of the few urban areas in the country where the bus
industry was never deregulated. The London Regional Transport Act of 1984 (LRTA) was
enacted prior to the Transport Act of 1985. As a result, the Conservative Government
proposed deferring deregulation in London and allowing London Transport, the subsidized
regional transit provider, some time to show progress (Glaister 1997). This legislation
required that London Transport, invite competition where necessary and efficient, and
to tender routes or networks to private contractors. By 1994, 60 percent of London’s bus
service was provided directly by the regulated public sector, 20 percent was operated by
the same operator under competitive contract, and the remainder was operated by private
companies, also under competitive contract (Glaister 1997). By the time planning authority
was devolved to Transport for London, the new regional transit agency for London in 2000,
the privatization of London’s bus services was almost complete.
Although Britain’s bus reforms revolutionized European public transit and attracted
attention from around the world, most Western European countries introducing policies
in favor of greater competition in transit provision emulated the London route tendering
model rather than deregulation model (van de Velde 2001). Indeed, in light of the results
in the U.K., many countries were initially skeptical about the value of competition in transit
altogether (Gwilliam and van de Velde 1990). In their review of European attitudes toward
competition in the provision of transit in the wake of the British reforms, Gwilliam and
Velde (1990) also note the manner in which subsidies were paid in different countries at
that time, differentiating between what they term “pure deficit finance,” (or automatic ex
post coverage of all costs to the organization providing transit); “norm-related finance,”
(or payment related to norms of performance determined ex ante); and “contract-related
finance,” (or payment based on contract terms developed ex ante under negotiation or
competition). With more developed countries, including the U.S., contracting is more
attractive than deregulation when exploring private participation in transit.
Where policy makers find it desirable to continue offering subsidies in order to achieve
long-term policy goals, such as many rural areas of the U.K., the nature of contracts and
payment schemes is crucial. Past research has examined the types of transit privatization
that will likely facilitate the best outcomes in terms of cost savings and service quality,
focusing on types of compensation and processes for selecting contractors (Gagnepain
and Ivaldi 2002; Hensher and Stanley 2003, 2008; Hensher and Wallis 2005). Indeed,
many factors associated with transit privatization influence the quality of a private operator’s
performance (Hensher and Stanley 2008), including the degree of government regulation
and the size of the market.
In the past decade, there has been a clear policy shift away from full deregulation in
the U.K. and toward a more regulated transit system model (Department of Transport
2004). The U.K. Department of Transport reported in 2004 that partnerships between
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local authorities and bus companies have increased innovation and produced better
services than private companies operating alone. The Transport Acts of 2000 and 2008
have made strides to increase system stability and partnerships by introducing what they
call “Quality Partnerships” and “Quality Contracts,” each entailing a relationship between
the local transport authority (LTA), private operators, and other transportation agencies
(e.g., highway departments). In Quality Partnerships, operators agree to invest in serviceimproving measures, such as newer vehicles, more dependable service or staff training,
while LTAs and other agencies agree to invest in better bus-related infrastructure, such
as bus stations, shelters, or other facilities. Quality Contracts have been introduced in the
past decade as potential tools to restore government control of bus services. The concept
is to replace on-road competition with competitive tendering, permitting LTAs to outline
service specifications and performance targets.68 While helpful, one drawback with Quality
Contracts is that they often take a year or two to establish, due to the lengthy process of
approvals required to regulate a previously unregulated route. Another problem is that
unless Quality Contracts cover a specific sub-area of a city, they are really only a bandaid on the problem. Thus, there is a need for a more comprehensive form of regulation
that encompasses numerous contracts or corridors (Rivasplata 2006).
One reason for promoting Quality Contracts is that they can effectively reestablish
transit coordination in cities outside of London. Following deregulation, Competition
Act provisions severely limited transit coordination between private operators outside
of London (U.K. Office of Fair Trading 1999). While transit coordination in London has
been strengthened by competitive tendering (e.g., TfL has incorporated specific operator
coordination provisions into the bidding process), outside of London, in most cases,
inter-operator coordination is considered to constitute a form of collusion and is strongly
discouraged (Rivasplata 2006).

68 Quality Contracts have not been widely used yet, because LTAs were originally required to prove that
such contracts were the best and only means of serving the public interest, a formidable task in most
areas due to the complexity involved in the approval process. The burden of proof was relaxed in the
2008 Act, and was revised again in January 2010 (Butcher 2010).
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France
France has had private involvement in transit management somewhat longer than many
European nations (Faivre D'Arcier 2009), but with little actual competition for contracts
(Yvrande-Billon 2006). From 1982, when France decentralized responsibility for urban public
transit to local authorities, most have chosen to delegate management to private companies.
Competitive tendering was not required until the Sapin Act of 1993, and contract were usually
renewed by tacit agreement.
In Kerstens’ (1996) review of 114 urban bus systems’ 1990 performance (excluding Paris
and multi-modal companies), France was one of the few European nations that had seen its
ridership grow over the previous two decades, and private ownership had a slight positive
effect on performance. Kerstens also found that arrangements in which more risk was shared
between parties had a positive relationship to technical efficiency, even without substantial
presence of competition for contracts (1996). In contrast, examining 165 French transit
networks’ performance from 1995–2002 (after competitive tendering became mandatory),
Yvrand-Billon (2006) found that operating costs rose 21.5 percent, labor productivity
decreased 9.8 percent, and fares covered only 34 percent of operating costs, reduced from 55
percent in 1992. Some improvements in technology and passenger comfort were observed,
but speed and frequency of service remained low. Approximately 88 percent of contracts up
for auction over those years awarded the contract to the incumbent, with little evidence to
suggest that competition was encouraging those incumbents to improve their performance,
or that the transit sector was performing well enough to not require change. Yvrande-Billon
dubs French competitive tendering a “myth,” as it is implemented in a two-stage process,
involving a competitive phase followed by contract negotiation after the selection of a winner.
Authorities are not required to provide detailed information either about the service desired
or the status of the current transit system (e.g., the quality of its stock, financial data) to
bidders, making bidding a high risk transaction cost to a non-incumbent unfamiliar with the
system.
Furthermore, the French government found sufficient evidence of collusion among three
leading operators to fine them each five percent of their turnover. Competitive tendering
per se is not to blame for poor performance in France, but Yvrand-Billon argues that the
particular French process of combining tendering and negotiation leads to “worst of both
worlds” outcomes. Faivre D’Arcier’s (2009) study of 1995–2000 data on French public transit
networks also found a drift of operating expenses and failure to attract new passengers, and
at the same time, oversupply of services. He attributes this in part to France’s dedicated
Transport Tax (Versement Transport). Over-reliance on a dedicated funding source may
inhibit efficiency, but the Transport Tax will likely fail to cover the rising costs in coming
years. Besides not fully achieving full cost savings and efficiency, France’s transit provision
methods are failing to realize public policy goals—particularly improving mobility for lowincome individuals, reducing congestion, limiting sprawl, and reducing emissions (Faivre
D'Arcier 2009).
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Italy
Italy is another country where competition has not clearly produced benefits. Italian
legislation in the 1990s attempted to ban all non-tendered bus concessions by 2004,
although later legislation left more discretion to local governments as to whether to tender
or self-provide transit (Boitani and Cambini 2006). Labor costs are exceptionally high in
Italy, making up approximately two-thirds of operating costs while having one of the lowest
levels of labor productivity in Europe. By 2004, public subsidies covered an average of
70 percent of operating costs. Addressing poor cost performance and high subsidies
were significant motivating factors in Italian regions that chose competitive tendering of
bus services. Almost everywhere that tendering was introduced, however, incumbent
operators won the concession, and savings relative to transit authorities’ reserve prices
were less than five percent (Boitani and Cambini 2006).
Boitani and Cambini (2006) found compensation per bus kilometer varied too widely to
observe any definite patterns, although they suggest that rates seem to be determined to
some extent by past cost levels. In some cases, higher than average compensation may
be related to mountainous terrain, but there are other cases that have no clear reason for
their high compensation rates. The authors suggest several possible factors hampering
true competition for Italian concessions. Transit workers are not eligible for unemployment
benefits in Italy, so “social clauses” in bus contracts require that new operators retain all
employees on the same terms, keeping Italy’s high transit labor costs untouchable. When
brand new routes were tendered in Rome, bids for those routes promised lower costs
than average bids on existing routes, suggesting that routes that permit operators greater
freedom to set staffing levels have more potential to realize savings than pre-existing
routes. Boitani and Cambini also note that local governments are not required to provide
bidders with precise service definitions or transit system data, giving incumbents an
advantage. Political factors also appear to be in play, with some cases of tenders designed
specifically for publicly owned incumbents to protect political rents. Like Yvrande-Billon
(2006), Boitani and Cambini agree that competitive tendering has the potential to be
beneficial, but in Italy’s relatively brief experience, tenders should be organized differently
if they are to promote competition that leads to lower costs and higher quality.

The Netherlands
The Netherlands did not introduce reforms to require competitive tendering until 2001 (to be
phased in gradually), and at the same time, devolved responsibility for transit to local and
provincial authorities (van de Velde, Schipholt, and Veeneman 2008). Bus concessions
can be awarded for up to eight years, so it is only recently that the first experiences with
tendering and private service provision are being assessed. Unlike France, which gives
transit authorities wide latitude for subjective judgment of bids and open negotiation, the
Netherlands requires objectively measurable criteria and prevents negotiation, and allows
more latitude over the term of the concession to create incentive structures for particular
performance goals (van de Velde, Schipholt, and Veeneman 2008).
Specific goals nationwide at the time of the reforms were to increase ridership, reduce
public subsidies from around 67 percent to 50 percent, and make use of experienced
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operators’ tactical knowledge. Since local authorities had little or no experience directly
managing transit, operators’ knowledge of passengers’ needs and wants and how to supply them efficiently was critical, while local authorities could define strategic goals related
to public policy (van de Velde 2001). Van de Velde et al (2008) found that prices per bus
hour dropped by around 30 percent across the country after competitive tendering was
introduced. The savings were not limited to tendered concessions; concessions that were
still negotiated improved as authorities used upcoming tendering as leverage, and operators prepared themselves to be more competitive for the future (van de Velde, Schipholt,
and Veeneman 2008).
Surveys by the Dutch Transport Knowledge Resource Centre (KpVV) have indicated that
passengers’ perceptions of service quality have risen more for competitively tendered
services than non-tendered services (van de Velde, Schipholt, and Veeneman 2008).
However, region-by-region implementation of tendering has not been without challenges.
Van de Velde et al (2005) have identified an interesting trend as provinces learn from
first-round experiences: authorities are diverging on how much service design freedom to
leave to operators, with authorities who chose wide latitude for service design in their first
tendering round reversing their position, and vice versa. First-round contracts that gave
more freedom to operators have tended to have poorer performance in terms of increasing
ridership and technological innovation, while those that gave public authorities stricter
control of planning were more likely to suffer from monitoring and quality control problems
(van de Velde, Schipholt, and Veeneman 2008). Although the Dutch tendering experiences
to date have had largely positive results, a few negative cases have drawn media attention
(van de Velde, Schipholt, and Veeneman 2008). Clearly, even in a competitive bidding
process, there are tradeoffs as far as what contracts can be expected to achieve.

Scandinavian Countries
Scandinavian countries were among the earliest adopters of public transit reform following
the U.K. (Karlaftis 2006). Helsinki, Finland was chosen as one of the competitive tendering
“Good Practice” case studies for the SIPTRAM project on sustainability in urban public
transport (Müller and Hidson 2003). The Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council awarded its
first transit tender in 1994, and since 1996, all of Helsinki’s regional transit services have
been procured through competitive tendering. While contracts are generally awarded to
the bidders with the lowest overall costs, quality-related properties of vehicles (e.g., low
emissions, low floors, etc.) are also evaluated positively in consideration of proposals.
Because of this consideration, the average age of the fleet declined from 6.5 years to
4.5 years between pre-tendering and 2002 (Müller and Hidson 2003). The Good Practice
report estimates that, adjusting for inflation, providing the level of service found in Helsinki
in 2002 at the cost of pre-tendering services should have come to FIM 446 million, but was
actually only FIM 322 million (Müller and Hidson 2003).
In Sweden, cost savings since 1991 (three years after a national transit act permitted
competitive procurement for transit services) are estimated to be between five and ten
percent on average (Jansson and Pyddoke 2007). While cost savings have been realized,
less attention has been given to service quality. Stockholm County’s authority, SL, has
experimented more than any other transit agency in Sweden with quality incentives
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in their gross cost contracts, reviewed by Jansson and Pyddoke (2007). SL bases
punctuality incentives and penalties (including late, early, and cancelled departures) on
their estimates of passengers’ valuation of delay time per minute, and also incentivizes
vehicle cleanliness, staff behavior, and information quality. Reviewing data sets on SL
contract areas ranging between 1996 and 2005 for changes before and after introduction
of (or change to) incentives, Jansson and Pyddoke (2007) found that for most of the bus
contract areas, punctuality incentives actually had a negative effect, despite attempting
to control for the effects of factors outside operators’ control, such as weather conditions,
numbers of passengers boarding, and speed (as a proxy for congestion). They also
found a slight (but not statistically significant) increase in passenger complaints after
cleanliness, staff behavior, and information quality incentives were introduced. Among
the authors’ hypotheses for such counter-intuitive results are that the number and kinds
of incentives are too large and complex, and bonuses and penalties too low, to be worth
operators’ transaction costs to implement quality improvements. They also suggest that
SL’s estimation of passenger valuation of their delay time and willingness to pay for
punctuality may need to be reconsidered. Their prime hypothesis, however, is that they
have not identified and controlled for some important factor influencing timeliness.

Germany
Local-level German transit systems have been dominated by publicly-owned companies,
but the new EU regulations have required that Germany introduce more competitive
elements (Müller and Hidson 2003). One way in which local transit authorities have been
encouraged to introduce competition with an emphasis on achieving better quality service
is through the Environment Ministry’s 2002 pilot project to promote better environmental
standards in local transit, and encourage the consideration of environmental externalities
(e.g., costs and benefits of different fuels, noisiness, etc.) in evaluating bids (Müller and
Hidson 2003). Competitive tendering is still not used in all regions. Nevertheless, Walter
(2009) has found that local transit operators have made increasing use of outsourcing
elements of their services to private partners over the years he studied 39 German transit
companies (1997-2006), and that high outsourcing values are correlated with higher
efficiency. When examining the relationship of technological progress and cost decreases,
Walter observed rising cost decreases associated with technology until 2004, when they
leveled off. This may be due in part to the replacement of the former East Germany’s
transit stock.

Central Europe
Central European countries have faced different challenges than their Western European
counterparts, as their transit markets have changed. In fact, Europe-wide studies
conducted by the MARETOPE project found that Southern and Central European cities
have lower labor costs than most of Europe, and still have public ownership of their
transit (MARETOPE 2003). Central Europe’s economic transitions are affecting public
transit markets, however. Car ownership has rapidly risen, high-density socialist cities are
giving way to rapid suburbanization, and funds to subsidize the formerly low fares have
been slashed at the same time that aging rolling stock and infrastructure are deteriorating
(Pucher and Buehler 2005).
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Polish transit ceased to be a monopoly in 1992, and transit management became the
responsibility of local Public Transit Authorities. Outside of cities, the market is almost
entirely deregulated and suffering from poor quality vehicles and information and lack of
coordination (Wolański 2009). Polish cities utilize a variety of provision strategies, from
entirely tendered services, to public sector entities with no separate identity from the
city government, and mixes of public and private provision in between (Wolański 2009).
Comparing tendered to non-tendered transit services in Polish cities, Wolański (2009)
found that tendering significantly improves efficiency; public operators forced to compete
are still capable of achieving efficiency levels similar to those of private companies, while
not achieving higher efficiency. Public operators still perform more than twice the amount
of tendered services as private operators, which may be due in part to some cities where
private operators find it difficult to satisfy criteria like owning their own bus fleets. There
are also instances where public operators with direct awards in one region were able to
underbid private operators on competitive tenders by cross subsidizing, which was not yet
banned by the European Union at the time of the study. Unexpectedly, Wolański found that
municipal monopolies not under the authority of a Public Transport Authority were more
efficient than public operators directly awarded contracts by PTAs.

Australia
Australian transit issues are comparable to those in Europe and the U.S., and beginning
in 1995, two state capitals—Perth and Adelaide—introduced tendering into their transit
systems (Wallis 2003). Both cities preserved public agencies’ control of policy and
regulatory functions (e.g., fares, service levels, finding funding), while conducting actual
service planning in a “partnership” arrangement between operators and state governments.
Each city also combined fixed annual payments with additional payment per bus revenue
kilometer and per passenger. Assessing both cities’ bus transit performance after several
years of tendering, Wallis (2003) found significant increases in user satisfaction in customer
surveys, and noticeable growth of revenue bus kilometers (15 percent in Adelaide and 32
percent in Perth) as well as patronage, after years of decline (8 percent growth in Adelaide
and 26 percent growth in Perth). At the same time, average costs per bus kilometer declined
in both cities, meaning that total bus system costs in Adelaide fell around 33 percent in
the period studied, and Perth’s system-wide costs stayed constant even though services
substantially increased. Elsewhere in Australia in the same time period, other cities’ publicly
owned bus systems improved efficiency under the continuous threat of possible tendering
in the future, although not as dramatically as in Perth or Adelaide (Wallis 2003).

Latin American and Developing Countries
Like Central Europe, Latin American countries are facing somewhat different public transit
challenges than those of Western Europe, Australia, and the U.S., but certain privatization
and regulation issues being faced in these nations have some relevance to competitive
tendering and regulation questions in the U.S. Orrico Filho, Aragão, and Santo (2007)
provide an overview of the main trends in competition in Latin American transit. Apart
from Brazil, much of the Latin American urban transit market is characterized by “artisan”
operators: individuals or families who operate one or a few vehicles, often outside of a
legal framework. Massive congestion reaching crisis levels in many Latin American cities
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is one of the primary factors encouraging policy-makers to attempt to create more formal,
coordinated transit networks, and modernize technology, sometimes using competitive
tendering.
Brazil has historically had larger operators, facilitated in part by a bus manufacturing
industry, but illegal artisanal operators have become more common there as well. Tendering
is legally mandatory in Brazil, but has been resisted by major operators. In cities and
regions where prosecution forced tendering procedures to be performed, collusion among
operators has frustrated the process. As in France and Italy, Brazilian cities, and to some
extent other Latin American cities, have found that reforming previous transit provision
methods to be genuinely competitive in ways that generate efficiency and higher quality
is more challenging than simply mandating tendering.
In the case of Santiago, Chile, a competitive tendering process similar to London’s was
implemented on a regional level. Over the past 20 years, structural reforms have been
introduced to a previously-privatized bus market, effectively modifying the amount and
quality of services to address major environmental concerns (Lee and Rivasplata 2001).
More recently, the Transantiago project, which introduced new vehicles and infrastructure,
reduced the number of potential contracts while requiring that bidders cite past professional
experience in the area of transit provision. This last provision was designed to prevent the
existence of artisan operators that did not have network vision and were not interested in
integrating services with other operators (Malbrán et al. 2003; Rivasplata 2006).

South Africa
In South Africa, the federal government’s Transport White Paper of 1996 and Cape Town’s
Moving Ahead (1998) placed emphasis on renewing investment in transit and reducing
travel times and monetary costs for commuters (Rivasplata 2006). In a departure from
past policy, the federal government committed itself to opening bus routes, including
those operated by Golden Arrow Bus (a private operator previously under a long-term
contract to the city), to a competitive tendering process. Competitive tendering, which
was first introduced in 1996, is seen as a tool with which to reduce subsidies and promote
innovation. Western Cape Province, the political unit containing the City of Cape Town,
regards tendering as a means through which to achieve “an effective, efficient, equitable
and affordable transport system” (Cape Metropolitan Council 1998).

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

119

APPENDIX C: LIST OF DOCUMENTS OBTAINED FROM
TRANSIT AGENCIES IN NEW ORLEANS
Table 35. List of Documents Received From Transit Agencies in the Greater New
Orleans Region
RTA

•
•

JeT

2008 Request for Proposals—Transit
Management Services
First Amendment to Transit
Management Agreement (Transitioning
to Delegated Management)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

2006 Request for Proposal—Transit
Services
Request for Proposal—Management
Contract
Transit Service Contract ATC/Vancom
2006
Contract Amendment—Name change to
Veolia
Operating Expenses FY 2007 and 2008
Revenue MITS and Fixed Route FY
2007 and 2008
Performance Indicators Report: 2007,
2008, and 2009
Title VI Reports 2007 and 2009
Geocoded bus stop inventory
Transit Budget: 2007, 2008, and 2009
Meeting minutes of pre-bid conference
Bid evaluation
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Appendix C: List of Documents Obtained from Transit Agencies in New Orleans
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APPENDIX D: RTA AND JET ROUTE MAPS
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Appendix D: RTA and JeT Route Maps

Figure 29. RTA System Map Route Legend
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Appendix D: RTA and JeT Route Maps

JeT Route Maps

Figure 30. Jefferson Transit (JeT) System Map, Interactive Web Version
Note: Available at http://www.jeffersontransit.org/maps
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January, 2010

Figure 31. Jefferson Transit (JeT) System Map, Printable Version
Note: Available at http://www.jeffersontransit.org/schedules/PDF_Schedules/2010/System%20Map%20SPREAD%20
2010%2010_11.pdf
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APPENDIX E: TRANSIT USER SURVEY
UNO Transit User Survey – Tell Us What You Think!!
University of New Orleans researchers are conducting a study to improve transportation services. Part of this work includes
asking people like you about your views on transit service and facilities. This survey should take only several minutes to complete and is completely voluntary. You are under no obligation to take or even to complete this survey once you have started.
Further, the survey is anonymous and no individuals will be identified in any of the work produced from this research.
Are you willing to participate in this survey?  Yes  No

Bus Stop Qualities

Do you agree
with or disagree?
(1) Strongly
agree,
(2) Agree
somewhat,
(3) disagree
somewhat,
(4) strongly
disagree

How important
it is to you?
(1) very important,
(2) important,
(3) somewhat
important,
(4) not important.

This stop area is clean.
There are enough places to sit.
There is shelter here to protect me from the sun or rain.

Have you noticed
any change within the last 12
months? Got:
(1) better,
(2) somewhat
better,
(3) no change,
(4) somewhat
worse,
(5) worse.

Approximately when did
you notice the
change?
(e.g., several
months ago;
around February, 2009).

.

The signs here are clear and helpful.
It is easy to get schedule and route information at this stop.
I usually have a short wait to catch my bus / train.
My bus / train is usually on time.
It’s easy to find my stop.
I feel safe here during the day.
I feel safe here at night.
This stop is well lit at night.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar schedules/route maps of RTA.
It is easy to get bus/streetcar schedules/route maps of JeT.
It is convenient to pay for fare.
It is easy to get around this stop.
It requires a short waiting time to make a transfer at this stop.
Overall, this is an easy place to transfer to another bus or streetcar.

How many days a week do you use public transportation? _____ If less than once a week, how many times a month? _____
How often do you make the trip you are currently on?  regularly  sometimes  not often  never before
Which transit lines do you usually take for this trip? _____; _____; _____
Does your trip involve any transfer between RTA and Jefferson Transit (JeT)?  Yes  No
How many transfers do you expect to make this trip? _____
Was there a car that you could have used to make this trip today?
 Yes, easily  Yes, with little effort
 No, probably not  No, definitely not
What is the main purpose of
 Travel to/from work  Other work-related trip  Shopping or Personal business
this trip?
 College/School  Hospital/doctor’s office  Social or Recreational  Other: ______________
How do you pay for this trip?  Cash  Monthly/weekly pass  Day pass  Transfer ticket  Other: ___________________
How long have you been waiting at this stop/station? ______ minutes;  I just got here  Unsure
How much longer do you expect to wait before catching another bus/streetcar: ______ minutes;  I just got here  Unsure
How long does your entire trip normally take? ______ minutes;  I just got here  Unsure
Gender:  Male  Female
What is your background?
 American Indian or Alaskan Native  Asian or Pacific Islander  African-American/Black
 Hispanic/Latino  Caucasian/White  Multi-Ethnic  Other: ___________________
What is your total annual household income?
 Under $15,000  $15,000 - $29,999  $30,000 – $49,999  $50,000 $74,999  $75,000 - $99,999  $100,000 or greater
What year were you born? 19_____
If you don’t mind, please tell me both the starting and ending locations of this trip: (address or closest cross street)
Starting: _____________________________________ Ending: _____________________________ THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!!
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APPENDIX F: SELECTED TRANSIT USER SURVEY RESULTS
Trip Characteristics

Figure 32. What is the Main Purpose of Your Trip?

Figure 33. How Often Do You Make the Trip You are Currently On?
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40%

35.1%

35%
30%
25%

23.9%

22.8%

20%
15%
8.5%

10%

9.8%

5%
0%
No transfers

1 transfer

2 transfers

3 transfers

N/A, no
answer

Figure 34. How Many Transfers Do You Expect to Make on this Trip?

Figure 35. Does Your Trip Involve Any Transfer Between RTA and JeT?
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Passenger Characteristics
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20.8%
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Figure 36. How Many Days a Week Do You Use Public Transportation?
(Respondents Reporting Weekly Ridership)

Figure 37. Was There a Car that You Could Take for this Trip?
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Figure 38. Proportions of Respondents With Income Under $50,000

Figure 39. Age
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Table 36. Race/Ethnicity of Survey Respondents
Race/Ethnicity
African American/Black
Hispanic/Latino
Caucasian/White
Multi-Ethnicity/Native American or
Alaskan/Asian or Pacific Islander

264
14
30
26

RTA
79.04%
4.19%
8.98%
7.78%

50
5
22
11

JeT
56.82%
5.68%
25.00%
12.50%

314
19
52
37

Total
74.41%
4.50%
12.32%
8.77%

Figure 40. Race/Ethnicity of Survey Respondents by Transit Agency, Total
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Figure 41. Race/Ethnicity of Survey Respondents by Transit Agency, Total

Figure 42. Jefferson Parish African American and Caucasian Survey
Respondents, Compared to Parish Population
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Figure 43. Orleans Parish African American and Caucasian Survey Respondents,
Compared to Parish Population
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APPENDIX G: MAXIMUM FLEET SIZES OF RTA AND JET
SYSTEMS
Table 37. Agency Sizes
VOMAL
RTA

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Size Category
JeT

Bus

Light
Rail

Bus

299
301
364
303
306
N/R
74
59
58
62

23
23
43
20
60
N/R
7
19
22
23

49
49
53
52
53
53
23
27
28
28

RTA

JeT

5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3

2
2
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
2

Size
Category

Vehicle Operated
Maximum Available
(VOMAL)

1
2
3
4
5
6

10–24
25–49
50–99
100–249
250–499
500–999

Note: RTA did not report data for 2005, due to Hurricane Katrina.
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APPENDIX H: REGIONAL TRANSIT COORDINATION SURVEY
Introduction
The University of New Orleans University Transportation Center (UNO-UTC),66 in conjunction
with the Mineta Transportation Institute at San Jose State University (SJSU), is conducting
a study to better understand the extent to which transit agencies have considered, are
considering, or are implementing regional coordination strategies. The study will examine the
efficiency and effectiveness of providing regional, multi-jurisdictional transit service to achieve
financial resiliency.
It will also assess the roles of private transit providers in improving regional and local transit
service. Responses you provide in this survey will be instrumental in assessing the status of
regional coordination among fixed-route transit service in the nation.
Please note that we would like you to provide factual information about the status of transit
service at your agency (and in the region where you serve) from the perspective of a transit
planner, manager or director, i.e., we are not asking for your personal views or opinions.
Thank you so much for responding to this questionnaire in a timely manner.
Please note that in order for your survey responses to be submitted, you must select "Done"
on the last page of the survey. Thank you.
Personal Information
1. What is your position in the agency where you work? (open ended)
2. What is your principal area of responsibility?
� Planning
� Management
� Operations
� Reporting to the board
� Public communication
� Other (please specify)
3. How long have you worked there? year (s): and month (s)
Transit Agency Information
1. What is the full name of your transit agency? (open ended)
2. If you know the National Transit Database ID of your agency, please specify. NTD #:
3. Within which state and metropolitan region does your agency provide fixed-route transit
service? State: Metropolitan Region:
66 Gulf Coast Research Center for Evacuation and Transportation Resiliency at the University of New
Orleans/Louisiana State University
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4. If you know the MSA Code and/or Urbanized Area Code, please specify. MSA Code:
Urbanized Area Code:
5. Does your agency contract out functions related to the provision of fixed-route transit
service to private firms or other public transit agencies? (Yes/No)
6. If yes, which function (s) does your agency contract out? Check all that apply.
� Operations
� Maintenance
� Management
� Planning
� Other (please specify)
7. Currently, how many private and public ontractors does your agency employ for
operation of transit service? (If none, please enter 0)
Private contractors: Public contractors:
8. How many other transit agencies operate fixed-route service in the region where your
agency provides transit service? � 0 � 1 � 2 � 3 � 4 � 5 � More than five
The “regional transit service area” refers to the metropolitan or urban area in which your
agency and other fixed-route transit agencies operate. It includes the entire transit service
area that your metropolitan planning organization (MPO) plans for, i.e., where some transit
riders may travel on more than one transit system.
Fares/Passes
1. Has a coordinated regional fare system (including the charging of a transfer fare) been
established in your region? (Yes/No)
2. If yes, which of the following interoperator fare structures has/have been implemented
in your region? Check all that apply.
�
�
�
�
�

Integrated fare structure based on distance
Integrated fare structure based on multiple operator criteria
Integrated fare structure based on flat fares
Transfer agreement(s) between/among certain operators
Other (please describe)

3. Does your agency sell transit passes, tickets, or tokens that can be used on other
transit systems? (Yes/No)
4. If yes, which of the following media are used? Check all that apply.
� One-ride ticket or token (including tickets valid for transfer within a few hours)
� One-day/few-day paper ticket
� Paper pass (valid for one week or longer)
� Magnetic swipe card (less than one week)
� Magnetic swipe card (one week or longer)
� Smart card
� Other (please specify)
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5. Do other transit agencies in your region offer or sell transit passes, tickets, or tokens
that can be used on your transit system? (Yes/No)
6. If yes, which of the following media are used? Check all that apply.
�
�
�
�
�
�
�

One-ride ticket or token (including tickets valid for transfer within a few hours)
One-day/few-day paper ticket
Paper pass (valid for one week or longer)
Magnetic swipe card (less than one week)
Magnetic swipe card (one week or longer)
Smart card
Other (please specify)

7. Does your agency allow transfers from other transit systems for free or with a discounted
fare? (Yes/No)
8. If yes, check the option that applies.
� My agency allows transfers with an additional fare
� My agency allows transfers without an additional fare
9. If a transfer is allowed, how are revenues allocated?
�
�
�
�

Each agency keeps fare revenues
Allocated based on a fixed ratio
Allocated based on a pre-determined formula
Other (please specify)

Service Schedule
1. Does your agency take into account the service schedule of other transit agencies in
the region to determine the daily and weekly service schedules of your agency? (Yes/
No)
2. If yes, check the option that applies.
� Some service schedules are coordinated
� All service schedules are coordinated with other agencies
3. Does your agency determine time schedules of buses, streetcars or other fixed-route
transit services in coordination with the schedules of other transit systems, taking into
account transfer time for users at major transfer points? (Yes/No)
4. If yes, check the option that applies.
� Some schedules at major transfer points are coordinated
� All schedules at major transfer points are coordinated
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Information
1. Does your agency jointly provide information to customers in conjunction with other
transit agencies? (Yes/No)
2. If yes, check all that apply.
�
�
�
�
�
�

Time schedule
Route map
System map
Fares
Transfer information
Other (please specify)

3. If applicable, which media are used in the joint provision of information?
�
�
�
�
�
�

Shared websites
Telephone service numbers
Information pamphlets
Transfer centers that provide information
On-board display
Other (please specify)

4. Is real-time information (e.g., an automatic vehicle location system) being employed
in your region?
�
�
�
�
�
�

No
Yes, for the agency's operation
Yes, for the agency's operation and for transit users
Yes, shared by multiple agencies for operation
Yes, shared by multiple agencies for operation and for transit users
Other (please specify)

Facilities/Vehicles
1. Does your transit agency share facilities (e.g., terminal, shelter) with any other fixedroute transit agencies in the region? (Yes/No)
2. If yes, check all that apply.
�
�
�
�
�
�

Terminal
Shelter
Park and ride lot
Station
Maintenance facilities
Other (please specify)
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3. Are transfer points in your region clearly designated for the convenient transfer between
different transit systems? (Yes/No)
4. If your agency does not designate transfer points shared with other agencies in your
region, have two or more fixed route transit agencies discussed the possibility of
locating and designing transfer facilities to better accommodate the transfer of transit
users in the future? (Yes/No)
5. If yes, please describe type of facilities and the corresponding modes that would utilize
these facilities. (open ended)
6. Does your agency share the design of system signage with other agencies? (Yes/No)
7. If yes, check the option that applies.
� Our agency shares some sign design with other agencies
� All signage design is shared between agencies
Other
1. Are there any existing agreements between your agency and other transit agencies to
jointly provide transit services? (Yes/No)
2. If yes, please note which types of agreements your agency has entered into.
�
�
�
�
�
�
�

To increase service frequency
To expand routes
To jointly market transit services
To introduce a regional transit smart card that can be used on multiple systems
To jointly train transit workers or share the same training materials
To jointly share data on ridership, accidents, etc.
Other (please specify)

3. Does your agency have any special discount program with public agencies, corporate
entities, schools, colleges, universities, or for particular events/festivals? (Yes/No)
4. If yes, check all that apply.
�
�
�
�
�
�

Public agencies
Corporate entities
Grade schools (K–12)
Colleges/Universities
Events/Festivals
Other (please specify)

5. In the event of an emergency (e.g., natural disaster), are there any existing agreements
between your agency and contracted transit providers to provide service? (Yes/No)
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6. If yes, please briefly describe them. (open ended)
7. Are there any particular roles that contractors have in improving regional transit service
coordination among multiple transit systems in your region? (Yes/No)
8. If yes, what are they? (open ended)
9. Do you have additional comments concerning transit coordination? (open ended)
Thank you again for providing information for our study. Your responses will help us better
understand the current state of regional coordination of transit service. If necessary, we
may contact you for further information and/or clarification of your responses.
In this survey, we have asked for your views and opinions as a transit planner, manager,
or director, on regional coordination as well as for factual information about the status of
transit service at your agency and in your region. We want to assure you that all of your
responses will be treated as confidential, unless you provide us with your consent to use
your name and that of your agency in the reports or other materials produced from our
research.
Please choose one of the following options:
� All of my individual responses should be kept completely confidential, including quotes
of written responses without attribution – I want no individual responses reported at all.
� All of my individual responses should be kept completely confidential, though you may
quote my responses anonymously provided that neither my identity nor my organization's
identity can be discerned from the quotes.
� You may identify my agency by name when reporting on this research, but you should
not identify who from my agency completed this survey.
� There is nothing confidential here; you may identify responses by me and/or my agency
by name in reporting on this research.
The results of this study will be made available at a later time. If you would like to receive
a copy of a report please leave your email address below.
Please select "Done" below to submit your survey responses. Thank you.
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Email invitation letter sent with survey
Subject: Regional Transit Coordination Survey conducted by Univ. of New Orleans and
Mineta Transportation Institute
Dear Transit Service Provider:
The University of New Orleans University Transportation Center (UNO-UTC), in
conjunction with the Mineta Transportation Institute at San Jose State University
(MTI-SJSU), is conducting a study to better understand the extent to which
transit agencies have considered, are considering, or are implementing regional
coordination strategies. The study will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of
providing regional, multi-jurisdictional transit service to achieve financial resiliency.
Your participation in this survey will be instrumental in assessing the current
status of regional coordination among fixed-route transit service in the nation.
You can take the survey by clicking on the link below or copying it into your
browser. The survey should take between 5 and 15 minutes to complete.
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/RegionalTransitSurvey
Thank you for your participation.
Sincerely,
Dr. Hiroyuki Iseki, Principal Investigator
Assistant Professor, Department of Planning and Urban Studies (PLUS)
University of New Orleans
Dr. Charles Rivasplata, Investigator
Lecturer‚ Department of Urban and Regional Planning
San José State University
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
APTA
AVL
BART
CBP
DART
EC
FEMA
FHWA
FTA
GIS
IS Analysis
JeT
LTA
MARETOPE
NEA
NOPS
NORTA
NTD
RPC
RPTA
RTA
RTD
SIPTRAM project
TfL
TME
TMSEL
UK
VH
VOE

American Public Transit Association
Automatic Vehicle Location
Bay Area Rapid Transit
Colin Buchanan and Partners
Dallas Area Rapid Transit
European Council
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Transit Administration
Geographic Information Systems
Importance-Satisfaction Analysis
Local Transport Authority Jefferson Transit
Local Transport Authority
Managing and Assessing Regulatory Evolution in Local
Public Transport Operations in Europe
An International Research Firm Located in The Netherlands
New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
New Orleans Regional Transit Authority
National Transit Database
Regional Planning Commission
River Parishes Transit Authority
(New Orleans) Regional Transit Authority
Rural Transit District
Sustainability in the Public Urban Transport Market
Transport for London
Total Modal Expenses
Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana
United Kingdom
Vehicle Hours
Vehicle Operating Expenses
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